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Abstract
A study of the aspects of language which characterise the cross 
examination of child victim witnesses affords the opportunity to respond 
to the question "How is language used to deny the experience of another 
human being and how is this signalled linguistically?" In that response data 
from a wide variety of stakeholders are brought together to provide an 
informed interpretation of the phenomenon of the child victim witness 
under cross examination. An empirical test of non court children's 
responses to court language provides the finding that children do not hear 
around half of what is addressed to them on such occasions. Other data and 
sources of information suggest that this finding is part of a general pattern 
of communication and one possible interpretation of that pattern is created 
through the postulation of 'the discourse of denial'. This discourse is 
described and a possible set of connections between levels of patterned 
behaviour, particular uses of language and their social consequences, is 
suggested.
The study articulates a relationship between language and the construction 
of meaning and seeks to show how child victim witnesses, and what they 
might have to contribute to the court process, are marginalised. This 
articulation of language in use is informed by contextual information 
which is extended here to include the 'inner contex' of the experiences of 
the child victim witness.
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The focus of this thesis is to answer and illuminate the question :
"How is language used to deny the experience of another human being and 
how is this signalled linguistically ? "
The question is justifiable on a number of grounds. Personal grounds 
suggest that as an adult human being I should spend my energy and 
intellect in promoting 'communication' rather than 'misinformation'. 
Professional grounds suggest that as an educator, I should articulate and 
share insights that educators have about children's capacities to create and 
express meaning and the conditions which either promote or hinder this. 
Theoretical grounds suggest that the interaction and connectedness of 
language and thought manifests itself in all situations, but with more effect 
in some than in others.
As a direct consequence of the first two grounds, the situation of child 
victim witnesses under cross examination in adult criminal courts 
presented itself as a problematic phenomenon. A study of this situation 
would both test and illuminate the particular and consequential connections 
between language and action. Further, I would be contributing to a general 
body of knowledge and theory about the role of language in life. Adding 
to the general body of theory would impact on a wide range of social, legal 
and moral issues; issues which are informed and defined by perceptions 
about the nature of language generally and specifically its use under certain 
circumstances.
It was necessary to carry out the study within a paradigm which would 
acknowledge and respond to many sources of information. I decided upon 
a naturalistic paradigm, within which a range of strategies, both qualitative 
and quantitative, could be employed. This enabled the focus question to be 
addressed; the admittance as knowledge of the insight from a wide range of 
human experience; and the pursuit of this in a real and problematic context.
A taxonomic device was subsequently developed to respond to the 
problems of description, analysis and critique, and to the particular 
problematic situation of the child victim witnesses. The taxonomy consists 
of a set of descriptors of a particular discourse which I have designated 'the 
discourse of denial. This discourse is grounded in the data analysed in the 
thesis and it now presents itself as an analytical tool to apply in other 
situations.
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This taxonomy clarifies the punitive and devastating effects of language 
deployed in a context of authority and power. The implications of this for 
adult moral obligations, legal practice, social equity, and therapeutic 
practice are far reaching. Its application to the problematic situation of the 
linguistic treatment of the child victim witnesses clarifies their treatment 
under cross examination.
The outcomes of the thesis are both applied and theoretical. On the one 
hand a problematic situation is informed and alternative action is thus 
made more possible. On the other there has been a contribution to the 
general knowledge of language in use.
This thesis identifies aspects of language which make it difficult for child 
witnesses to 'hear” the language which characterises cross examination. 
The study is an exploration of why much of the language of cross 
examination is hard for children to hear and further, how such language 
works to deny the experience of the child. At the outset of the research 
project the situation of the child was perceived in a general sense as 
punitive. Towards the conclusion of the thesis the descriptors for that 
punitive effect are made explicit.
From these descriptors and from frameworks of language use and power 
suggested by Valdes (1986), O'Barr (1982), Labov (1972) and Brause and 
Mayher (1985) it was possible to build up a taxonomy which draws upon 
the insights of the dynamics and the details of cross examination. This 
taxonomic description is presented as 'the discourse of denial'.
The results strengthen the concept of 'language as action' rather than 
'language as rehearsal', and as such recognise the significance and 
centrality of ideological struggles as linguistic struggles.
The results also specifically answer the focus question How is language 
used to deny the meaning of another human being and how is this signalled 
linguistically?'
Following this overview:
Chapter 1 provides the background for the development of the thesis. It 
sets out the contexts within which the problematic phenomenon of the 
child victim witness under cross examination is to be studied.
Chapter 2 reviews literature in a number of areas of language study, 
analysis and interpretation which had some bearing in the thesis. The 
bodies of knowledge which will be addressed cover language ideology and 
control', 'analysing discourse from court', and 'analysing language'.
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Chapter 3 considers the issues associated with choosing an appropriate 
research method. This is pursued both in a general sense for the type of 
study I undertook and also how I saw that method being appropriately 
employed in this thesis.
Chapter 4 describes the research procedures which I used to generate and 
analyse data.
Chapter 5 presents the results of the application of the procedures 
outlined in the previous chapter.
Chapter 6 draws together the results in order to create the taxonomic 
framework used to describe the 'discourse of denial'.
Chapter 7 through reflective discussion, recapitulates and retraces the 





This study specifically addresses the question: "How is language used to 
deny the experience of another human being and how is this signalled 
linguistically?' The situation chosen to study this question is the cross 
examination of child witnesses, often victims, in adult criminal cases of 
alleged sexual abuse. The reasons for the selection of this study are varied 
and include a personal, an educational and a theoretical orientation towards 
the topic.
In describing those reasons I need to decide, as in the case of all narratives, 
where to begin the telling. That point for me is indicated by the time when 
concerns, ideas and aims became discernible and were discussable beyond 
the totally personal. Through discussion with friends and colleagues, I 
came to accept that the treatment of child victim witnesses in court was 
inappropriate and thus worthy of study. I accepted that the problematic 
phenomenon as described by others was also of concern to me, and I also 
saw that my own concerns, skills and insights may have something to 
contribute.
To reach this point, my own interest in establishing connections between 
language behaviours and their social and psychological effects was shared, 
used and tested in a situation of debate fraught with professional and 
philosophical division. W elfare considerations versus justice 
considerations were constantly argued about by the protagonists in the 
debate and much of this within generalised arguments about children's 
credibility.
See Appendix 1: News clips and case study
Given these sometimes irreconcilable perspectives I was challenged by the 
possibility that, as a researcher, I could find new ways of looking at old 
problems. Through my participation I could restructure, refocus and 
clarify problematic issues. My response to this challenge signalled a 
willingness to discuss, investigate and share. I recognised that whilst there 
was a wealth of information offered about the problem, it came from many 
different perspectives.
At this early stage I was intent that my own study be informed by a variety 
of significant data and perspectives. I was also convinced that insight into 
language in use could best be served by crossing discipline borders. I was 
mindful of both the criticism and direction offered by Sless:
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There has been a long and sterile debate in communication research 
about the relationship between researchers and the messages, texts 
or discourse of study. The debate has focused on questions of 
objectivity or subjectivity, as if a simple dichotomy between two 
positions were sufficient to deal with the complexity of relations 
within communication ... we need to move beyond simple notions 
of position such as insiders or outsiders, subjective or objective.
(SI ess, 1986:24)
The personal orientation of this study derives from my commitment to the 
rights of the individual, including the right to resist oppressive and 
damaging behaviour. My educational orientation is towards protecting the 
interests of children. This involves constantly searching for contexts which 
are supportive and in which children can express themselves clearly and 
fully. Further, this educational orientation indicates a commitment to 
outcomes arrived at through insight and development. The third 
orientation, arising from both of the former, is towards the theoretical 
connections between language and action, such that language use is seen as 
significant in determining the framing of concepts, relationships, conflicts 
and outcomes.
In addressing the focal question this thesis displays, in a variety of ways, 
the nature and effect of courtroom interrogation. It is a study which began 
by drawing together concerns for the welfare of child victim witnesses in 
proceedings of sexual assault, the language features of those proceedings, 
and the characteristics of sexually abused victims. The study arose from 
the concern for the welfare of such children and produced results which 
suggested they were being linguistically discriminated against in a 
predictable and patterned way. The data the study draws upon consists of 
interviews with medical, legal, health and welfare professionals, analysis 
of transcripts, discussions with child victim witnesses and their carers, and 
the results of a testing program assessing children's ability to respond to a 
range of questions.
The opportunity to study a situation which is antithetical to my educational 
precepts arose when young children (for the first time in NSW) were 
allowed to give sworn testimony in an adult criminal court. The general 
intent of the change in the law was to let children 'have their say', 
especially in cases where they were the supposed victims. But 
accompanying this good intention came the exposure to what appeared as 
rigorous and often punitive cross examination. Having opened up the 
possibility for these children to contribute, the general evidence from court 
observers was that many children were being systematically and publicly 
abused by the court process. This occurred in a situation which purported 
to adduce 'the truth' by the taking of evidence. However this very context 
seemed to deny the evidence of (potentially) its most valuable contributor. 
This observation raised suspicions of social inequity.
As interviews with informants and my own observation progressed, I 
decided to collect records of court proceedings. These represented the 
basis for the credibility, or lack thereof, of the participants. These are the 
records that only exist if a case is sent to a higher court and thus become 
the basis of subsequent argument and review. I accumulated a range of 
transcripts from every possible level of proceedings, twenty six transcripts 
in all. The transcripts came from a variety of sources including local, 
regional and metropolitan; they were recent (within the last three years), 
and they were not chosen for any particular feature or characteristic.
An initial review of these, prior to any other speculation or analysis, 
revealed that twenty two out of that twenty six finished with the words: 
’child breaks down'. The 'child breaks down' observation represented a 
central motif and phenomenon and also contradicted data and assertions 
from members of the legal and judicial profession who maintained that 
barristers were 'gentle with children' and saw no future in appearing as 
'bullies'. There were comments from others that children broke down in 
court as a final admission that they could no longer sustain an untrue story. 
The generalised reports of trauma were supported by this single patterned 
observation, but were not interpreted in a cohesive or complementary way. 
To some, 'child breaks down’ would appear as proof of lying, to others as 
proof of an effort to sustain a truthful story. I accepted the existence of the 
phenomenon but sought to generate explanations which could be 
understood and in turn responded to by judicial, legal and welfare 
personnel.
In addressing the question of how the language of cross examination is 
used to deny the experience of child victim witnesses it was reasonable to 
suggest that an understanding of society in general might be discerned 
from understanding particular incidents and interactions in court. The way 
language is constructed and used creates and perpetuates relationships, 
definitions and realities. Since linguistic expression is a function of the 
context in which it is used, it is best understood in terms of its social intent 
and effect, through a full description of context. It follows therefore that 
children's expression will be fuller, richer and more complete in an 
investigative environment which allows for the construction of an informed 
and detailed narrative. The opportunity to construct that narrative does not 
seem to be available to the child victim witness in criminal court 
proceedings. In this thesis I explore how and why language is used to deny 
the experience of child victim witnesses and suggest that, for reasons of 
equity and social justice, this situation should not be so.
In exploring the specific question of how language is used for such denial 
purposes, I have applied educational knowledge and insights about the 
communicative strength of children who are able to express themselves
with clarity and truth if they are given appropriate time, space and tools. In 
so doing I have aimed to provide others with the tools of linguistic analysis 
and description in order that they may explain their own disquiet about the 
cross examination of child victim witnesses and better advocate the rights 
of the child.
In order to fully comprehend the significance and impact of cross 
examination upon the child, the nature of the cross examination process is 
described, and I include contextual descriptions which acknowledge the 
experiences of these child victim witnesses.
This chapter looks at the variety of contexts within which the phenomenon 
of the child in court is examined. These include the linguistic (1.1), legal 
(1.2), psychological (1.3), personal (1.4) and social (1.5) contexts. The 
chapter concludes (1.6) with a brief response to the challenge of studying 
the experience of the child victim witness in court.
Whilst each of these contexts can be identified and discussed separately it 
is obvious that the intersection of all of them is critical for the child in the 
witness box. The ways in which these contexts interact and intersect will 
inform the extent and nature of the answer to the research question: 'How 
is language used to deny the experience of another human being and how is 
this signalled linguistically?'
1.1 THE LINGUISTIC CONTEXT
1.1.1 The role of language
Why language as a focus of concern?
One of the assumptions on which this study is based is that language is the 
prime vehicle for the definition and creation of meanings.
What can linguistic analysis tell us?
The first principle we must understand is that words can only really be 
understood and analysed in terms of their context. Context is made up of 
all those things which impinge upon and define what words are used, how 
they are put together, what purposes they serve and what function they 
satisfy. Words, as well as purporting to mean something in their own right, 
are primarily defined by situation, history, role and intent. Analysing 
language and its impact in terms of words alone is to deny the basis of their 
existence. Thus we need to examine the contexts in which the words are 
used.
1.1.2 Language and its contexts
The context of court is almost totally a context of words and those words, 
their effect and the responses they provoke, are worthy of study. However, 
the nature and function of language is more than the utterance of words 
alone, thus it is necessary to place these words in a social, physical, 
historical and psychological context, that is, we must study text and context 
together.
For example, an account of court proceedings (the 'text') may denote 'the 
witness'. However if the context is not given that the witness is a nine year 
old female who has been the likely subject of constant sexual assault by her 
father over a period of five years, who is fearful of being sent away from 
her mother, who has been interviewed at least six but possibly twenty two 
times, and who is regarded as 'trouble', then the fuller narrative is not being 
told.
What happens in a particular context delineates the purposive role of 
language. The purposive role of language in cross examination is 
expressly to discredit the witness's version, or story. This purpose 
becomes formalised and ritualised in the culture of court, a culture of 
formal proceedings and power relationships. As a result, the language of 
court proceedings becomes removed from the language of everyday, and a 
pattern of definite language behaviours emerges, peculiar to one particular 
social context. Houghton describes such specific use of language thus:
the texts are part of the enacted discourse of a socially defined 
group, a culture or speech community and [that] to fully 
understand these texts as linguists we need to look at them within 
the broader context of the culture from which they spring and 
within which they belong.
(Houghton, 1988: 8)
However while cross examination highlights the problems of language 
faced by child victim witnesses, the prosecution and the bench are by no 
means free of difficult and convoluted language. As a result, the cases they 
are charged to put and protect often fail because the child witnesses are not 
given the opportunity to say what they might.
The problem of courtroom language denying the individual the opportunity 
to recount their experiences is not exclusive to children, sexually abused or 
otherwise. However, being young, as well as being victims of abusive 
power, they represent the most obvious example of this kind of constraint. 
Young people who have asked for help and protection, are forced to 
become accusers and their only tool of credibility, their language, is almost 
totally denied them at the time of confrontation.
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1.1.3 The psychological importance of words
As indicated earlier, the context of court is words. It is about what you say 
to me, and what I say to you, and what you said about what I said to you. 
From the perspective of psychological health, the greatest single factor in 
the establishment and maintenance of sanity is that the meanings people 
carry with them (embodied in their own language of thought and word), are 
recognised by others as existing, and are thus meaningful. Conversely it is 
legitimate to maintain that the stuff of insanity is the denial of meaning; 
when others refuse to recognise meanings created and held by another. 
Some discourses are grounded in and reflective of acceptance, healing, 
development and growth, while others contain and project processes of 
exclusion, repression, dismissal and injury. This psychological perspective 
of discourse views language from effect rather than intent. The discourses 
cannot be reviewed on the evidence of words alone, but have to be 
considered as an interaction between the words used and the effect they 
have.
1.1.4 The power of words
The deployment of words by a powerful speaker upon a weaker one who is 
either known or suspected to have been the victim of specific traumatic 
experiences, provides an opportunity to study a specific and intended use 
of language - in this case, the use of language to deny the experience of the 
’weaker’ individual.
Since the time of Socrates, arguments and positions have been maintained 
from both moral and functional perspectives, about the essential uses and 
effects of language and the power of words. For Socrates, the use of 
language was for the express purpose of discovering and disclosing 
meaning. For others it was, and remains, a tool for exploitation like any 
other resource, for whatever end the user chooses. In many cases this 
expressly involves the covering up of the truth. This is the art of the 
advertiser and the propagandist, the state of the psychopath and the job of 
the inquisitor. There is a range of positions about the power of language. 
However one function of language which can be tested is to what extent 
the language used in any particular situation either admits or denies the 
experience of the participants.
Language can be used in such a way that it either recognises the 
experiences of an interlocutor, or it does not. Combating the values of 
sexism and racism has been carried out largely through the reconstruction 
of certain kinds of phrases, expressions and vocabulary (Lakoff, 1989).
Working class education movements have recognised the need for 
language and expression to allow for and embrace the experiences of 
working class children in middle class schools. The very existence of 
cultures is grounded in the language and the concepts which that language 
either nurtures or excludes. Linguistic imperialism is one of the major 
causes for the decline of indigenous languages and the concepts and 
relationships embodied in those languages. I believe it is appropriate to 
study language as discourses which can either admit or deny experiences of 
one or other partners to a dialogue.
1.1.5 The language of cross examination and filters
During cross examination (it appears) language is most often used for 
calling into question the credibility of the child victim witness rather than 
assessing the truth of a proposition. Cross examination is that part of court 
proceedings where the interests and rights of the child are most likely to be 
ignored and sacrificed. Evidence is displayed to discredit the witness and 
thus bolster the case for the defendant. The extent to which truth is 
prejudiced by the use of language tactics is a question to which the legal 
profession must eventually address itself.
When cross examination takes place, the style and the content of the 
language serves as a filter through which the child's experience often 
cannot penetrate. Cross examination generally is so denying of the child's 
experience that anything connected with that experience has to be 
eliminated from the conscious working mind.
An example of the effects of such denial is evident in Sylvia Fraser's book, 
My father's house (1989), in which the author details a lifelong episode of 
amnesia which is only relieved as the victim relives the episodes of abuse 
she experienced as a young child. Prior to this reliving, the victim had 
eliminated the experiences from her mind.
Cross examination can be seen as a summative example of how such denial 
is effected and where
... language, by its words, its grammar, its syntax, by the whole spirit 
which is frozen in it, determines how we experience, and which 
experiences penetrate to our awareness.
(Fromm, 1960: 101)
Societal taboos also exist in that every society excludes certain thoughts 
and feelings from being thought, felt, and expressed. Court represents one 
such society as does the society from which an abused child might come. 
In court, the nature of the adversarial combat requires the child's perception
to be negated and denied, whilst at home, normal societal taboos operate so 
that the experience is left unrecognised. Such societal taboos act as 
another filter through which it is difficult for a child's experience to 
penetrate. Children, like adults, may often prefer to endure physical and 
psychological abuse rather than expose such abuse and risk being 
ostracised by family and society at large. Fromm's profound observation 
(1960: 104) of the human condition is that While insofar as he is an animal 
he is most afraid of dying, insofar as he is a man he is most afraid of being 
utterly alone'.
In addition to social taboos there are individual elaborations of these taboos 
which differ from family to family. Children may repress experiences 
which they recognise as taboo for either or both parents. They may fear 
that expression of such experiences may lead to abandonment or 
retaliation. These fears act as a filter on the language they use to describe 
their experiences.
1.1.6 Language and inequity
The inequity which takes place when a sexually abused child is cross 
examined in court during the trial of his or her attacker is encapsulated at 
the end point of cross examination where, in the majority of cases, the 
'child breaks down'. This often signals an end to the child's involvement.
A testing program conducted during the course of this study showed that 
children ranging in age from 6 to 16 failed to hear about half what was said 
to them in court. Questions were asked in such a way that they could not 
respond to them accurately. In this thesis I consider the extent to which 
this lack of match between questioner and respondent is a function of the 
strangeness of the language employed. Some of the aspects which 
characterise of that language are also illustrated.
Thus my initial concern with inequity, with the use of power, and the issue 
of social justice is fundamental. This is a critical and descriptive study 
rather than an attempt to prove the internal consistency of a context free 
idealised lexico-grammatical system. In the words of Fowler et al. (1979: 
185) 'there are strong pervasive connections between linguistic structure 
and social structure’.
1.1.7 The language of the court
The situation of court is one in which issues of equity and ideology are 
constantly played out and a truly informative study of courtroom language 
needs to recognise these dimensions. Whilst the legal profession is aware
that there is a distinct courtroom language containing inherent problems, it 
appears that the use of such language is still able to sway judicial 
outcomes. Lind and O'Barr comment that:
... the legal profession has shown considerable concern with speech 
variables - primarily in the context of tactical considerations in trial 
advocacy - but this concern has not been translated into procedural 
restrictions on the use of particular manners of court speech.
Speech dimensions which are influenced by factors which are 
supposed to be irrelevant to judicial decisions, may in some 
instances affect such decisions.
(Lind and O'Barr, 1978: 86).
The following observation establishes the courtroom as a site for the study 
of human interactions other than those concerned exclusively with 'the 
law'.
The social psychological study of court speech may also be 
expected to be of considerable value to the understanding of the 
social psychology of language in other situations. The courtroom 
provides a social context with definite and widely recognised social 
relations within which general speech may be studied. While 
studies will be needed to determine the accuracy of generalisations 
from studies of court speech to other speech situations, there is no 
reason to think that such generalisations are not valid.
(Lind and O'Barr, 1978: 87).
1.2 THE LEGAL CONTEXT.
1.2.1 Changes in the law.
In March 1986 the law was changed in New South Wales regarding the 
testimony of children under the age of ten who (supposedly) are victims of 
sexual abuse. The evidence of young children can now be heard in adult, 
open court. Their involvement is part of the court process in which a 
person is charged by the police with an offence. The case is brought to 
court with that person as the defendant. Witnesses are examined for both 
the defence and the prosecution and in turn are cross examined by the 
lawyers on each side.
The July 1987 Consultation Paper issued by the New South Wales 
Government Violence Against Women and Children Task Force notes that:
The requirements for giving sworn evidence were altered so that a 
child under 12 can give evidence as if on oath once she/he has 
satisfied the court that she/he is intelligent enough to give evidence 
and that she/he understands the duty to tell the truth in court
However, in a successive paragraph it states:
Although the child sexual assault reforms introduced in 1985 have 
significantly reduced the trauma of child victims giving evidence in 
court, the Child Protection Council continues to hear from 
concerned professionals who witness the inadequacies of our 
criminal justice system when dealing with child complainants. The 
difficulty of obtaining clear evidence from very young children 
who do not have the verbal skills to explain what has happened to 
them remains a significant problem which can often lead to a 
decision not to prosecute. The number of times a child is required 
to retell the story of the assault is usually against a child's best 
interests.
The evidence from workers in the field (including police, youth and 
community services officers, community health workers and doctors), 
indicates that because of the rigours of the adversarial, adult court 
procedures, those responsible are reluctant to prosecute offenders whose 
victims are either young, unconfident, slow or passive. However, these are 
precisely some of the characteristics which either suggest them as victims 
in the first place or are the results of continuous victimisation. These 
views are echoed by a magistrate who stated in an early interview that 
cross examining children in court is '... like shooting rats in a barrel ... it's 
easy to confuse them and make out they're telling lies'.
1.2.2 Child victim witnesses and cross examination
There are several vital aspects which justify the interest in the cross 
examination of children who have been sexually abused. Cross 
examination is a special kind of questioning which, within the legal 
profession, is acknowledged as being tactically geared to upset the 
credibility of a witness. The witnesses in this study are victims, a 
psychological status which carries its own characteristics. In cross 
examination a question is not a mere question but a tactical tool deployed 
on the battleground of credibility; a battleground where the option for 
negotiation is wrested from the child victim witness.
There are many issues about the experiences of child victims during cross 
examination, and because the context of court is primarily a context of 
words and what they represent, it is useful to view those issues in terms of 
the uses and effects of language. Some of these issues include the 
following: What are the effects of multiple recounting? What do children 
remember of traumatic happenings and how do they recount them? What 
are the effects of multiple and continuous abuse and how is this reported by 
children? What account do courts take of age? Is aggressive cross 
examination a legitimate tool to test truth? What are the effects of 
continuous questioning? What means are currently available for allowing 
children to tell their story? How can children's stories be validated?
These issues were brought into focus when I examined the way in which 
children responded to questioning in court. The need to provide quality 
information for practitioners in the field is supported in the concluding 
statements of the New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research publication, Child Sexual Assault - The Court Response 
(Cashmore and Horsky, 1987)
Although special Children's Courts were established some time ago 
in most jurisdictions in recognition of the special needs and 
vulnerability's of juvenile offenders and 'children in need of care', 
so far there has been little special provision for accommodating the 
needs of children who appear in often traumatic circumstances as 
witnesses in the 'adult' criminal justice system. Children who are 
required to appear in criminal court, to give evidence and face 
cross examination, encounter a number of difficulties in dealing 
with a system that does not take into account that, as children, they 
are even more vulnerable than an adult witness giving evidence 
about a traumatic event in their lives.
The major difficulties faced by any witness include the requirement 
that they repeat the story of what happened to a variety of people 
during the investigation and in court hearings, the delays between 
the various stages of investigation and prosecution, and the 
intimidating nature of the physical environment of the court and of 
court procedures. Child witnesses experience all these difficulties, 
but more acutely, since they may not be (depending on age) at a 
stage of their development which would enable them to fully 
understand the court experience and place it in a meaningful 
context.
(Cashmore and Horsky, 1987: 82)
This statement assumes that children must be subjected to cross 
examination. There are children who do have the verbal skills to tell clear, 
sustainable and substantial stories but whose sense of self and command of 
language does not equip them to withstand the rigours of cross exam­
ination. It appears that the existing procedures do not focus on the 
establishment of truth but rather on the assertion of power; the power to 
confuse.
This is not to say that children should not be given the opportunity to 
confront their attackers, real or imagined. Nor is there support for the 
assumption that retelling stories over and over is necessarily bad. It is in 
the nature of trauma to want to do this. Likewise we should not assume 
that all recounts will be of equal quality, or that it is wrong to submit 
children to complex adult language since this is how they learn and 
develop language. However there is an obvious need to educate all 
members of the legal profession about the linguistic implications and 
effects created by their activities in court
For the child victim witness the effect of certain linguistic activity may be 
to deny the legitimacy of their claim of abuse. To deny the existence of
such deeply felt experiences is to isolate these children from sources of 
comfort and reconciliation on one hand and from a belief in the validity of 
their own experiences on the other. These are the techniques of torture and 
perpetuate the abuse of privilege and secrecy.
1.3 THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTEXT.
1.3.1 Language and its psychological effects
In addressing the question of how language is used to deny individual's 
experiences and how this is signalled linguistically, I have tried to 
illuminate and suggest a relationship between the language used and its 
psychological effect. The cross examination of victim witnesses in adult 
criminal court may not be just a generalised expression of power but a 
specific and expressly created punishment. Words spoken are the primary 
currency of court proceedings and although they can withstand scrutiny 
and analysis in isolation, they are only fully revealed when their context is 
apparent. However context is not appreciated by simply describing the 
situation in terms of the actors, time and place. Rather ¿here must be an 
appraisal of the social and psychological baggage which the actors bring to 
the situation. Analytical tools for describing this baggage and the 
interactions with words have been developed to some extent through the 
systemic analysis of the structure and function of language in context.
Various researchers have conducted studies which suggest an appreciation 
of the psychological context of language. Halliday's concepts arise from 
his appreciation of contextual interaction (Halliday, 1973). Bernstein 
provides powerful descriptions of class associated language. (Bernstein, 
1980). Labov shows insights on propositional knowledge (Labov, 1972) 
and Vygotskii discusses inner speech (Vygotskii, 1962).
1.3.2 The denial of personal experience
Language has the capacity to include or exclude experiences, to create 
taboos, to provoke guilt and to create deep psychological states. The 
denial of personal experiences, especially of victims of trauma, has effects 
which have been documented in a number of arenas. Victims of war, rape, 
imprisonment and natural disaster need the acceptance of those around 
them and the opportunity to tell their story in their own way in order to 
commence the process of healing. They also need time. I am not 
suggesting that court should become a place for therapy or that it should be 
’soft on kids' at the risk of convicting someone on unsubstantiated 
evidence. However I am concerned to show the dynamics of denial which 
operate to some degree in many social situations. Cross examining a child 
victim witness in court is expressly about denying that person's story.
Often it seems, the effectiveness of the denial of a person's meaning is 
predicated on the assumption that the witness is indeed a victim. By 
making this assumption the cross examiner can then rely on the existence 
of vulnerabilities which facilitate his/her task in achieving loss of witness 
credibility so that the 'child breaks down.’
1.3.3 Children's reactions to sexual abuse
Children who have been sexually abused carry a burden of responsibility 
by keeping the abuse secret. They often blame themselves for any discord 
which occurs. Having been forced into a quasi-adult role, they are often 
isolated by the requirement that they speak for themselves. The 1987 
N.S.W. Task Force paper (p.7) observes that:
... children are not adults in miniature and they are not usually 
expected to understand or behave as adults in most aspects of their 
lives. When children become victims or witnesses of violence or 
sexual assault however, they are generally expected to perform on 
a par with adults in a legal system designed by adults for adult 
participants.
Loneliness, confusion and guilt define the condition. Aggression, passivity 
and anger are often it's expression.
1.4 THE PERSONAL HISTORICAL CONTEXT
1.4.1 The importance of personal history
The fourth context brings with it all the force of personal psychological 
history. In the cases I am concerned with this means the history of being a 
victim. This particular history has its own susceptibilities which can be 
acted upon by well prepared phrases and accusations designed to 
intimidate and trigger painful associations within the child victim. In turn 
the personal histories of child victim witnesses influence their linguistic 
vulnerability to the courtroom situation.
A study of language aims at leading to some understanding of the impact 
of one actor upon the other. It also aims to give some clues to ways in 
which child victim witnesses could resist the forces of intimidation and 
easy confusion.
Psychological indicators of the abused child, which are features of their 
personal historical context, are summarised as:
• loss of trust by the abused of those around them, especially those in 
authority
• self-loathing
• confusion of sexuality and affection.
All of these features combine to reduce a clear sense of self in the victim. 
These indicators provide a grounding for further abuse through the
deliberate distancing of the victim from available help, thereby 
perpetuating physical, psychological and linguistic vulnerability.
It is in this context of loneliness and desperation that cross examination 
and the courtroom drama takes place. Given that it is only the children 
who are 'good witnesses' who get to court, (that is articulate children who 
can be helped to cope with this experience), then it must be assumed that 
the worst or most needy cases (in terms of long term protection and 
resolution) simply do not appear.
1.4.2 Personal responses to abuse
Lindberg and Distad (1985) having reviewed the situation of twenty seven 
incest victims aged between 12 and 18 years of age, tabulated a number of 
survival responses to incest. All responded to their experiences with self­
destructive behaviours such as substance abuse, suicide attempts, 
perfectionism, isolation or depression. These behaviours can be seen as 
attempts to alleviate stress and assert some control over the helplessness 
created by incest. Subsequent therapy focused on the premise that such 
adolescent behaviours are logical and predictable survival responses rather 
than simply clues to sexual abuse. Treatment goals included:
... establishing trust, helping the victim re-define his or her role by 
viewing destructive behaviours as predictable responses, and 
understanding that present behaviours are a continuation of these 
past survival responses.
(Lindberg and Distad, 1985: 521)
The authors go on to note that:
A child is helpless when incest occurs. Inherent in that 
helplessness is rage toward the abuser as well as other family 
members who have left the child unprotected and unsupported; 
guilt and confusion for participation in acts the child cannot 
understand intellectually or emotionally; isolation in sustaining the 
incest secret and enormous stress. These adolescents had little 
insight into their self-destructive behaviours ... They saw no 
connection between their incest behaviours and their incest 
histories ... their experiences had so distorted their perceptions of 
family roles they did not realise they were victims ... they believed 
they had always been bad’ or 'crazy'.
(Lindberg and Distad, 1985: 522)
As the child victim witness is caught in the cross-fire of adversarial combat 
the hopes for a therapeutic resolution fade. The requirements and 
inclinations of the justice system become the prime consideration rather 
than the emotional and social needs of the child. Even after clear 
assurances are given that it is the defendant who is on trial, the child 
assumes otherwise given the adversarial nature of the proceedings and the
nature of cross examination. The perpetuation of shame, guilt and hurt 
become a tool of the court through the denial of the personal experience of 
the child victim witness.
As Summit and Kryso (1978) have pointed out, sexual abuse is not a single 
condition or activity. It carries with it psychological consequences and 
cultural interpretations. What an adult criminal court tries to do is 
rationalise away conflicting accounts of what happened. There is a general 
assumption that someone will ’win' the case and that someone will ’lose'. 
Whether the victim 'wins’ or loses' the case, there is inevitably a degree of 
trauma surrounding the whole court procedure.
System-induced trauma arises where the real and personal hurt visited 
upon a victim is either subjected to repeated examination or is openly 
disbelieved. The experience of the child victim witness is invalidated and 
is thus the grounding for radical and continuous disturbance. The 
occurrence of system-induced trauma can only increase as rising numbers 
of child victim witnesses appear in court. This is because the incidence 
and the effects of sexual abuse seem to be a more widespread cultural 
phenomenon than has been previously appreciated
1.4.3 Children as witnesses
The personal history of being an abused child is located both within the 
individual's personal experience and within a wider context of personal 
histories about 'children' and their 'truthfulness'.
Much of the current literature and public debate on the ability and 
willingness of children to tell the truth is propounded by those who believe 
that children are less responsible than adults by virtue of their frailty, lack 
of maturity, social prowess or intellectual capacity. This often leads to 
dismissal or denigration of their evidence in court. On the other hand there 
are those who are pleased to recognise the ’specialness' of children and to 
plead the case for die need to talk to them in special ways. However both 
partners in the competing rhetoric miss a basic point of philosophy and 
justice. To argue in terms of a whole class of people manifesting a single 
unifying characteristic - for example, Aborigines are lazy, women are 
hysterical, men are aggressive - masks alternative definitions.
The characteristics and needs of people are often lost in the 'class action' 
waged by one side against the other. In the case of 'children are capricious' 
versus 'children are innocent', the nature of the debate excludes precisely 
those characteristics and needs which must be addressed.
However one thing that is abundantly clear about children as a class of 
people is that, in cases of notified and alleged sexual abuse, their cases are 
notoriously unsuccessful in NSW courts. (Cashmore and Horsky, 1987). 
This lack of success will continue as long as the underlying issues go 
unrecognised, and the unequal treatment of children as witnesses 
continues.
1.5 SOCIAL CONTEXT.
1.5.1 Language as part of society
As well as having regard for the nature of abusive relationships and the 
nature of court procedures, I have also tied this thesis to a perspective 
which suggests that institutional discrimination is not acceptable in a just 
society, and that instances of its occurrence should consequently be 
highlighted, substantiated and critically appraised.
I am suggesting that the language of cross examination when applied to a 
victim-witness, functions to confirm feelings of guilt, confiision and 
responsibility. Language is thus regarded as 'an integral part of social 
process' (Fowler and Kress, 1979: 189).
By studying the sociolinguistic dimensions of cross examination in court I 
hoped to increase my understanding of the dynamics of adversarial combat, 
and particularly the mechanics of the denial of meaning. The nature of the 
relationship between language, action and ideology is axiomatic to this 
study.
If linguistic meaning is inseparable from ideology and both depend 
on social structure then linguistic analysis ought to be a powerful 
tool for the study of ideological processes which mediate 
relationships of power and control. But linguistics is an academic 
discipline and... rests on a number of assumptions which constitute 
an ideology of the subject. It is not a neutral instrument for the 
study of ideology, it is one that has been neutralised. The need 
then is for a linguistics which is critical, which is aware of the 
assumptions on which it is based and prepared to reflect critically 
about the underlying causes of the phenomena it studies, and the 
nature of the society whose language it is.
(Fowler and Kress, 1979: 186)
In accepting this view of linguistic study I also accept the fundamental 
relationship between personal experience and social experience. The 
social areas of interest in this study encompass the culture of abuse, the 
culture of court and the culture of formalised power. In order to 
understand the connections between language and culture, I needed to 
consider an ethnography of communication.
As Muriel Saville-Troike writes about the ethnographic study of 
communication; ... the field of inquiry lies at the intersection of 
linguistics and anthropology, sociology and hermeneutics, folklore 
and political science, speech and social psychology, and like 
Kurdistan, remains a terra incognita divided amongst competing 
states
(Houghton, 1988: 83)
1.6 THE CHILD VICTIM WITNESS IN COURT
1.6.1 The focus of the study
The phenomenon of the child victim witness in court is a manifestation of 
the various contexts outlined above. Each describes particular and 
sometimes competing aspects of the phenomenon but no single perspective 
is sufficient to describe the experience of the child victim witness under 
cross examination in adult criminal court. I aimed at developing a 
cohesive description which acknowledges the significance of each of these 
contexts.
Different situations offer the researcher an opportunity to unravel and 
present the details, dynamics and essences of particular relationships. 
Those relationships are dependent upon particular configurations of words, 
phrases and larger units of text. In an attempt to understand, analyse or 
duplicate the dynamics of easy communication, (based on sharing and 
inclusive language) it would be useful to observe the workings of a church 
group or therapy session. Similarly, the techniques for convincing others 
to buy products would be observed through the language of advertising. 
Such situations are fertile ground which present themselves for social and 
linguistic analysis, in much the same way as court language.
To anyone who has observed the trial of a civil or criminal law 
case, one of the most obvious characteristics of this social 
institution is the great amount of spoken communication which 
goes into the generation of the final verdict
(Lind and O'Barr, 1979: 66)
The method used in pursuing this study derives from the work of 
ethnographers and naturalistic researchers who claim that reviewing the 
data as it is generated and accessed in a variety of forms generates insight 
and foci for testing and review. This study is based on the following 
assumptions:
• a child victim in court is less powerful than the cross examiner
• language is the prime vehicle for the construction of meanings
• reduction of credibility is the main aim of the cross examining 
discourse.
The focus of this study is to show how these assumptions are translated 
into action as linguistic mechanisms.
1.6.2 Outcome of the thesis
The thesis aims to develop a perspective of language, the denial of another 
person's experience or meaning as a result of the discourse of cross 
examination. The credibility of the thesis is built upon the analysis and 
review of discourse as it functions in the site chosen, that is, the court. It is 
neither possible nor desirable in such a study to provide mathematical 
proof, or diagrammatic aesthetics, but rather to provide a cogent argument 
which convinces the reader that cross examination of child victim 
witnesses demonstrates in part how external behaviour is determined by 
internal or personal history. The interpretation of 'child breaks down' is 
problematic.
In summary, this thesis arose from a concern for children who had been 
subjected to a process that denied them the ability to preserve their 
integrity and generate a cohesive version of the truth. The context of court 
examination, and cross examination in particular, does little to generate the 
best possible narrative
The thesis seeks to show how the dynamics of denial are, for many 
children, a further punishment activated and endorsed by public action. 
The denial of personal experiences, especially those of victims, has effects 
which have been documented separately in a number of arenas.
These studies will be acknowledged in the thesis but are not central to it. 
The central aim is to show how cross examination is used as a linguistic 
device to deny the experiences of child victim witnesses, and thus a sense 




Since the time of Benjamin Whorf and Edward Sapir, language analysts 
such as Saussure, Labov, Lakoff, Kress, Halliday, Lawton, Bernstein, 
Vygotskii and Ortony have studied the relationship between thought and 
language and more specifically the capacity of language to shape our 
social, psychological and political experiences. With less specific intent 
but with equal philosophical force Socrates talked of the different uses 
of language and urged the pursuit of truth as its main feature. Indeed 
he saw it functioning otherwise, as educated practitioners practised the 
art of confusion and obfuscation.
Dwight Bolinger used the expression ’the sorcery of words' in his 1980 
publication Language - the loaded weapon to capture the idea that on 
occasions language is used to twist and conjure meanings in such a way 
as to create illusions. An illusion is not simply another version of the 
truth but rather something which displaces truth. However, the illusions 
are absolutely necessary in order to create new meanings where none 
existed before. Without closer examination it is difficult to differentiate 
between the liar and the creative artist.
I have chosen three separate collections of literature in order to review 
the literature base which acknowledges, activates and explores these 
concepts. They are presented here as bodies of literature which extend 
from the broader concerns of courtroom studies, (especially those 
which recognise the usefulness of language analysis); to literature which 
seeks to connect ideology, control and linguistic behaviour; concluding 
with a review of the possible tools of language analysis which may be 
usefully utilised in this thesis.
In the first collection of literature I consider studies of court 
proceedings (2.1) generally. A variety of measures and perspectives 
are used in these studies and provide us with the landscape within which 
to place this thesis. The majority of studies referred to seek to connect 
and acknowledge the nature of linguistic activity in the courtroom 
setting and thus to analyse in some way the speech of the courtroom. 
These studies embody a perspective which persuades us to view court 
proceedings as:
• a manifestation of a wider social process
• a social activity controlled primarily by identifiable discourse styles
• a setting in which certain human relationships are clarified.
A consideration of these processes points to the need to review studies 
which acknowledge the more specific connection between ideology, 
control and linguistic behaviour (2.2). These studies are not restricted 
to those focusing upon courtroom interaction but provide the possibility 
for a wider analytical context within which to place this thesis.
The third collection on analysing language (2.3) reviews those works 
which have implications for what exactly should be evaluated in the 
process of language analysis. What is recognised as data and 
subsequently analysed depends on the (perceived) nature of language 
itself. In this section I acknowledge a range of features of linguistic 
activity which present themselves as possible candidates for analysis. 
The section concludes with the observation that, in spite of recent 
concerns with the 'contextual nature of language', little has been done to 
accommodate the most significant feature of all, namely, the lived 
through experiences of an interlocutor.
I commence then, with studies which examine the nature of court 
proceedings as they are viewable through analysis of court discourse. 
With the occasional exception, most of the literature assumes that 
courtroom behaviour is predicated upon legal constraints, such as rules 
of evidence or due process, and tends to ignore the more pervasive fact 
that what happens in court is as much a function of adversarial combat, 
as of legal protocol.
2.1 DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND COURT PROCEEDINGS
A significant aspect of the study of language interaction in the 
courtroom is that it is an environment in which language is not so much 
a rehearsal for action but is the action itself. The environment is almost 
entirely regulated and manipulated through the deployment of words.
The interaction functions as a result of a near continuous stream of 
words in an adversarial context. In the criminal court results are 
neither tempered nor negotiated. There are only winners and losers.
This environment is defined and given substance through a series of 
private rules which arise from notions of right, wrong and winning by a 
variety of means. It is accessible to the public gaze and demands the 
attention of selected members of the public.
At the centre of the environment are the parties who are to some extent 
desperate to procure a particular judgment. The courtroom
proceedings are society’s response to an as yet unresolved conflict. It is 
also a place in which children are subjected to adult rules and action.
Courtroom interaction stands as a counter situation to 'normal' 
conversational interaction, wresting from the individual witnesses the 
strategies they have built up during their development as members of 
society.
Hearings in courts involve verbal exchanges which in many respects are 
organised differently from conversational talk. Verbal exchange is 
frequently regarded as the source of the 'oppressive' nature of court 
proceedings; proceedings in which the needs of an individual are 
overshadowed by the general societal need for the court process to 
proceed.
Courtroom language studies represent a range of concerns and 
perspectives. The 'legal' aspect of the proceedings is often assumed or 
addressed and the researchers' insights and findings are expressed in 
such terms. This section (2.1) however reviews courtroom language 
studies which include a consideration of legal aspects as well as a range 
of features and factors which clarify our perceptions of courtroom 
interaction, especially those studies which express such interaction in 
terms of verbal exchange. The review proceeds under the following 
headings:
2.1.1 Identifying special features of courtroom interaction
2.1.2 Understanding discourse in courts
2.1.3 Dealing with difficulty; its analysis and interpretation
2.1.4 Towards the pragmatic
2.1.5 From the pragmatic to the ideological
2.1.1 Identifying special features of courtroom interaction
Identifying courtroom interaction as a special feature, as a variation of 
'normal speech', is one way of analysing the distinctiveness of 
'courtroom language'. A number of students of courtroom interaction, 
having accepted the concept of 'linguistic variation' as their prime 
measure of sociolinguistic analysis, have identified many such special 
features of which the following are examples. The examples in this sub­
section (2.1.1) are significant in that they not only demonstrate a range 
of indicators of a different discourse environment but they attempt to do 
so by identifying single features.
2.1.1.1 Embedding in legal propositions
In an effort to understand the features that set legal texts apart from 
others, Hiltunen (1984) has concentrated on the aspect of embedding. 
His concentration is on both statements which take place in a legal 
context as well as legal documents. The language under scrutiny in this 
thesis is the former rather than the latter. However much of what is 
said in legal proceedings draws heavily on the corpus of regulations 
from which those proceedings arise. Hiltunen's concern is with the 
syntax of legal discourse and especially '... the extensive use of clausal 
embedding which is definitely one of the style markers of the legal 
genre' (Hiltunen, 1984: 2).
2.1.1.2 Propositions within propositions
As a direct outcome of the revelations of transformational-generative 
grammar the use of subordinate clauses within one sentence came to be 
seen as a measure of either compactness or depth. In turn, depth was 
perceived as more difficult to comprehend. This provided the tangible 
and measurable link between language (what is said) and psychology 
(what is comprehended). Many suggested or assumed that the difficulty 
of understanding heavily embedded sentences was a function of the 
strain upon 'short term memory' directly attributable to the syntactic 
complexity. The corollary however is not sustainable, ie. that memory 
or comprehension test results could be taken as a reading of syntactic 
complexity. Hiltunen alerts us to the assertion that 'memory for 
sentences has a semantic rather than syntactic basis' (Hiltunen, 1984: 2).
This suggests a particular kind of complexity in the construction and 




There apparently are confounding semantic, pragmatic and 
performance factors that make real world situations much more 
complex than the earlier studies suggested.
(Charrow, 1979:15)
Although that now appears as a sensible and acceptable proposition the 
situation still pertains that :
... there are some types of embedding, such as the so called self 
embedding constructions of the type ’the boy (whom the girl (whom 
the man in the red car hit) kissed) lives next door to me’ (quoted 
from The Man in The Red Hot Car Kissed Lives Next Door to Me)
(quoted from Charrow and Charrow 1979:1328) which are difficult 
to process regardless of their semantics and pragmatics. One 
indication of this is the fact that such constructions are hardly ever 
used in speech.
(Hiltunen, 1984: 3)
Hiltunen draws on two concepts for his analysis of depth and 
complexity. One is the concept of left branching and right branching 
sentences and the other is distance from nested clauses. Both these 
approaches however suggest an analytical interest in discovering a 
single, main ’culprit' or factor within the whole complex activity of 
using and responding to language.
2 1.1.4 Finding the x factor
The Hiltunen article attempts to tackle the problems of access to English 
in legal settings on the basis of a single concept, embedding.
It is interesting to acknowledge other studies which proceed from the 
point of single factor analysis. One is Joan Cashion's work on 
’politeness’, (Cashion, 1985) in which she compares and contrasts the 
degrees of politeness displayed by male and female judges.
0'Barr's work through the Duke Language and Law Project must be 
acknowledged as the most extensive study in the field of single factor 
analysis, especially in narrative versus fragmented testimony. The 
concept and manifestation of symmetry is also important especially as it 
relates to powerful and powerless speech. Here I shall briefly outline 
just three examples of 'x factor’ study; politeness, narrative/fragmented 
testimony, and symmetry.
i. Politeness
Joan Cashion suggests politeness as a significant variable and investigates 
this because it is seen to be associated with powerful and powerless 
speech (Cashion, 1985). The paper attempts to test and replicate the 
courtroom study by O’Barr and Atkins (1981) which suggested that 
Lakoffs (1975) 'women's language features' were associated more 
strongly with power and status variables than with the sex of the 
speaker. Cashion hypothesised that:
... judges hold the most power and have the highest status within the 
courtroom, therefore the language of judges should contain the least 
number of 'powerless' language features.
(Cashion, 1985: 10)
In this study politeness did not correlate with either sex or power. The 
main methodological outcome of the study was a reassertion of the
proposition that in order to understand language and human relations 
more acutely we need to:
... spend more time looking at situational factors involved in the use 
of language and consider in what context we find or do not find sex 
differences.
(Cashion, 1985: 20)
Politeness and the underlying concept that when one is polite it acts to 
solicit either compliance or agreement with the other party, derives 
from the 'Grice-ian' principle attributed to H.P. Grice in his 1975 paper 
entitled 'Logic and conversation'. In discussing the way in which 
conversations operate Grice views speaker-hearer interaction in terms 
of his posited co-operative principle:
... we might then formulate a rough general principle which 
participants will be expected (ceteris paribus) to observe namely: 
make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the 
stage at which it occurs, by the expected purpose or direction of the 
talk exchange in which you are engaged. One might label this 'the 
co-operative principle
(Cashion, 1985: 7)
Compliance to the rules of the conversation itself, and through this of 
one speaker to another, is the communicative product.
ii. Narrative and fragmented testimony
Observations of court speech suggested that a major variable in 
testimony speech is the length of a witness' response to the lawyer's 
questions. In some of the observed testimony the witness responded at 
length to the lawyer's questions while in other testimony the witness 
gave a relatively brief answer to each question. As might be expected, 
relatively fewer questions were needed to elicit the same amount of 
information in the 'narrative' type of testimony than in the 
'fragmented' type.
O'Barr's studies (1979, 1982) confirm that the manner in which 
witnesses and lawyers speak in the presentation of testimony can affect 
social evaluations of them by those who hear the testimony. The first 
experiment demonstrated that a socially patterned variable in witness 
speech, the relatively frequent use of 'powerless' features, has strong 
effects on evaluation of the witness and perceptions of the witness' 
credibility. The second and third experiments showed that speech 
dimensions in the form of the lawyer/witness interaction, as exemplified 
by the narrative/fragmented testimony, also influence the social 
perceptions engendered by testimony. These findings have important
implications for language studies, social psychology, the law and this 
thesis.
iii. Symmetry
Although not a courtroom study the observations of Fisher (1984) in 
educational and medical settings are of obvious significance. In a 
discussion of the way in which structural authority is both discerned and 
maintained through discourse, Fisher suggests that:
In everyday contexts, participants engage in conversations in a 
relatively symmetrical relationship ... in the institutional contexts of 
schools and medical settings they engage in conversation in more 
asymetrical relationships.
(Fisher, 1984: 200)
Fisher notes that authority is controlled:
... both by the selection of the topic as well as who will speak next 
... The asymmetry is also reflected in the noticeable absence of 
similar behaviour by the students.
(Fisher, 1984: 201)
One of the obvious features of court interaction, and especially of cross 
examination, is the discrepancy between the volume and the quality of 
language spoken by both parties. Lawyers ask questions in a variety of 
styles and for a variety of communicative purposes and by and large 
witnesses answer ’yes' or ’no’.
Although special feature identification might be revealing, the essence 
of discourse analysis is to understand and reveal the texture of an 
interaction. The interaction of the details (of analysis) with the whole 
meaning of the text requires us to constantly refer to the forces which 
generate 'the big picture'. There are differing views as to how this big 
picture is accessed. Courtrooms are complex social settings in which 
oral language predominates. If we are to understand these settings, 
especially with respect to the focus of this thesis, we need to go beyond 
the single feature analysis which characterises the research reviewed 
above. We need to throw a wider analytic net to 'understand the 
discourse of court'.
2.1.2 Understanding discourse in courts.
Court discourse has interested researchers for a variety of reasons 
ranging from the opportunity to study a particular piece of significant 
social interaction to the attractiveness of study in an isolated and closed 
situation which dramatically exhibits specific aspects of social
interaction. Within and between the studies reviewed below I show a set 
of connections tying general social appreciations of courtroom 
interaction with particular social and (ultimately) psychological states.
2.1.2.1 Viewing court and seeing society
This sub-section reviews some examples of literature which trace the 
connection between a social requirement (to establish the truth), how 
that requirement is institutionally manifested (by courtroom 
interaction), and how as part of that interaction, key players are 
positioned and (re)defined. When taken together, these studies imply 
that denial to the point of degradation of an individual is part of (or 
may even be required by) the process of administering justice.
Atkinson and Drew (1979) see the study of the court situation as a 
microcosm and as an encapsulation of society, in the way it affects the 
lives of individuals. It is also seen as the forum for the public 
expression of personal power. All of the above can be shown to be 
brought about through patterned behaviour and thus structurally 
defined. The sociological appreciation also forces the analyst to look 
further, beyond the actual proceedings, to more generalised patterns 
within the wider society. In so doing, what goes on backstage must be 
accepted as data along with what appears in the proceedings. Language 
used in the courtroom can be better understood by deepening and 
widening the concept of what constitutes 'context' so as to admit into 
our understanding both the intent and the effect of language in use. One 
of the pervasive aspects of the courtroom situation is not only what 
'goes on backstage' but the domination of the environment by words 
themselves. Orality itself must be seen as a significant social determiner 
just as physical movement is a strong feature of the football field.
2.1.2.2 Courtrooms as a sea of words
One of the most significant language features of the court situation is its 
reliance on words spoken, to the exclusion of all other communicative 
supports; supports which are available in other social situations. As 
Atkinson and Drew note:
Whatever else may be said about court proceedings, the fact that talk 
is an all pervasive and highly significant feature can hardly be 
seriously doubted.
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 6)
Because of an almost total reliance on words, the court setting is an 
appropriate site in which to study the words themselves and how they 
reflect other significant relationships.
Yet it would seem strange to any competent speaker of English were 
one to conclude from this that the term 'trial' can be equated with 
'people1 talking. For any such person could presumably point out 
that it clearly is not 'ordinary talk' that takes place in courts of law, 
and that there is a sharp distinction to be drawn between the kinds of 
talk that characterise court proceedings and those which are to be 
heard in various other contexts.
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 6)
In examining the difficulties of some actors in handling court, many 
studies tend to assume that 'difficulty' arises only from the demands of 
'legalese', a language derived from legal documentation, Latin forms, 
and the dualistic logic of adversarial proceedings. These forms and 
processes are defended on the grounds of 'looking for the truth'.
2.1.2.3 Looking for truth
Another significant feature of courtroom studies is their critique of a 
forum which claims for itself a high standard of seeking truth for the 
purpose of dispensing justice. The court claims this status through a 
supposed ability to establish truth at the level of 'what happened' and 
'who did what to whom'. This proposition sets up and capitalises upon a 
dualistic concept of truth and falsity, the very existence of which 
philosophically justifies the adversarial system. As we become aware of 
other concepts of truth, other mechanisms for revealing such are 
explored.
The legal process of examination, cross-examination and re­
examination can hardly be rated highly as an instrument for 
ascertaining the facts of past history, at least no scientist would 
expect to extract the truth from opposite directions ... no one can fail 
to be struck by the contrast between high degrees of sophistication 
attained by forensic science in the detection of crime and the 
prescientific character of the trial process itself.
(Wootton, 1963 in Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 10)
Indeed, if it were possible to establish facts 'scientifically' there would 
be little need for the continuation of courtrooms. It is obvious that they 
do not concern themselves with matters of simple truth. They are the 
stage for acting out philosophical, political, and moral dilemmas. To 
use Goffman’s (1959) theatre metaphor I would suggest that if the court 
is a stage then this thesis might be about examining who has access to the 
script for the repertoire of plays performed. The sense of privileged 
access to the script for only some of the stakeholders, points to a
situation which is worthy of study in terms other than those set down by 
the key players.
In a comprehensive review of language in the legal process Danet 
(1980a) points to the dearth of discourse analysis in this area and to 
'... their potential contribution in advancing the critique of the 
adversary system of justice' (in Penman, 1987: 201).
Penman goes on to explain how even in a situation of adversity and the 
strong desire for different outcomes, coherence in the discourse still 
exists. As a function of coercion an enforced co-operation is enacted 
via the careful use of language. She notes that some court studies 
employ a sociolinguistic orientation:
... studying such variables as the speech styles of witnesses (eg 
O'Barr, 1982) and of barristers (eg Parkinson, 1979); verbal 
response modes under direct and cross examination (eg McGauney 
and Stiles, 1980); coerciveness of question form (eg Danet and 
Kermish 1980) and the strategic use of questioning (eg Woodbury,
1984). These studies all indicate that the various ways in which 
language can be used, do influence the dispute-processing function 
in courts. On the other hand, none of these studies tell us how 
language is used interactively in courts.
(Penman 1987: 201)
Penman's own concern is to unveil the dynamic mechanisms of language 
in use which contribute to the establishment of the court’s authority. 
This aspiration to both outcome and establishment of an appropriate 
method for study, suggests support for the process and outcome of this 
thesis.
2.1.2.4 Establishing the authority of court through discourse
Penman continues:
One of the rather unique features of courtroom conversations, 
compared with more everyday ones, is the formal power invested in 
the court to impose its will on others.
(Penman, 1987: 202)
To allow the format of adversity to continue, some sense of coherence 
has to be established by the court especially when '...the witness's goals 
may be quite incompatible with those of the court'(Penman, 1987: 
202).
That coercion as well as cooperation is used to enforce this coherence is 
the subject of Penman's examination of the Gricean Cooperative 
Principle in which it is suggested that one has to:
... make your conversational contribution such as it is required, at 
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of 
the talk exchange in which you are engaged
(Grice, 1975 in Penman, 1987: 203)
The requirements of institutional continuity as well as the nature of 
adversarial discourse conspire to create a discourse which is extremely 
restrictive when compared with other ways of people have of 'telling 
their story'. This restrictiveness is significantly different from the 
prescriptiveness of other genre of information and story telling. 
Penman also notes the summative work of Atkinson and Drew (1979).
Like many types of communication, the question-answer adjacency 
pair forms the foundation for the organisation of talk in courtrooms.
This is particularly the case in the direct and cross examination 
episodes in which one person asks a question and the other answers.
However the rules governing these exchanges differ markedly from 
more ordinary conversations. In the first instance, the type of 
speaker turn is explicitly and rigidly fixed, there can be only 
questions and answers. Sk;ond the type of speaker turn is fixed to 
die acting role; it is only the barrister (or judge) who has the right to 
ask questions, and the witness is under strong obligatory pressure to 
answer and to answer in certain ways only. These structural features 
identified by Atkinson and Drew (1979) are the same as those 
identified by Fisher (1984) in her analysis of doctor-patient 
discourse and as Fisher demonstrates, parallels can also be drawn 
with classroom interaction.
(Penman, 1987: 204)
2.1.2.5 Keeping the discourse cohesive
In the first instance Penman reviews an array of court language in order 
to assess the workings of the maintenance of cohesion in this site and to 
reflect upon the relationship of this to the Cooperative Principle of 
Grice. With the help of an account of conversational difficulties, to 
highlight the points of tension (where appropriate discourse is 
redirected) she is able to generate a list of 19 rules. These rules:
...can be taken as indicative of the institutional constraints imposed 
on talk so that the exchanges are coherent in the eyes of the 
court...Moreover, they are not unrelated to each other being 
employed as a whole to ensure that the ’truth of the matter' is 
arrived at, at least approximated, in some orderly manner.
(Penman, 1987: 211)
This assertion is only possible if one adopts a teleological definition of 
truth (truth is what the court finds); and if the status and potential 
contribution of stakeholders are ignored. These two premises are only 
possible if one accepts that talk and the purpose of conversation is to 
exchange information with maximal efficiency.
Talk exchanges in court however... appear to be other than a genuinely 
co-operative effort. "
(Penman, 1987: 214)
A contradiction appears to exist, namely, that courts need to coerce 
participants to be cooperative. Not only do judges require this of the 
court as a whole, but cross-examiners drive the witness towards this end 
in support of their own (opposing) case (Penman, 1987).
2.1.2.6 From cohesion to coercion
Penman suggests that a range of coercive devices is employed, the most 
obvious one being:
... admonitions and orders by the judge to answer in the proper way 
and the refusal to acknowledge any information given by participants 
that was outside the parameters o f the questioning. Less directly 
obvious, equally powerful devices are contained in the particular form 
of questioning used in courts. The typical use of closed questions in 
cross examination asked by barristers with the authority of the court is 
one particular way in which witnesses are forced into answering what 
is required. Moreover failure to comply, in manner and content, to the 
requests and directions of the court, can bring about the use of even 
more coercion: the threat, or actuality, of finding the witness in 
contempt of court
(Penman, 1987: 214)
Given this background of threat and coercion it is legitimate to suggest 
that principles other than cooperation might be involved in enabling the 
proceedings to continue; to cohere. The need of a witness to avoid 
further retribution can be seen as a significant driving force. The 
establishment and continuation of all sorts of relationships stems from 
more than the simple exchange of information. They are also based on 
the negotiation of roles and the meeting of needs, including the need to 
be released from threat.
... information on exchange is not the only function served in 
conversation. In fact we never just exchange information with someone 
we converse with, we are always at the same time offering a 
commentary, however implicit, on the relationship and negotiating our 
own identity. Whatever information may be obtained in talking, it is 
never independent of the relationship and negotiating our own identity.
(Penman, 1987: 216)
The negotiation of identity now becomes the 'commodity* which is the 
subject of competition in the courtroom drama.
2.1.3.4 Recognising motives
In moving towards establishing a ’micro analytical framework' for 
investigating sequences of examination and cross examination, Valdes 
accepts the appropriateness of such accounts revealing the 'discourse- 
hood' of the language interaction. This recognises that:
Courtroom speech must be viewed not as an unrelated sequence of 
questions of the same or of different types, but rather as a series of 
moves which are used to carry out specific actions.
(Valdes, 1986:277)
These actions can be viewed as necessary to establish fact X or situation 
Y or supporting detail Z, which justifies asking question A or B. This 
accounts for the sequence and type of question but does not account for 
the general desired effect of all cross examination questions, namely to 
discredit the witness.
Levinson (1983) recognises the inappropriateness of assuming the same 
rules of analysis of conversation in one place will apply in another. He 
resolves to exclude talk which:
... occurs inside specific institutional settings such as religious services, 
law courts, classrooms and the like, from his definition of 
conversation. For this reason, analytical frameworks developed for the 
analysis of normal conversation (both within the tradition of discourse 
analysis and conversational analysis) are difficult to apply directly to 
either classroom or courtroom speech.
(Valdes, 1986: 279)
Certainly a study of sequences rather than adjacency pairs provides a 
larger context and a sense of discourse, however none of the studies 
referred to above suggest a framework arising from the stated aim of 
the situation, that is, 'you discredit the other party in the context of a 
strictly controlled question and answer sequence’.
The microanalytical framework suggested by Valdes
... seeks to identify the basis of the smallest unit of interaction and 
relate this unit to the larger contexts which conditions courtroom talk.
(Valdes, 1986: 294)
It is based upon a system put forward by Edmonson (1981) in which
...verbal interactions are seen to consist of communicative acts...acts 
which are considered to be both interactional and illocutionary in 
nature.
(Valdes, 1986: 294)
Interactional describes functions such as 'initiate', 'respond', 'terminate' 
which fuel the interaction. Illocutionary describes the way in which this 
is done such as by 'requests display of information', 'responds literally’, 
'clarifies'. The basis for these descriptions comes from the utterances 
themselves and arise from the grounding proposition that the whole 
sequence is patterned in order to achieve the purpose of the questioner. 
That purpose is to display evidence in a particular way to fulfil the 
requirements of the laws of evidence.
By organising and viewing the 'text' in this way, examination 
encounters can be seen in terms of the general interaction as it is 
manifested in and projected by illocutionary acts. Further:
... each exchange within a phase of an examination encounter is 
considered to have been intended (by the examiner/cross examiner) to 
contribute to this (his own) purpose.
(Valdes, 1986:284)
This gives rise to the view that in a situation in which one person has 
control over the discourse, and chooses not to change it to include 
others, then their action is intentional. It is not only intentional, but 
becomes an integral part of the situation. In developing a framework 
which is both truly descriptive and appropriate to the situation, the 
above research presented me with a plethora of tools and units of 
analysis and description. The considerations ranged from single unit 
identifications to wider descriptions of all manner of 'contexts'.
Existing models of analysis provided a point of reference for 
developing more useful ones. They also provided a range of the 
possible essential features and characteristics which might be taken into 
account. The analysis of 'intent' however presented a challenge to 
'objective' evaluation.
In Valdes' account of the demands that courtroom language makes upon 
speakers of ordinary English, each exchange within a phase of an 
examination encounter is considered to have been intended by the 
examining attorney. Function and intent are assumed to exist, given the 
control the lawyers have over the situation and also the predictable and 
patterned nature of its occurrence.
Language studies which recognise the manifestation of motives in 
language and which further recognise the varying effects of language on 
different interlocutors acknowledge both the social import of language 
and the need for language analysis to include such vital factors. This 
directed me towards studies in pragmatics, studies in which intent and 
effect are regarded as appropriate qualities for linguistic description.
interlocutor to recognise the effect of his/her speech. The combination 
of intention, effect and further response creates the dimension of the 
pragmatic. This dimension further informs our 'discourse 
understanding'.
For Scha (1986) the term 'discourse understanding' refers to all 
processes of:
... natural language understanding that attempt to understand a text or 
dialogue. For such processes, the sentences of natural language are 
elements whose significance resides in the contribution they make to the 
development of a larger whole, rather than being independent, isolated 
units of meaning.
(Scha, 1986: 2)
To understand discourse one must track the structure with respect to the 
proper context:
... taking into account the real world setting of the utterance as well as 
the linguistic context built up by the utterances preceding it
(Scha, 1986: 3).
This view can be tested against the reality which is the concern of this 
thesis, that is, the 'text' created during cross examination is not so much 
the sum of the individual evidentiary elements and proposals as the total 
achievement of reducing the credibility of the witness.
The pragmatic perspective on discourse and its analysis, as encapsulated 
by Scha and others, provides the analytical space to accommodate the 
details of real lives, the concerns of the researcher, and the descriptors 
of linguistic analysis. The following extended quote sums this up:
Language, especially written language, is often viewed as a code for 
packaging and transmitting information from one individual to another.
Under this view, a linguistic message is fully represented by the words 
and sentences it comprises; texts are thus objects that can be studied in 
isolation. By taking such a stance, one is led naturally, for instance to 
regard words as referring back to other words. Concepts like 
coherence, relevance, and topic are then referred as properties of texts, 
leading researchers to confine their search for these properties to words 
and sentences. A contrasting view, proposed by Strawson (1950),
Austin (1962), Searle (1969) and others is that speakers or writers use 
words to do things, for instance, to refer to things or to get a hearer or 
reader to believe or do something. They are produced by a person who 
is attempting to use them to produce certain effects on an audience. 
According to this view, utterances are tools used in social interaction 
and should be studied in this light ... Pragmatics is the study of 
communication as it is situated relative to a particular set of 
communications demands, speakers, hearers, times, places, joint 
surroundings, linguistic conventions and cultural practices including 
language in a theory of action, this suggests that 'pragmatics' is just the 
application to verbal problems and of general abilities for interpreting
the everyday world. People tend to interpret the behaviour of other 
humans in terms of the situation and the actors intention and beliefs. 
Much of what has been discussed under the rubric of pragmatics is most 




The pragmatic perspective on language has three important implications 
for discourse understanding research. The first is that the meaning of a 
linguistic message is only partly represented by its content; its meaning 
for a hearer also depends on the hearer’s construal of the purpose the 
speaker had for producing i t  The second is that the attribution of 
intentions to a speaker must be an integral component of the listener's 
comprehension process. The third is that a theory of language 
comprehension should determine the extent to which the same strategies 
people use to arrive at satisfactory explanations of physical behaviour 
of others can be employed in their comprehension of speech acts.
(Scha, 1986: 37)
This analytic perspective acknowledges the legitimacy of attempting to 
establish, for example, the possible connections between the meaning of 
a message and the producer's goals and beliefs.
Further as Grice has pointed out (Grice 1957), effective communication 
is achieved when hearers attribute to speakers intentions which the 
speaker's intend them to hear.
If we regard communication only as the transmitting of propositions 
then cross examination of children in court will be viewed as a prime 
example of 'failed' communication. If we regard communication as 
achieving a specific result for one party, then failure to comprehend on 
the part of the child victim witness represents itself as 'successful' 
communication.
This insight makes obvious the sense of the concept of speech acts; social 
acts performed by means of linguistic utterances (Searle 1969). 
Amongst these are requests, commands, assertions and most 
significantly here, questions where a question is interpreted as ’...a 
command to provide an answer’ (Scha, 1986: 40). Pragmatic studies 
suggest that analysing language is a real opportunity to examine many 
aspects of real life relationships.
2.1.4.2 Analysing language: analysing life
The operational challenge within the focus question of this thesis is to 
create a descriptive framework within which to display linguistically
manifested relationships, intents and effects. That is, to create a 
linguistics that is informed by and is informative for the real lives of 
real people in real social situations.
The studies reviewed above led me to accept the need to incorporate 
into linguistic analysis the details of intent and effect as competing 
parties use whatever is available in order to gain control of the 
discourse.
2.1.4.3 Fighting with what's available
In his book Courts on trial, Frank contrasted the 'truth theory' of courts 
with what he called the 'fight theory', which attributes the origins of the 
trial to the substitution of public, verbal battles for private physical 
brawls (Frank, 1966). This replacement suggests that although the 
format for the resolution of conflict has been overlayed with an 
ideological rational imperative to 'seek truth', the pragmatic intent 'to 
win' is at the root of the court process. As Frank points out:
... the adversary system encourages the use of trial tactics to prevent 
the judge or jury from correctly evaluating the trustworthiness of 
witnesses and to shut out evidence damaging to a case. The lawyer 
aims at victory not at aiding the court to discover the facts, he 
doesn't want the trial court to reach a sound educated guess if it is 
likely to be contrary to his client's interest
(Frank, 1966 in Danet, 1980: 190)
This tactic, to exclude certain meanings, is closely scrutinised by Danet's 
(1980) review of the Edelin trial. In that trial Danet reports the explicit 
preoccupation with language. The defence counsel for Edelin, William 
Homens, submitted a motion for an order to prevent the use of the 
words 'suffocate', 'smother', 'murder', 'baby boy', and tiuman being'.
In making such a submission the defence counsel was certainly 
recognising the significance of words; however there is an implicit 
assumption that the meanings of those words are constant from one 
sentence or paragraph context to another. This is not a defensible 
assertion as the significance of their having been uttered differs from 
context to context. Indeed one aspect of context is that meanings are 
cumulative. The repetition or lack of reference to a particular word 
will generate meanings which can only be apprehended, and possibly 
comprehended, by those involved.
Defence counsel sensitivity to the significance of the semantic issues was 
in evidence throughout the trial and in his opening statement he 
addressed the jury with the words 'that your effort be at all times to 
determine not what is said to have happened in terms of the words you
Court proceedings create an ideological stance, which is heightened 
during cross-examination. Under cross examination the victim witness 
is clearly asked to accept the proposition that there is no ’social' 
problem but rather a ’personal' problem, the basis of which is his/her 
own misrepresentation of reality. There are a number of theoretical 
positions within which to view the impact of what is said to victims 
under cross examination. Some of these may be used to show how 
linguistic structures are used to explore, systematise, transform or 
obscure analysis of reality; to regulate the ideas and behaviours of 
others; to classify and rank people, events and objects; to assert 
institutional or personal status. I am inclined to adopt the orientation of 
Kress when he says that:
There is no reason in principle why linguistics should not make a 
systematic study o f ... social structure and linguistic form, function and 
process and complex states of mind. Such linguistics would be of 
direct value in a critical account of contemporary culture.
(Kress, 1979: 25)
That orientation is further detailed in Fowler's statement that:
1. Language embodies specific points of view, realities and 
propositions. These are created and maintained through a wide 
variety of linguistic mechanisms and forces, some of which are more 
easily distinguishable than others... The linguists Edward Sapir and 
Benjamin Lee Whorf both proposed the concept and gave it flesh in 
their study of whole (speech) communities.
2. Different social groupings and different relationships vary 
from each other and can be seen to be at once different from each 
other and internally patterned. Social meanings are both created and 
perpetuated by the maintenance of discourses.
3. These discourses are part of the social processes and constitute 
social meanings and social practices.
(Fowler, 1979: 1)
These premises lead me as a student of language to:
... make a contribution to the unveiling of linguistic practices which are 
instruments in (social) inequality and the concealment of truth.
(Fowler, 1979: 2).
Studies which address themselves to issues of language and control will 
be reviewed according to their ability through linguistic analysis to 
provide insight into human experiences (2.2.1 Language and life; 
responding to the reality). These are followed by studies which take 
seriously the challenge to analyse language in terms of intent and effect 
in patterned social behaviour (2.2.2 Using the anthropological). For the 
purpose of this thesis there is a need to build upon precepts of ideology 
and social control to find an appropriate way to describe language as it
is used both (generally) as a cultural tool and in specific circumstances 
for specific ends. Studies which attempt this are thus of central interest 
for review. (2.2.3 Connecting culture, site and language)
2.2.1 Language and life: responding to the reality
There are several areas of study where the organic synonymy of 
language and experience are taken as a given whilst the intricacies of the 
connections are investigated further. Nowhere is this more clearly 
expressed than in the field of language and ideology where pursuing the 
subject continues because:
... ideology operates not so much as a coherent system of statements 
imposed on a population from above, but rather through a complex 
series of mechanisms whereby meaning is mobilised in the discursive 
practices of every day life for the maintenance of relations of 
domination. It is of the utmost importance, therefore to search for 
ways in which the theory of ideology can be linked with methods for 
the analysis of the discursive forms in which ideology is expressed.
(Thompson, 1984: 64 in Threadgold, 1986: 15)
Halliday establishes the relationship in the following way:
The study of language which is linguistics, is for many, in no way 
different or separate from the study of semiotics, that is the study of the 
way meanings are made in a social system ... Linguistics has often 
failed to concern itself with the crucial relations between meanings, 
contexts and realisations which is central to the study of language and 
ideology.
Meanings, ideas, intentions, and positions do not '... float about without 
any relationship to discursive or linguistic form'. (Halliday in 
Threadgold, 1986: 15)
Threadgold reiterates this point, stating:
Ideas do not circulate in the air. They are produced and reproduced as 
spoken or written utterances ... To study ideology is then always in 
some sense, to study the ways in which language and meaning are used 
in everyday forms of social interaction. This is why a theory of 
language and a linguistic tradition which concerns itself with ideology 
will be much richer than narrow approaches to linguistics and the 
philosophy of language which concern themselves only with systems of 
signs, fixed meanings, or language as communication of well formed 
sentences. A theory of language as social semiotic and of language and 
ideology has the potential in itself with language as a form of social 
interaction, a meaning potential in and through which subjects and the 
social are reconstructed and reproduced and cultural and human conflict 
are negotiated.
(Threadgold, 1986: 16)
Threadgold extends this understanding to the issue of appropriate 
research technique.
What has been missing has been any attempt to account for particular, 
concrete linguistic forms as realisations of meaning and contexts. (That 
is we have lacked any adequate account of the relationship between 
micro and macro levels of linguistic, semiotic and social analysis) ie. 
the relationship between the analysis and the material.
(Threadgold, 1986:17)
Translating this general appreciation into the specific situation which is 
the focus of this thesis suggested that what happens in cross examination 
is not so much isolated from real life but rather, for the victim, a lively 
expression of it.
There are many ways in which one speaker manages to achieve and 
maintain that control. When studies on language and control were 
restated in terms of position and discourse I began to appreciate that the 
desired outcome of cross examination is to position the witness in the 
(dominant) discourse in such a way as to be insignificant (as a victim).
Practitioners in court depend on a neat separation of the lexical 
meanings of words and the semiotic meanings generated as a function of 
use, impact, response and situation. William O’Barr notes:
Whether consciously planned or merely the result of native intuition, 
form communicates. As form varies, the messages communicated 
vary as well. Some forms are strategically more useful because of 
the connotations they carry. (OBarr, 1982: 7 )
Here there is the implied duality of denotation and connotation: the real 
meaning and the developed or used meaning. In a fully social definition 
of language use it is difficult to maintain the separation as one becomes 
the other.
William O'Barr echoes the problems expressed by so many other 
analysts of invading the territory of practices which are ’obviously 
natural and naturally obvious’.
Classical rhetoric and oratory are based on this knowledge as are rules 
of journalistic style, advertising practice, media presentation, and such 
everyday rules as the etiquette of social interaction. Yet, such a 
perspective on the legal process is neither widely recognised nor 
understood by the public, by social scientists who study it, nor even by 
lawyers and their witnesses who regularly employ such strategies.
(OBarr 1982: 7)
Most sociolinguistic researchers show a clear preference for the use of 
social factors in explaining language variation. It is uncommon to find 
researchers pursuing language to understand social phenomena. In 
working toward an understanding of the relation between two such 
matters as language and society, it is difficult to attempt to explain both.
Rather in relating phenomena not usually considered together, an 
explanation of one must be the goal while the other is the means. For 
most sociolinguists then, explaining language is the goal whereas social 
factors are the means used.
(O'Barr, 1982: 8)
If it is desirable to move beyond the correlational to where language is 
seen as the essence of the social construct then the attribution of 
meanings in particular situations remains problematic.
2.2.1.2 Nominating the text
'Meaning', as an expression, suggests a unitary concept, that 'it' can be 
identified as a single entity. The meaning of a conversation is not 
necessarily discernible from the script alone but from the location and 
relocation of the speakers within it. The text is a vehicle and can serve 
as a window into the multiplicity and complexity of meanings. This 
conceptualisation of meaning is reflected in comments by Wardlaugh 
when he suggests that:
Conversation is an activity which makes use of many devices in order 
to reduce the risk of participants. Consequently conversationalists 
rarely get hurt.
(Wardlaugh, 1985: 3)
However, unskilled ones can be severely punished as he recognises:
You may be hurt or you may inflict hurt in that one of the participants 
can emerge from the conversation diminished in some way.
(Wardlaugh, 1985: 3)
In extending this appreciation, he later states:
There is often considerably more to a message than the actual words that 
were uttered; there may be matters of importance both beyond and 
behind those words.
(Wardlaugh, 1985: 78)
It follows that a suitable linguistic description would take into account 
the 'meanings beyond and behind those words'. Those meanings are 
sometimes made available to us through viewing the experience of the 
individual in the widest anthropological context possible. This is the 
focus of the next sub section.
being a function of their context. Instead words are seen only as the 
means for establishing ’facts' and the rules evoked for regulating this 
procedure are aimed at maximum efficiency in the gathering of facts. 
Communication is taken as something instrumental in the legal process.
As a consequence, witnesses are seen as something simply instrumental 
to the process. That they are seen as no more than this, is further 
evidenced by the observation that there are no formal rules to regulate 
the relational aspects of discourse. They are thus left to proceed almost 
unregarded and only get noticed when they cut across the rules of 'the 
fact game'.
(Penman, 1991: 28)
Besides the existence of the 'fact game' Penman posits the existence of 
the ’face game’ (from Brown and Levinson, 1987) in which all parties 
strive to either promote or detract from their own or the others 'face'. 
A struggle to maintain face or to diminish the face of another, 
constitutes a significant but unadmitted discourse, while conversational 
difficulties arise in court as the court proceeds with the other more 
obvious struggle to establish 'facts'. If the concept of 'conversational 
difficulty' can be seen to encompass the 'difficulty' of child victim 
witnesses not hearing, but responding to, what is addressed to them in 
court, it suggests a huge discrepancy between the discourses being 
enacted. The difficulty arises because of the tension between the official 
'fact' game and the unofficial 'face' game which are played 
simultaneously.
Penman's study suggests that because 'credibility' and not 'truth' is the 
basis of the court play, one discourse (the fact game) is in fact a cover 
for the other (the face game) and the real purpose of the court is well 
served by the continuance and nurturing of this. This specific assertion 
about court is reflected in the general assertion of Fowler and Kress that 
language serves to:
... confirm and consolidate the organisations which shape it, being used 
to manipulate people, to establish and maintain them in economically 
convenient roles and statuses, to maintain the power of state agencies, 
corporations and other institutions ... language is a part of as well a 
result of social process.
(Fowler and Kress, 1985:190)
As I have come to appreciate that language is 'part of and a result of 
social process', I have also come to see how particular language features 
are deployed to create and perpetuate social relationships; to see that:
The systematic use o f ... linguistic structures is connected with the 
text's place in the (socio economic) system.
(Fowler and Kress, 1985: 190)
The system under consideration here is the adversarial system operating 
according to the limits and licence of evidence. Within those rules of
procedure other discourses are established and realised. It is a matter of 
argument elsewhere as to just how conscious the cross examiners are of 
the details and dynamics their own discourse. By attributing intent or 
purpose to the cross examiner it suggests th a t:
... the processes X manipulates Y through language and X pulls the 
wool over Y's eyes through language. But these processes tend to be 
unconscious for most members of the speech community, for much of 
the time. If they were not they would not work.
(Fowler and Kress, 1985: 186)
All language users draw upon differences, perceived, real or imagined, 
between themselves and their fellow speakers however:
... once we become conscious of the ways in which interpersonal 
structures encode power relationships, it is easy to see spoken 
interactions as enactments of or negotiations about status - contrary to 
the commonsense view of, say, the research interviewer or the job 
interviewer that their discourses are neutral, designed merely to elicit 
information.
(Fowler and Kress, 1985: 186)
Cross examination professes to be part of the process necessary for the 
pursuit of 'the truth' but can, when deconstructed, be seen as an 
expression of ideological interests.
If linguistic meaning is inseparable from ideology, and both depend on 
(social) structure, then linguistic analysis ought to be a powerful tool 
for the study of ideological processes which mediate relationships of 
power and control. This is possible providing that such descriptions are 
aware of the assumptions on which they are based and are prepared to:
... reflect critically about the underlying causes of the phenomena it 
studies and the nature of the society whose language it is.
(Fowler and Kress, 1979:186)
An operational challenge which flows from this conclusion is that 
linguistic analysis should in some way be able to provide insightful 
connections between general culture and specific site. In the next 
subsection (2.2.3) I review studies which attempt to tie down in 
analytical detail the language and ideology connection in court whilst 
speculating on the significance of that challenge for this thesis.
2.2.3 Connecting culture, site and language
There are some features of both the court process and cross examination 
which are particular and pervasive:
• adversarial methods are the accepted ways in which the truth is 
ascertained;
• there are certain cultural assumptions about being 'a child’ which can 
be presented as implications
• being an alleged victim does not entitle one to any ’privileges’ when 
giving evidence
• telling your story in your own way is not acceptable
• cross examiners, acting in the best interests of their clients, are 
entitled to constrain the witness to tell only the story he, the cross 
examiner, wants to be told.
The list above, although not comprehensive, suggests some ideological 
underpinnings to both the culture of court proceedings and the pursuit 
of cross examination.
These ideological underpinnings suggest what participants are allowed 
and not allowed to do (or get away with) in that particular cultural 
context which itself is a part of a wider culture which supports it. The 
relationship between the cross examiner and the child victim witness 
becomes both metaphor and sample of a pervasive social reality. And 
the language used becomes the substance of that reality.
2.2.3.1 Language as representation or matter
This assertion operates from the premise that the words of language 
'stand for' a deeper, possibly more elusive reality. It suggests in the 
strongest terms that language asserts an influence on reality and the way 
it is constructed, to the point of determinism.
In this case the cross examiner and the child victim witness become the 
representatives of external social groups. They come to stand for other 
situations in which one party seeks to ’rewrite’ the script; to recast the 
victim as a culprit, and to restrict their capacity to ’tell their own story’. 
The activity serves to define a reality acceptable to the listening world. 
The force of language is so clear and direct that language comes to be 
regarded as having a material existence. If language is not this material, 
how well founded is the philosophy which pursues the critique of 
society synonymously as a critique of language? How misdirected are 
the plethora of liberation movements which pin on language their hopes 
for identity and change? In seeking to transform language we seek to 
transform the world. Why else do people fight and die for their
language? Why do people seek to destroy the language of others? The 
essentiality of language in culture is a far cry from concepts of 
language which admit only the accumulation and combination of words. 
The difference forces the choice:
... between an idealist contemplation of the essence of language, 
whether grasped as grammar usage, the ego, rational properties of 
everyday language or the difference, or an attempt to effect a material 
transformation of the practice o f language, in the widest range of the 
settings in which it occurs.
(Silverman and Torode, 1980: xiii)
Given such a choice this thesis would position itself with the latter.
The studies reviewed indicate that language can be used and displayed in 
such a way that it either recognises or denies the experience of the 
interlocutor. The fact that a great deal of political and educational 
activity focuses on language change or constraint is either a conscious or 
intuitive recognition of this issue. Language and sexism, language and 
working class education, language and colonialism, language and 
cultural maintenance, are clear and powerful examples of these 
axiomatic links.
Further to these axioms, language both drives and perpetuates certain 
psychological, social and political positions. This reality is recognised 
by those who seek to maintain such positions and by those who seek to 
change them. News reports, propaganda statements, advertisements, 
speeches and conversations all serve human intention at some level of 
consciousness. The propaganda statement is designed to create a single 
line of thought to the exclusion of all others, the conversation to provide 
grounding for a social relationship. Throughout the range of 
possibilities there exists a range of discourses which provide the maps 
and templates for one set of engagements or the other. They are not 
mutually exclusive and the borders are not necessarily clear cut as they 
seek to fit reality with its description. In many cases however it is 
possible to generate formulae for one discourse or another. There is an 
analytic imperative when considering the ideological basis of language 
to not only identify differences between various discourses but also to 
articulate their communicative intent and their consequent impact.
2.2.3.2 Language tools and language weapons
Views on ideology and language and the focality of language in (social) 
change are driven by perceptions of how 'close' the association between 
'language' and 'society' is, or even whether they are separable entities.
The organic relationship between the two is consummated when placed 
in an ideological context.
There are a number of ideological assumptions which underlie the 
existence and tolerance of the sometimes punitive cross examination of 
child victim witnesses. Indeed the activity is allowed to continue 
because of the existence of the, (albeit unspoken), ideological defence 
that this is the way we get at 'the truth'. But a lot is achieved other than 
the dominant purpose as Penman showed above. It seems reasonable to 
accept that discourses could be described and defined in terms of their 
ability to heal, accept, or develop as opposed to their capacity to 
exclude, punish and diminish the position of a speaker. This can be seen 
to operate at both the cultural mass level as well as the personal 
individual level. The invitation is to view language as a series of 
choices of discourses. This arises from a functional perspective which 
describes language in terms of effects, intentions, precepts. Language 
viewed in this way can neither be understood nor analysed through the 
evidence of the words alone, written or spoken. What possibly appears 
as a repressive speech in one context might appear as high comedy in 
another.
There are situations however in which the parameters and players are 
well defined and represent a constant, where the words are the bringing 
to life of the script as they reveal the deeper text. The context of sexual 
abuse is the application of personal power and the maintenance of 
secrecy. The context of the abused child is shame, guilt and helplessness 
operating as a function of isolation. The context of cross examination is 
the denial of personal experience and perception. The context of court 
is to choose a winner. In order for the defendant to not become 'the 
loser', the experiences and perceptions of the abused child have to be 
reconstructed and reformulated and re-presented. That language is and 
should be the focus of our (analytical) activity as we seek to understand 
how people and societies work is supported by the traditions of analysis 
which relate 'language and ideology' with 'language and thought'.
2.2.3.3 Managing thought with language
In her work on eyewitness testimony, Loftus offers one of the most 
convincing demonstrations of the consequences and power of words. In 
a series of ingenious experiments, she reveals a great deal about the 
relation of language, thought and legal processes. From the very 
moment people begin to talk about an event, their words capture, 
encode, and shape memory of the event. Through an experiment in 
which subjects viewed films of automobile accidents and later answered 
questions about events occurring in the films, Loftus and Palmer (1974)
were able to show that questions using different verbs to describe the 
action elicited different answers. The question:
... 'About how fast were the cars going when they SMASHED into 
each other?' elicited higher estimates of speed than questions using the 
verbs 'collided', 'bumped' 'contacted' or *hit' in place of 'smashed'. 
Questions of the form 'Did you see the broken headlight?’ as opposed 
to 'Did you see a broken headlight?' encouraged experimental subjects 
to say 'yes' more frequenUy.
(Loftus, 1974: 118)
The power of the selected word or phrase may on the one hand be seen 
to be derived from the selectivity of one item over another and thus 
framing and limiting the response. It can also operate as a function of 
negation, ie. of all the other possible expressions or forms not used. If 
the word ’collide' is not used then this contributes much to the 
interpretation and response to the question, as does the word 'smashed', 
which is used.
The detail of court proceedings that is left unexamined is the possible 
range of other options. A question is asked and an answer is given. 
The language transaction is supposedly complete. However, two 
fundamental questions are posed. First, what other questions could have 
been asked and secondly, does the fact that an answer is given indicate 
comprehension. In this context of uncertainty and restriction, desired 
themes and ideologies can be built and nurtured.
The continuation of court proceedings does not necessarily depend on 
whether or not they are comprehended by participants. Jurors and 
witnesses are often left behind but respond, as they are compelled to do, 
in an appropriate way. Charrow and Charrow 1979 have found that 
jury instructions are poorly understood and that, '... alterations to some 
of the more troublesome linguistic features significantly increase 
comprehension' (O'Barr, 1982: 27)
2.2.3.4 Picking the variables
In taking up the challenge to study and represent more clearly the 
workings of language in court, O'Barr decided on four speech variables 
around which to concentrate his research efforts.
1. 'Powerful' versus 'powerless' speech (based on Robin Lakoffs 
notions of 'women's' language, which we found to be generally 
present in courtroom speech but more closely associated with social 
class, educational background and previous courtroom experience, 
rather than gender).
2. Hypercorrect versus formal speech (inspired by the work of Labov et
a l . )
3. Narrative versus fragmented testimony (based on observations in 
court and opinions expressed by lawyers about the significance of long 
versus short answers).
4. Simultaneous speech by witness and lawyers (inspired by work 
done in the conversational analysis tradition).
All four sets of studies focus on the central question of the importance 
of form over content of testimony.
(O'Barr, 1982: xii)
The concern with ’form over content’ is a reflection of linguistic 
concern with ’syntax’ and the organisation and structure of expression 
rather than with lexical content. What emerges most significantly from 
these studies is that:
... seemingly minor variations in manner of testifying produce major 
differences in the evaluation of testimony on such key factors as 
credibility, competence to testify, intelligence of the speaker, and the 
like. In a court of law, factors affecting such evaluations of speakers 
may in turn affect the entire decision making process.
(O'Barr, 1982: xii)
The examination of language and the law led O'Barr to be extremely 
critical of the processes and consequences of the system he studied. He 
baldly summarises:
The findings of the Law and Language Project raise fundamental 
questions about the degree to which certain aspects of the (American) 
legal system as presently structured serve the cause of justice.
(O'Barr, 1982: xii)
O'Barr attributes much of the injustice to the perpetuation of forms of 
expression and presentation which are justified by an ideology of 
domination.
... Form at times may be highly significant, even to the point where a 
change in form can alter or reverse the impact of a message.
(O'Barr, 1982: 2)
O’Barr was concerned to demonstrate:
the inseparability of form and content in a setting where it is customary 




The conclusions to O'Barr's study are partly expressed in a table where 
he shows not only what lawyers need to do in order to achieve 
successful examinations but what witnesses need to do in order to resist 
the control and domination of cross examination. Welcome though this 
orientation is, the study may be little more than a confirmation or 
expansion of the techniques manuals. It is expressed only in terms of 
counter tricks and does little to encourage a qualitatively different kind 
of procedure or discourse within the courtroom.
2.2.3.5 Language as lens
In general terms the rationale of the Language and Law Project carried 
out over twenty years at Duke University also forms part of the 
rationale for this thesis in that:
Thus far sociolinguistic studies have focussed on the rich variety of 
socially patterned language variation but have done little with courtroom 
language p e r  se. Those social scientists who have studied courtroom 
processes have not for the most part devoted much attention to language 
as a factor to be explained or as a factor that can help explain the legal 
process itse lf .... despite the importance of language in the law and of 
language as a strategic resource to lawyers, the role of language in 
courtroom chemistry has been and remains poorly comprehended.
(O'Barr, 1982: 12)
Although these studies provide some basic evidence for a critique of the 
justice purported to be at the centre of the court's enterprise, there is 
little focus on the direct consequences to the witness of the effects of the 
court experience.
The focus of the next section (2.3) will be upon possible and appropriate 
ways of analysing language whilst having due regard for the 
significance of the overarching implications of the relationship between 
language, thought and control.
2.3 ANALYSING LANGUAGE
Having reviewed some of the pertinent literature in the general field of 
language, ideology and control and also in the more specific field of 
courtroom study I move now to address the issue of reviewing possible 
ways of analysing language. The aim is to identify appropriate ways of 
analysing language to illuminate the relationship between language, 
ideology and control and also accommodate the nature and complexity 
of courtroom interaction.
Operationally there are three major aspects to the task of 'analysing 
language'. They are:
• the focus of the analysis and the use to which it might be put
• the most appropriate pools of data to inform the research question
• the most appropriate linguistic indicators with which to analyse and 
present the data.
This section (2.3) seeks to locate this thesis amongst language studies 
which acknowledge the social and ideological nature of linguistic 
activity and which seek also to ground their linguistics in the 
observation and analysis of problematic situations. As such the field of 
inquiry of this thesis and those it seeks to be associated with lies, (as 
Dell Hymes (1972) suggests) at the intersection of linguistics and 
anthropology, sociology and hermeneutics, folklore and political 
science, speech and social psychology and, like Kurdistan, remains a 
terra incognita divided among competing states!
Studies which analyse and present language in a way appropriate to the 
research question of this thesis are reviewed.
An appropriate literature base includes those works which seek to 
address and respond to productive and ever richer ways of describing 
how language works to particular effect in nominated situations and 
circumstances.
I start by acknowledging and commenting upon studies which establish 
linguistic inquiry as an appropriate activity (2.3.1); one which requires 
the researcher to delineate a field of inquiry and to nominate a 
perspective from which the research is both carried out and interpreted. 
This is the general activity of establishing a focus. I then (2.3.2) review 
studies which suggest a variety of pools of data which may be 
appropriate to consider in informing the research question of this thesis. 
Following this I present a selection (2.3.3) of linguistic indicators which 
others have used as a basis for their analysis of a range of data pools.
2.3.1 Establishing a focus
Given that the territory of linguistic inquiry can be mapped and 
interpreted in many different ways, the only truly useful way of 
understanding the territory is to chart with the tools available and, as in 
all good navigational practice, to take readings from a number of 
angles. The perspective which is called upon, one which admits and
acknowledges the complex intersection of angles involved, is a 
sociolinguistic perspective. I have decided to adopt a sociolinguistic 
perspective because it clearly uses linguistic insight to inform social 
practice and vice versa.. The nature of the research question is such 
that it also clearly seeks to respond to a problematic situation in terms 
of its social and linguistic dimensions.
2.3.1.1 Establishing a sociolinguistic perspective
A sociolinguistic perspective provides us with that information which 'a 
foreigner must learn about a group's behaviour in order to participate 
appropriately and effectively in its activities' (Hymes, 1972: 101).
The depth of that perspective is only as extensive as the angles, 
instruments and descriptors used to investigate and define it. Jonathan 
Webster gives us the simple proposition that:
Any observable tendency to use a particular word or phrase or to define 




... meaning of something does not reside in any outside, objective or 
independent reality; rather meanings are created out of our 
communicative practises ... any account or explanation cannot be taken 
as a discovery in the 'real world', but as the creation of a story to make 
sense of our world.
(Penman, 1990: 1)
The making of a credible and useful story rests not so much on the 
validation of a single reading or calculation but the accumulation of 
disparate data which when reviewed alongside each other 'make sense'. 
This suggests not only an outcome, a sensible story, but a way of going 
about laying the foundations for such.
All discourse analysis is concerned with making sense of a fundamental 
human phenomenon-communication. At the heart of this analysis is the 
assignment of meaning to communicative practices.
(Penman, 1990: 1)
This statement supports the idea that the focus of study generally drives 
the method and strategies used to uncover both the display of that 
communication and the subsequent assignation of meanings. The tools 
of examination already contain within them certain meanings and 
exclude certain others. When a study is concerned most specifically
with language, and talking about language, the levels and details of 
embedded meaning become our concern.
2.3.1.2 Committing the researcher
The position of the researcher as both driving force and filter must be 
recognised. Questions of morality, for instance, have been neglected in 
much past research not only because of the paradigmatically driven 
belief in scientific neutrality but also necessity to maintain distance from 
the object of study. Within that conventional framework, the researcher 
and writer was expected to act as a dispassionate chronicler and analyst 
of observed events; not as a proponent of, or commentator on, a moral 
position. Within a framework of language study which admits the social 
and thus ideological nature, all communicative practices are taken to 
have a moral dimension and researchers have the moral task of 
exploring it. The nature of such communicative morality is that 
communicative acts have consequences and this requires communicators 
to take responsibility for such. Penman suggests a conceptual 
framework in which 'goals' and 'games', which can be seen to be 
operating through discourse, provide the basis for inferring a moral 
order. (Penman, 1990)
If for no other reason the aspect of morality is established by the 
general fact that in all communicative situations where one party is 'in 
control' then that party has options as to how the discourse will proceed. 
The constant linguistic fact which flows from this is that when someone 
says 'something' they are not saying 'something else'. If we can imagine 
that something else is utterable then we have to acknowledge that a 
choice has been made.
Analysing the language of cross examination clarifies and establishes 
that it is different from other speech activity. It establishes also that 
other ways of speaking in court can be imagined. This sense of 
alternative is the basis of a moral commitment to both the focus and the 
process of the research. The mode of inquiry is as significant as the 
items of inquiry in determining the morality of research processes. 
Qualitative research presents itself as being able and willing to 
accommodate such concerns into the process of research. What matters 
most is answering the questions to which we need answers.
2.3.1.3 Responding to site and data
What constitutes 'language analysis' is necessarily part of the choice of 
site and data, the definition of the problem and questions addressed, the
extent of context, and the method of reporting. All phases and aspects 
are reflective one of the other, are recursive in their progress and are 
responsible for the constant growth of our appreciation.
All these aspects taken together become an ethnography of 
communication and in order to increase our understanding we need to 
know more about all aspects of the genre, particularly the often 
unconscious bodies of social conventions which guide and constrain the 
possibilities of communicative action.
Analysing language thus becomes a challenge to widen as far as possible 
the parameters of our investigation in order to allow for the emergence 
of ’patterns which connect’. In order to develop an appreciation of 
patterned linguistic behaviour it may be useful to explore it in two 
dimensions. The following dimensions are suggested by Webster 
(1972).
i Lexico semantic dimension. This consists of lexical units which 
contribute to the thematic construct of discourse. This is usually 
recognised as:
... jargon, special vocabulary. They need not be uncommon words but 
might, as is most often the case, be lexically common but semantically 
special. They mean something special in that context. Two speakers 
may speak closely related and on the surface mutually intelligible 
varieties o f the same language, but they may nevertheless 
misunderstand each other because of differences in usage rules resulting 
from differences in background.
(Gumperz, 1970:138 in Webster, 1972)
ii The stylistic dimension. This consists of those features of language 
which are restricted to or highly identifiable in a certain kind of 
social context, as in a feature when:
... it is restricted in its occurrence to a limited number of social 
contexts, we shall call a stylistically significant or stylistically distinctive 
feature. Crystal and Davy’s definition of style is so broad as to make 
the term nearly synonymous with ... register. Halliday et a l . define 
register as a variety of language 'distinguished according to use'.
(Webster, 1972: 49)
This dimension is discernible through both surface and prosodic 
features such as repetition, pitch, loudness and pause (Crystal and Davy, 
1969).
Taken together analysis and combinations in both these dimensions may 
provide a complete description but cannot be as critically significant as a 
description which takes into account belief systems and ways of
knowing. The tools and the resulting descriptions suggested above 
allow only for the identification of specialised varieties of language 
through the observation of variation from others. Valuable and 
necessary as this is in making initial distinctions, it fails to critically 
analyse the activity. An example of a complete but uncritical analysis is 
to be found in Ghadessy's treatment of business letter analysis.
2.3.1.4 Form and function
Ghadessy used a schematic analysis of form and function in order to 
arrive at an appreciation of the commonalities of business letters. 
(Ghadessy, 1988)
Alongside the (almost physical) recognition of form was set the 
appraisal of functions which, when existing together, suggest some kind 
of ideal or complete specimen of the type. Functions referred to the 
possible processes of greeting, inquiry, bargaining, offering and the 
like. The possible outcome of this analysis was a series of proposals for 
discourse patterns for business letters which could be translated into 
computer programs. The programs might prompt the writer to give 
attention to or review both the details of form and function in order to 
produce not only 'the ideal' type but also varieties and combinations of 
letter types. Again, this analysis clearly recognised the need to create 
analytical insights from the interaction between surface features of 
language and the differential effects they have on 'listeners’.
Nevertheless the challenge remains to understand the:
... precarious dependence of all we know upon linguistic tools 
which themselves are largely unknown or unnoticed
(Whorf in Fishman, 1966; 505)
In referring to ’linguistic tools’ Whorf is talking of the language in use. 
The dependence is ’precarious’ insofar as often we cannot imagine ways 
of carrying out our communications, other than the ways we currently 
use.
Through studying discourse which was initiated and sustained through 
questioning, Mishler (1975) sought to bring together individual aspects 
of expression with a macro appreciation of the structure of the dialogue 
plus the contextual understanding of differential status between the 
speakers.
Mishler analysed the 'chain and arching functions' of a discourse where 
power and authority are maintained by the adult speaker. The technique
consisted of drawing diagrammatic links between questions, subsequent 
questions and the maintenance of the status of questioner.
In doing this Mishler consciously addressed the connected issues of data, 
analysis, problem focus and methodology. He indicated that the various 
ways in which a conversation may be extended or sustained through the 
use of questions
... provided the basis for a typology of discourse. We propose that 
the different subtypes of question-sustained discourse reflect role 
relationships between speakers, particularly along a dimension of 
authority and power ... the ways in which social relationships are 
’realised’ in the structure of language is the central topic of the larger 
study from which these data are drawn; our approach to the analysis 
and interpretation of findings is guided by our concern with the 
general problem.
(Mishler, 1974: 100)
In an effort to step beyond the analysis of words and strings of words 
Mishler suggested the usefulness of connections between non-adjacent 
strings of words and developed the concepts of arching and chaining. 
What is importance is that this approach:
allows us to formulate discourse in terms of dialogue; that these 
connected units of dialogue constitute discourse. There are three 
primary ways in which questions may serve to connect dialogue 
units and thus produce a type of discourse that is both question- 
initiated and question -sustained. These are referred to as Chaining, 
where the confirmation utterance contains a question; Arching, 
where the response utterance contains a question; and Embedding, 
where there are two responses to the initial question.
(Mishler, 1974:101)
Having settled upon these criteria to form the basis of description 
Mishler speculated whether the length of the discourse is related to the 
types of connections used and whether there might be systematic 
relationships between types of connection and the age and sex of 
interlocutress. The significance of the study is the connections it sought 
to make between the details of a discourse described at both a micro and 
macro level and how these are realisations of social relationships and 
social functions. He was interested in:
... the ways in which social reality is constructed through language.
We have assumed that questioning is one of the ways through which 
one speaker attempts to exert control over another. For us, it is a 
realisation of an expression of authority relationships. Through the 
act of questioning, one speaker defines the way in which the other is 
to continue with the conversation and thus defines their relationship 
to each other along a dimension of power and authority.
(Mishler, 1974:103)
When we look to the range of functions which a 'question' can fulfil this 
is not surprising. Mishler calls upon the Webster's New International 
Dictionary which contributes synonyms for 'question' as challenge, 
demand, dispute, call into question, examine, charge, accuse and doubt. 
The questioner using these functions is calling the tune. The term ask is 
often considered to be a synonym for question, however the synonyms 
for it are given as need, entreat, beseech, petition, and implore , a much 
lower status in terms of control. When the functions associated with 
'questioning' are translated into the dynamic of the suggested chaining, 
we observe a complete and powerful control of one speaker over the 
other as the dialogue is controlled a cycle ahead. Questioning is revealed 
to be a 'mode of communication through which authority relationships 
are realised' (Mishler, 1974: 107).
Mishler contended that as a common method of creating extended 
discourse when talking to children adults use chaining extensively. 
Children when talking to each other, use the dynamic considerably less:
In research on language, as in any other inquiry, we must begin 
somewhere. That is, we must take some features of the world as 
given for the purposes at hand ... we must ... choose particular 
problems for study, select particular ways to observe and collect 
samples of relevant speech, and define particular units and 
relationships for analysis ... our methods of collecting samples of 
talk, of segmenting the corpus into conversational episodes, of 
selecting question initiated exchanges, and of unitising and 
connecting units of dialogue and stretches of discourse - all of these 
procedures were intended to permit an analysis of language through 
which we could explore these intuitive and orienting assumptions.
(Mishler, 1974: 119)
For the purposes of a rich, informed and relevant analysis there is a 
need to use a wide selection of appropriate data and analytic procedures. 
The studies referred to above help to establish focus and give some 
initial operational flesh to answering the research question and 
orientation of this thesis. However while some useful types of data and 
techniques of analysis have been identified, the appropriate data pools 
for this thesis lay both amongst and beyond data pools utilised in other 
studies.
2.3.2 Possible pools of data
2.3.2.1 Constructing a record
The first issue of discourse analysis is to fix on a pool of discourse in a 
given form as the focus for analysis. The very construction of a record 
of a discourse in a particular form determines and pre-empts analysis 
and perception. The most obvious feature in any record is the naming
of the parties. To read of a conversation between ’General 
Schwarzkopf and the 'terrorist' attributes clear personal identity and 
rank to one party and negative anonymity to the other. Naming in this 
way claims for one party legitimacy and for the other disregard. The 
way in which an interaction is recorded further constrains interpretation 
of the discourse.
A large pool of data was available to this research project in the form of 
transcripts from nearly every level of court. It is amongst these 
transcripts that the official identity of the child victim witness is to be 
found and it is within the social and verbal contexts, (of which the court 
transcripts are one record), that those children find themselves.
2.3.2.2 People and words in context: the practice of questioning
Studies, especially those which focus on questioning practice in 
educational settings, represent the range of orientations available to the 
language researcher. The decision to settle upon 'questions’ as a useful 
focus for my other problematic concerns may be justified because of 
their obvious centrality. If someone stops 'asking the questions' then the 
social relationships change or disappear. It is this aspect of associating 
linguistic activity in one situation with more pervasive social 
relationships that distinguish between studies of 'language in use'.
Language studies differentiate themselves from each other by:
• recognising a larger or smaller range of contextual features for 
analysis, and
• associating language behaviour with other aspects of social 
experience.
Whilst participants use their understanding of the context to interpret 
what a particular utterance is doing at any one moment, (Beynon, 1987)
....it is evident that the question and answer pattern dominates (in schools); 
and that this is learnt early in pupils' school careers (Willes, 1983). Further 
it seems that teachers' questions are a confirmation of power relations, 
rights and obligations (Edwards, 1976).
French and N. Maclure (1979) explore how teachers orchestrate right 
answers by constantly providing indicators of what they define as valid; by 
controlling discourse in this manner teachers also control the transmission 
of knowledge and employ recognisable 'methodic practises' to 'make 
lessons happen’. Payne confirms that in most secondary classrooms 
teachers do nearly all the talking and ask nearly all the questions, the great 
majority of these being the closed factual variety. (Payne, 1976)
(Beynon, 1987: 39)
It seems that deciding just what a question is, is itself problematic.
2.3.2.3 When Is a question?
On the nature of questions, Beynon ( 1987) suggests that there is no 
clear cut way of recognising questions as such and indicators that a 
question is being asked, and an answer sought, is as much defined by 
situation and history as by grammatical construction and inflection. It 
should be further noted that teachers and other people concerned to 
establish and maintain authority rarely ask questions to which they don't 
already know the answers. He tells us that:
... the asking of known-answer questions is ... associated with 
situations where one partner assumes power and authority over 
another ... (and is) ... displayed most noticeably in the follow-up 
turn from the questioner, whose prior knowledge of the answer is 
then revealed.
(Beynon, 1987: 40)
The analysis employed by Beynon is based on his own response to the 
meanings generated by conversations between pupil and teacher, 
informed also by a follow up interview with the participants.
Following his account of a Verbal wrestling match’ between teacher and 
pupil as the pupil resists the challenge to answer a ’stupid’ question to 
which the teacher already knows the answer, Beynon observes that:
... a question is a product of the way features of total form interact 
with aspects of its situation ... Participants use their understanding 
of the context to interpret what a particular utterance is doing at any 
one moment. Questions are not only used to gather and display 
information but also to ’deride, complain, challenge, disrupt, assert 
stature and invoke institutional power’.
(Beynon, 1987: p42)
In conclusion he calls for:
... increased interdisciplinarity in the study of (classroom) language, 
but for the collection of ethnographic data through both participant 
observation and interviewing, to complement the distanced, cold 
analysis of transcripts. Only then can the discourse function of 
(classroom) questions be adequately related to their wider negotiative 
and strategical roles and the interpretive work entailed in asking and 
answering them.
(Beynon, 1987: 42)
2.3.2.4 What does a question do?
I suggest that the significance of questions in court is not so much how 
’questioning’ they are but rather how constraining of a particular 
response they are. Barnes and Todd (1975) in Some problems in the 
analysis o f questions make the following observations about some of the 
difficulties in identifying a question as such. They state:
The question statement/distinction is essentially a false one, and one 
that is rooted in a specific method of analysis, namely the 
consideration of single utterances only. Our examination of situated 
continuous discourse leads us to believe that question and non­
question forms alike may be used to make identical claims about 
speech roles, that is to offer ’interaction frames’. The way the 
strength of these claims varies from utterance to utterance tells us far 
more about the construction of meaning in conversations than does 
an analysis in terms of form alone.
(Barnes and Todd, 1975: 12)
2.3.2.5 Ideology as context
Gunther Kress (1985) in Discourses, texts, readers and the pro-nuclear 
arguments suggests that:
... the listener/reader, speaker/writer (should be) seen not as an 
isolated individual, but as a social being located in a network of 
social relations, in specific places in a social structure. What we are 
looking to identify are a series of sociolinguistic strategies which 
together create a particular discourse. This inquiry proceeds upon 
the established premise that texts are everywhere and inescapably 
ideologically structured, and that the ideological structuring of both 
language and text can be related readily enough to the social 
structures and processes of the origins of particular texts...
(Kress, 1985: 67)
Kress's approach to the analysis of public discourse is to critically 
review the text whilst reflecting upon the larger social and political 
intentions of the creators of those texts. In this work there is a real 
interest in understanding social and psychological process, within the 
frameworks of linguistic theory.
A discourse provides a set of possible statements about a given area 
and organises and gives structure to the manner in which a particular 
topic, object, process is to be talked about, in that it provides 
descriptions, rules, permissions and prohibitions of social and 
individual actions. (Kress, 1985: 68)
Discourses strive towards total and encompassing accounts in which 
contradictions are resolved or at least suppressed of problematic 
areas are resolved in this way and the social is made natural when 
everything is not 'obviously natural' and 'naturally obvious'.
(Kress,1985: 73)
Because the nature of the adversarial court system is to express 
outcomes in terms of right/wrong and win/lose it is possible to apply the 
above insight. The process is about a struggle between 'total and 
encompassing accounts'. In my search for appropriate ways of 
analysing language in order to inform the research question of this 
thesis, it may useful to heed Kress’s advice that:
A theory of language based on (discourses) explains two 
fundamental factors at one and the same time; the social 
determination of an individual’s knowledge of language on the one 
hand and individual difference and differing position vis-a-vis the 
linguistic system on the other hand ... in a discourse oriented theory 
of language both (social determination of linguistic practice and 
individual difference in linguistic practice) And a plausible and 
motivated account
(Kress, 1985: 74).
It is also a working premise of other researchers that linguistic structure 
is a most significant mechanism through which to create different 
realities.
In the tradition of ethnomethodology some researchers (Garfinkel, 
1974; Hymes, 1975; Demarest and others, 1975) have explicated the 
relationship between discourse understanding and social reality and the 
coercion towards particular meanings as they explored the nature and 
effect of Christian Science oral testimonies. Because this analysis 
actively seeks to relate the experiences of individuals to the general 
process of truth seeking, it suggests some useful concepts for analysing 
the treatment of child victim witnesses under cross examination. The 
roles in both situations are heavily circumscribed (victim-witness and 
liar-sinner), and both are ritualised public 'examinations'.
A process common to both the Christian Science testimony and the cross 
examination situation may prevail. Both are intended to create a 'text' 
in such a way as to enforce a particular insight. Such insights are often 
created by commonly held beliefs which do not require conscious 
articulation. Because of their powerful presence as framers and 
creators of meaning however it is imperative that such cultural 
meanings be recognised as data when attempting to describe and analyse 
language in use.
Using the Christian Science testimony example further it is possible to 
see that the words, patterns and sequences can be shown to constitute a 
carefully managed dialectic between what is told, and what is 
understood and not told. What is not told draws upon the background 
knowledge which can remain untold but remains powerfully present 
(Demarest, 1975).
Demarest suggests there are two distinct kinds of such knowledge.
• The cultural knowledge and conventional wisdoms held by the 
listeners. In the court situation being studied here this would include 
press, gallery, judge, and jury. In the Christian Science situation this 
would include all present.
• The experiential knowledge of the 'witnesses' being addressed. In 
both the Christian Science situation and the court the 'witnesses' are 
the focus of attention as they are persuaded to accept new creations of 
the truth.
The basis of the analysis in the Demarest paper consisted of identifying 
distinctive features which arose out of the creation of a distinctive 
language variety, restricting usage of certain forms to the (Christian 
Science) context or by assigning specialised meanings to everyday forms 
when used in (that) context (Demarest, 1975).
Demarest observed that this process is shared by many religious and 
professional groups. He observed further that the 'advantage' of this 
accomplishment is the maintenance of group solidarity through the 
public sharing of (specialised) common understandings and associations 
which members can readily and easily bring to bear (Demarest, 1975).
The process of truth construction can be viewed as a process which, 
through a series of patterned interactions, creates themes which can be 
'played' at will.
In the Christian Science testimonies under examination, patterns of 
meaning focussed specifically upon:
• the concepts of (personal) error and (transcendent) truth. These are 
related through a number of propositions and agencies.
• 'truth' and its reference.
The underlying pattern is derived from its individual documentary 
evidences but in turn the individual documentary evidences are 
interpreted on the basis of 'what is known' about the underlying pattern. 
Harold Garfinkel's (1967) description of this process as 'the work of 
fact production’:
... throws light on the testimonial account. In addition it indicates 
that reality construction processes (in Christian Science) share basic 
features with reality construction processes in everyday life.
(Demarest, 1975: 23)
The outcome of the analysis is a seven step ’map’ for the giving of 
testimonies and an explanation of each of the seven section headings 
suggested. However it is the analytical perspective which shows us the 
relationship created by the more powerful speaker. Individual and 
personal inadequacy juxtaposed beside superior notions of generalised 
truth are implicit within the relationship. These analytic insights are 
created by reviewing whole texts and the social, psychological and 
cultural contexts in which they are placed.
It is this development of cultural imperatives which steers us to a 
consideration of language interactions which are patterned and themed, 
and thus predictable and constraining of the roles of interlocutors; as 
constituting a ’discourse’.
2.3.2.6 Discourse for analysis
'Discourse' is used by Halliday to delineate a given text or script which 
is so featured in a particular way, and which functions in a particular 
way and to such a degree, that its application is observable in a given 
setting. The discourse arises from a register which in turn is a function 
of the general proceedings. In this thesis my interest is in the site of 
activity called 'court proceedings' or 'cross examination' within which a 
particular 'discourse' may be discerned. By concentrating on this site 
the study may be able to reflect the insight that:
Types of linguistic situation differ from one another, broadly 
speaking, in three respects; first as regards to what is actually taking 
place; secondly, as regards what part the language is playing; and 
thirdly, as regards who is taking part These three variables, taken 
together determine the range within which meanings are selected and 
the forms which are used for their expression in other words they 
determine the register.
(Halliday, 1978: 31)
In the context of that observation I reiterate that the primary linguistic 
focus of the research question of this thesis is to investigate the 
purposive role of the language as part of what we are doing (Ghadessy, 
1988).
2.3.3 Choosing appropriate linguistic indicators
The outcome and rationale of an analysis of discourse is its 
differentiation from other uses of language; of other discourses. A 
particular discourse may be shown to vary from another by virtue of its 
variation in syntactic structures, lexical items, patterned progression, 
development of themes, or the role of key elements. Indeed much
recent work on the relationship between language and ideology has 
concentrated on the employment of particular syntactic patterns with 
marked but not always easily discernible designs on the reader (Carter 
in Ghadessy, 1988).
Carter points out the differential use of the 'factive verb' in the 
example, 'the Prime Minister explained that the budget measures were 
unnecessary' v. The leader of the opposition claimed that the budget 
measures were unnecessary'.
He observes that:
The truth flows more easily from the verb 'explained' in that it is 
non-contentious whereas the verb 'claim' creates elements of doubt 
as it is a position attributable to only one person.
(Carter, 1988: 8)
This analysis of the role played by the verb is only one option amongst 
many available to the observer of language in use. Carter (1988) 
suggests the following indicators; first, that agents and processes can be 
lexicalised to distort or direct emphasis away from real world events 
and towards expression of a particular ideology. In the situation of 
court where the attribution of blame is of the essence, this linguistic 
indicator may be significant. In this context, Carter also refers to 
'nominalisation' which is used to simplify and objectify, and thus 
sometimes mask causal relations.
Another suggestion is that 'lexical choice' is a key determiner of 
meanings, although he acknowledges that this is hard to pin down from 
an analytical point of view because words change their meanings and 
emphasis with a slight shift in time situation, or history. Carter suggests 
that because of the ’slipperiness’ attached to attributing set meanings to 
lexical items, it is appropriate to develop a descriptive scheme:
... for the recognition of core vocabulary as a step towards fuller 
examination of lexical structure and the role of lexical items in a 
discourse ... a llow ing] us to discuss vocabulaiy in a more 
principled way, and provide a basis for examining 'bias' in the lexis 
... and, in a more general way, provide a basis for exploring the 
relationship between lexis and ideology.
(Carter, 1988: 8)
If an objective or dispassionate 'truth' is being searched for (in court 
proceedings) then one might expect, as suggested by Carter, a 
prevalence of 'core terms', that is, a vocabulary which is as accessible as 
possible to the discussants. As an extension of this idea, he suggests that 
a 'lack of coreness' would naturally reduce the participation of one of 
the partners in the conversation. He summarises:
Linguistic devices at several levels interpenetrate to produce some 
especially dense and subtle effects ... the deletion of any agent or 
witness ... serves to impart evidence which cannot be authenticated.
(Carter, 1988:12)
The significance for this thesis is the suggestion that core lexis be 
regarded as a feature of text generation. The general proposition is that 
general coreness will be inclusive of participants and possible 
interpretations and that as the vocabulary becomes less core, the text 
becomes more interpretive and excluding of a range of possible 
meanings. This concept of 'shared vocabulary' between speakers is a 
possible lens for viewing the language relationships between child 
victim witnesses and cross examiners.
2.3.3.1 Context of situation
Ghadessy (1988) suggests that for the acculturated reader the 
relationship between text and context is two-fold. If we have access to 
the context, we can predict the essentials of the text; if we have access to 
the text, then we can infer the context from it. He draws on the 
observation that 'we proceed from that which is present to that which is 
not present but stands in some relation to the former' (Hasan, 1981: 
111.).
If the research question is to relate linguistic reality to the reality of the 
experience of the child victim witness, the 'context of situation' must be 
acknowledged. A way of establishing contextual connections is available 
through the identification of 'collocational patterns'.
2.3.3.2 Collocational patterns
Collocational patterns are those patterns of meaning that are created 
when one word goes with or is invariably used with another. The 
meaning generated is a function of their particular combination and 
semantic chemistry. A collocation is the regular co-occurrence of two 
or more words or word forms, within a given text (Sinclair, 1985 in 
Ghadessy, 1988).
It may be that being a victim is so tied to other experiences that the 
linguistic characteristic of collocational patterning can be used to great 
effect.
A technique for establishing collocation is to designate a key word and 
examine it in the context of the five words either side of its occurrence. 
The text may then be seen to vary from other texts according to the type
and distribution of its collocational patterns. Where these patterns are 
pervasive and denote a variation from other texts, there exists the 
possibility of asserting that they be regarded as registers in their own 
right. This variation in register may occur both between discourse as 
well as within a particular discourse.
2.3.3.3 Being the object of attention
Another linguistic indicator which distinguishes between actors in a 
given dialogue is that of subject and object. Transitive and intransitive 
verbs define grammatical subject or object. Where the subject stands, in 
real life and grammatically, in relation to the action, alleged or 
otherwise is axiomatic to the whole proceedings. A struggle over this 
relationship, in the context of the word battle that is court, can be 
viewed as a battle over grammar.
2.3.3.4 Learning from advertising
Other language behaviours which present themselves as devices for 
establishing and keeping control, and also as possible units of analysis in 
this thesis, are available from studies of advertising.
• Repetition
Sheer repetition of a proposition has been noted as a feature of much 
advertising, the underlying aim of which is to firstly create a meaning 
(even from sometimes totally fictitious and erroneous premises) and 
then to convince the hearer to adopt that meaning (Leech, 1966).
Most advertisements reveal copious repetition of the product name and 
certain emphasised attributes.(Toolan in Ghadessy, 1988). This results 
in narrowing the attention of the consumer.
• Syntactic chunking and modal verbs
Syntactic chunking is a technique used in advertising where one small 
proposition is expressed in close proximity to another with the result 
that the reader creates a cohesive meaning. This occurs because it is in 
the interests of humans generally to create for themselves whole, 
sensible stories about themselves and others. This sense can be created 
even if it has no foundation in truth. The acceptability is to be found 
not so much in the verifiability of their details but in the completeness 
of the presentation. Music and rhythm are often used in advertising to 
support this sense of completeness. Leech notes that the commonest
modal verb in advertisements is ’can' but in other arenas other modal 
verbs may be employed. A verb becomes the central message having 
been used in such a way as to set up a dominating and seductive musical 
rhythm (Leech in Ghadessy, 1988).
• Closure
A sense of incompleteness in any message induces a hearer to create 
their own meaning. On the one hand this has the effect of constructing 
a desired message whilst on the other creating in the hearer a sense of 
involvement. Having gone through the process of completing the 
message they then have part ownership of such, and consequently defend 
and promote that message themselves.
• Common adjectives and verbs
By using a common pool of adjectives and verbs the creator of 
advertising and other messages constrains the hearer to not think in 
terms of other processes and descriptors.
• Twisting words
Over time lexical items change so that a word can be used which means 
something slightly different in the context now, but is close enough to 
the 'dictionary meaning' to allow the speaker to utter it either without 
challenge, or if challenged to appeal to the authority of the dictionary. 
In language the constant dynamic which operates between usage and 
reference creates an ambivalence which is at once interesting, lively 
and evolutionary as well as fertile ground for exploitation.
The aim and power of advertising is to trigger a series of underlying 
tendencies and to react positively to one product or range of products in 
particular. There are a number of characteristics of the message 
(constructed by the advertiser), as noted above, which serve to focus 
these tendencies and needs.
It is feasible to suggest that judge and jury in the courtroom might be 
similarly subjected to the 'advertising techniques' of the cross examiner 
as are the victim witnesses who, as a result of good selling, will come to 
believe in their own lack of credibility, as the other hearers do. The 
techniques specified above suggest themselves as of possible use in 
capturing the linguistic dynamics of cross examination. However whilst 
these micro aspects of language offer the possibility for a restricted 
insight of 'language in use' the development of a macro level 
appreciation will modify or enrich that insight and contribute to an 
understanding of the culture to which the particular language style
belongs. Such macro-level structures might include themes, arguments 
and the way in which they are treated.
2.3.3.5 Understanding culture
Diane Houghton's analysis of creationist writings (Houghton, 1988) and 
the source of their power of both conviction and credibility, provides 
such an appreciation as she seeks to account for activity, participants, 
and the nature of participation. In seeking to know more about all 
aspects of the creationist genre she points to the often unconscious 
bodies of social conventions which guide and constrain the possibilities 
of communicative action (Houghton in Ghadessy, 1988).
The lenses through which she views the texts, although not referred to 
specifically as such by her, are impressions created upon her as a user 
of language. She uses her intuitions and insights to make judgments as a 
mature and experienced language user and examples of her analysis read 
in a conversational and personal way.
Houghton's concern is with the meanings embodied in the language, 
which are not equally accessible to all parties. In order to address this 
concern she attempts to explicate a range of language devices and their 
effects which contribute to this lack of equity.
Something that is clear to one party but not clear to another, or 
something which is used to great advantage by one but diminished 
advantage by another, is problematic in language. Language devices are 
not always consciously understood by the one who is advantaged, but the 
advantage itself is most certainly apprehended.
Houghton lists a number of aspects of the language used in creationist 
writings and speeches, all of which go beyond linguistic insights 
associated with words and phrases.
• Word meanings and allusions are clouded when the majority (of 
terms) involve use of the names to describe the theory rather than its 
supporters.
• Theme or topic are discerned not from the thesis being proposed but 
from the underlying propositions that permeate the tex t.
She suggests that by appealing to these macro characteristics of the text, 
we are able to discern principles of the generation, delivery, and 
reaction to that text. A traditional sentence level or even paragraph
level analysis is unlikely to reveal the most interesting and important 
aspects of these texts.
A variety of features are displayed by the written passages she analyses, 
but she suggests that in order to make them visible, our analysis must be 
of the context of culture. Some of these features are 'nominal group', 
'syntactic density’, and 'modal verbs' which set a particular tone of 
credibility or lack thereof, 'authorial involvement' (present or not), 
and 'implied dialogue'. What combine the different writings into a 
single identifiable genre are not only the surface features of the text but 
the ways of knowing they imply, suggest and enforce. She suggests that:
... cultural factors can have a legitimate place within a model of 
language in use, and that there does already exist a category within 
which these (creationist) texts can be placed. The category to be 
chosen is the category of 'genre'.
(Houghton, 1988: 75)
Having flagged the intricate sociolinguistic enterprise of systemic 
linguistics, which is articulated by using the tools and framework of 
functional grammar she summarises as follows:
Michael Halliday’s systemic approach to register [it] seems... is part of 
the 'context of situation' in which a variety of language belongs. There 
are three components of register - field, tenor and mode. Field includes 
setting or scene, topic and action; tenor is made up of participants, their 
purpose and role relations; and mode includes the channel used for the 
communication, and its form. As we work downwards, from context 
of situation, to the semantic system, the three components of register 
are matched by equivalent semantic components, namely;
context of situation; field tenor mode
semantic system; ideational interpersonal textual
(Houghton, 1988: 76)
The fineness of the analysis is achieved by working further downwards 
towards greater specificity. However:
... there is always the danger that two pieces (of writing) may 
illustrate similar organisational patterns, using Halliday's analysis, 
but it could be clear from other observable features that the texts are 
from very different 'registers'.
(Houghton, 1988: 76)
She asserts that what is actually wanted is an analytical tool that works 
upwards from context of situation, rather than downwards.
She reports Martin's suggestions that purpose, at present an aspect of 
tenor, should be regarded in a more umbrella fashion to become context 
of culture. Thus, in attempting to establish the existence of a genre the
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analyst would take into account context of culture (described in terms of 
genre); context of situation (described in terms of register consisting of 
field, tenor and mode); and semantic system (described in terms of 
linguistic realisations). Together these indicators and features describe 
language.
The forms of text are likely to vary considerably at the micro-level. 
However at the macro-level of themes and arguments and their 
treatment, there are certain structural similarities to be discerned. Just 
as texts which make use of the bible as the only source of data so the 
single examination and use of a child's (child-victim-witness) answer to 
questions of memory could be used to enforce the general proposition 
that it is poor. Creationist texts are against evolution rather than for 
creation. They are dedicated to establishing a single position to the 
exclusion of another. The argument is mounted from the point of 
creating doubt in one side in order to strengthen the other.
The ultimate tension in this cultural and macro appreciation of the 
nature and use of language is that the culture of abuse which is the basis 
of the conflict in court exists. But it is the one proposition which cannot 
be admitted out loud in court. In order to fully understand the 'texts' 
created in court we need to place them in the culture to which they 
belong
Clearly the advice is that when one is truly interested to understand the 
nature and dynamics of language use, and when one has come to realise 
that the culture within which that language is uttered is pivotal to both 
its apprehension and its meaning, then in any analysis of language one 
has to accommodate as much of that 'culture' as is possible. What we 
choose to take note of is necessarily selective .
This section (2.3) on 'analysing language' has ranged across a variety of 
alternative and useful ways in which language can be analysed given the 
focus question of this thesis. All suggest aspects of concern and possible 
terms within which to carry out analysis.
On reflection of the chapter as a whole I am confronted with a 
challenge. As language analyst, I am obliged not only to find 
descriptors and characteristics which differentiate one discourse from 
another, but to place this study within other courtroom studies and to 
also relate the study to concepts of pervasive ideology and culture. This 
chapter has sought to review works which, when taken together, 





The purpose of this chapter is to describe, explain and justify the choice 
of research method. By 'method' I mean the processes of data 
collection, analysis, and interpretation which were generated in response 
to the research problem. In answering the focus question, the desired 
outcome of the method was to create an informed narrative, a detailed 
and cohesive account that was convincing to the variety of central 
stakeholders. That account also aspired to 'present the case' for the 
child victim witness under cross examination.
The research design of this study was based on several methodological 
considerations and operational constraints. As the aim of the study was 
to uncover and explain a strongly perceived but not clearly appraised 
phenomenon, (the experience of the child victim witness under cross 
examination), the tools of data collection and analysis were unknown at 
the beginning. The design was therefore emergent with a view that 
exploratory and investigative procedures would reflect emerging 
questions and would respond to these in order to refine both the 
concerns and the answers.
This is not to suggest that the study took place in a theory vacuum. On 
the contrary - it was constantly reviewed and informed, not only by 
emerging data and results, but by a range of theories including schema 
theory, speech act theory, critical linguistics and pragmatics as indicated 
in the previous chapter.
The search for an appropriate method proceeded by first considering 
the nature of the phenomenon under question, the context in which the 
focus question was situated, and the stance of the researcher (3.1). The 
next section focuses on recognising what constituted data (3.2) followed 
by a description of the various methods used to collect data (3.3). A 
suitable paradigm was considered and a theoretical statement concerning 
sociolinguistics included (3.4). Issues of validity, useability, reliability 
and narrative style form the basis of the next section (3.5), and the 
usefulness of ethnography as a suitable research method is discussed 
(3.6). The chapter concludes (3.7) with a statement on the choice of
appropriate method.
3.1 ISSUES, CONTEXT AND METHOD
The focus question of this thesis ’How is language used to deny the 
experience of another human being and how is this signalled 
linguistically'? was grounded in the experiences of child victim 
witnesses as they were cross examined. The whole issue of their 
experience became problematic when a great deal of distress was 
observed by workers in the field. Even at that level of generalised 
concern it was suspected that the occurrence of distress was common 
and constituted a patterned social phenomenon. Subsequent evidence 
from the courtroom, transcripts, and surveys did nothing to reduce that 
suspicion. In order to arrive at a method appropriate to pursue the 
research question it was necessary for me to:
• look at the options regarding research methods available to me 
(3.1.1)
• delineate the context within which the research question was being 
asked (3.1.2)
• take into account my own stance as a researcher (3.1.3)
The results of these reflections and considerations determined the choice 
of a paradigm of research activity and the subsequent choice of method 
appropriate for the pursuit of the study.
3.1.1 Research method options
In seeking to clarify and examine the phenomenon of the child victim 
witness under cross examination I sought a way to talk about and 
investigate personal and social experience and change. I was influenced 
in this search by Bateson's conceptualisation of cybernetics which:
... has become an increasingly influential way of understanding and 
describing human events, and has been claimed to be the appropriate 
epistemological foundation and language for talking about personal 
and social change.
(Bateson, 1972 in Kaye and Winefield, 1988: 131)
A basic aim was to generate insights by drawing data and evidence from 
a variety of sources which were grounded in the experiences of a 
variety of informants. One problematic and challenging aspect of the 
phenomenon being studied, the experience of the child victim witness, 
was that it was interpreted and viewed by the central stakeholders in 
non-comparable ways.
I needed to find a method which would allow me to make connections 
and create narratives capable of being informed by a number of 
sources. The resulting accounts should 'make sense* in a variety of 
settings. Like other settings in which question asking is a major feature 
of the discourse (as in educational settings), it was obvious that language 
played a dominating role in shaping the setting.
I needed data and ways of analysing that data which would examine and 
clarify meanings displayed and perpetuated through language; thus I was 
looking for an approach which recognised that:
The complexities of child sexual abuse inadvertently invite analyses 
and responses that seek to simplify the problem and reduce it to 
manageable components. Thus professionals, agencies and the 
community itself may be seduced into a reductionist and linear mode 
of thought about child sexual abuse. In this context, solutions which 
will make a difference become more and more difficult to generate.
(Kaye, 1988: 134)
This meant that the method needed to be oriented towards establishing 
patterns and connections rather than the seductive option of isolating a 
predetermined number of factors.
The method of research chosen could either open or close options. No 
method could claim to be neutral. Because this thesis was based upon a 
perception of the personal experience of child victim witnesses and their 
subsequent public treatment by cross examiners and the court system, a 
method of research was needed which acknowledged these personal, 
public, legal and linguistic dimensions, and which also allowed others to 
scrutinise the process. The method also had to acknowledge the 
complexity of the inter-relationships between information and 
methodology.
Given these research needs I concluded that I needed a research method 
that would:
• examine and clarify the phenomenon from the perspective of the 
experience of the child;
• convince a wide variety of otherwise non-resolute stakeholders.
One paradigm of inquiry which seemed to fit these parameters was the 
naturalistic paradigm described by Guba and Lincoln, a paradigm in 
which:
Phenomena do not converge into a single form, a single truth, but 
diverge into many forms, multiple 'truths'. Moreover, the layers 
cannot be described or understood in terms of separate independent
and dependent variables; rather, they are intricately interrelated to 
form a pattern of 'truth'. It is these patterns which must be searched 
out, less for the sake of prediction and control than for the sake of 
verstehen  or understanding.
(Guba and Lincoln, 1982: 57)
In order for the research activity to proceed, it was necessary to give 
some kind of substance to the phenomena under investigation. I saw 
that this could be achieved by encapsulating the experiences and qualities 
of the phenomena in language. Without such encapsulation the 
phenomena would remain disembodied and unanalysable. The choice of 
language itself as the medium for analysis responded to a range of 
research needs, pressures and advantages. Atkinson and Drew state that:
[while] a systematic approach to the study of language use is a 
sensible and even essential starting point for the analysis of data 
consisting largely of extended verbal exchanges, it is perhaps less 
widely appreciated that, even in social science disciplines other than 
sociology, empirical research into language use is still a relatively 
recent development. The issue of ordinary language philosophy, 
however, coupled with technological innovations in audio and video 
recording, has stimulated an increasing interest in such research. 
Psychology has seen the growth of psycho-linguistics as an 
expanding field, in linguistics there has been some movement away 
from the traditionally predominant concern with grammar and syntax 
toward pragmatics and speech act theory, while in anthropology 
there has been an emergence of the ethnography of communication 
and componential analysis. Viewed in these terms, then, the 
development of ethnomethodology and conversational analysis by 
sociologists can be seen as a trend which is consistent with similar 
changes in emphasis taking place elsewhere. And insofar as this 
multi-disciplinary convergence is a recent phenomenon the products 
of which are only just becoming available, it is hardly surprising that 
the organisation of verbal exchanges in courts has yet to be subjected 
to much in the way of detailed scrutiny.
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 5)
For this study a scrutiny of the written records of interaction could be 
juxtaposed beside simple observation. To sit in court and simply absorb 
the rhythms, sounds, actions and manners of the proceedings was an 
engaging and eventually interpretative activity. Being there in both a 
focussed and unfocussed way generated questions and confusions which 
later become the stuff of data and analysis. To predict the worth and 
force of observation was not possible; it was simply an act of faith 
which suggested that experiencing, however vicariously, is eventually 
informative. It reflected the idea that:
The best way to learn how the courts work is to go and watch them.
The rules which govern the process of law enforcement only become 
comprehensible when they are seen in action; in the abstract, they 
seem hopelessly obtrusive and confusingly muddled.
(Barnard, 1974: 1 in Atkinson and Drew, 1979:9)
3.1.2 Context of the research question.
The mere issue of contrast between the language which takes place in 
court and the language of other speech contexts was not enough to 
justify the concern of this study. However there was a further concern 
that language in the specific instance of cross examination was being 
used in an ’exclusionary’ way. Most rules of evidence are exclusionary:
... which means that they seek to prohibit the use in court of various 
conversational practices which may, in most everyday settings, be 
perfectly adequate and acceptable methods for discovering and 
deciding matters of fact, blame, responsibility and so forth.
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 8)
It would appear that, in the pursuit of ’truth' in court, players are 
restricted in their means of expression.
For me to have assumed the primacy of words as so many lexical items 
strung together would have been a mistake. There are several contexts 
in which they exist, and understanding these contexts became a 
significant part of the investigation. I could not simply compare 
'ordinary' speech (whatever that might be) with 'special' (court) speech. 
I needed to show how the 'special' becomes a discourse with its own 
features and effects. In this study the concept of 'context' needed to 
accommodate the largest and most extensive aspects of social fabric.
As a researcher I did not want to fall into the sort of trap described by 
Carlen (1976) in which 'the staging of magistrates’ justice in itself 
infuses the proceedings with a surrealism which atrophies the 
defendant's ability to participate in them'.
Obviously there are likely to be as many versions of what goes on in 
court as there are observers. It is the focus of that observation and the 
sharing of the observer’s perspectives which allows the reader to assess 
the veracity of the observer's conclusions. The challenge for me was to 
observe, scrutinise, and critique situations that to others were 'obviously 
natural and naturally obvious'.
Court appeared not only as a violation of 'normal' rules of interaction 
but as a special kind of normal situation itself; court norm ally  
disenfranchises vulnerable witnesses. The basis of concern about the 
effects of court was not just the difference that court presents since 
people cope with radical differences in their everyday lives. Rather the 
exclusionary practices which seem to go on in court create an 
environment which cannot be accounted for only in terms of contrast to 
other environments. Atkinson and Drew question how effective 
'ordinary' everyday practices and language would be in reaching
unambiguous, final legal decisions if ’special' legal procedures were 
dispensed with. They claim that:
[if the main thrust of analysis] is to complain about the special legal 
procedures and to argue in favour of the greater appropriateness of 
’ordinary’ procedures, then ... the most desirable situation would 
presumably be one in which there were no recognisably 'special' 
procedures at all but only ’ordinary’ ones; in which case the situation 
itself would presumably be no longer as recognisable as other than 
an 'ordinary' one. But, if it is the case that the existence of special 
legal procedures may be related to the noticeable inadequacies of 
ordinary everyday procedures as effective methods for arriving at 
decisions which are (for practical purposes) unambiguous, definite 
and final, then it is not at all clear how such decisions could be 
reached in a recognisably appropriate way following the elimination 
of the 'special' legal procedures.
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 17)
This ’defence’ of the need to have a special court language rests on the 
premise that what happens in court happens in pursuit of 'legal 
procedure'. However a lot more goes on in court than the pure pursuit 
of legal procedure. The challenge for the methodology of this study 
was to identify, describe and analyse the phenomenon in other than the 
purely legal dimensions.
3.1.3 Stance of the researcher
The initial asking of the research question was bom out of my concern 
for justice and the rights of child witnesses. Those rights are grounded 
in the general notion that everyone has a right to 'tell their own story’ 
in their own way. Anne Walker (1981) refers to these rights as 
'discourse rights'.
The perspective arising from rights has its own preferred way of 
engaging in data collection, data analysis and data presentation. The 
challenge for me was to create and present that perspective so that it was 
well grounded in evidence and did not fall into simple relativist 
rhetoric.
Transcripts of things said represent only one record of what goes on. 
There are other records; the way people stand, the way they respond, 
various histories that people bring with them to the court situation, the 
various stakes they have in that situation, whether they are there and 
attending under duress, whether they are there as part of their job or 
whether they are there in a voluntary capacity. The analyst could 
choose to observe any one of these ranges of behaviours. All 
observations are driven by theory whether personal or formal, but
theory nevertheless. Different ways of recording observations 
necessarily permit (or restrict) different types of presentation and 
interpretation.
Whether we use a series of category systems, or a narrative approach, 
or whether we depend for our observational data on video and audio 
recordings, the observer is the first level of mediation of available data. 
The tacit or formal theory held by an observer can orient them in 
deciding what kind of data to record and what kind of data to ignore.
The features of the research problem which existed in my mind can be 
summarised thus - there was a problem (the seemingly inequitable 
treatment of child victim witnesses in criminal court during cross 
examination) and one of the possible ways of investigating this was 
through the examination of special language features. This perspective 
arose because I believed human interaction to be a function of, and 
describable as, language in use. The rationale for this has its 
foundations in a plethora of linguistic, sociological, anthropological and 
philosophical premises.
However the fact that language could be seen as both a source and 
expression of power was not the only concept justifying this study. 
There was also a need to clarify the dynamics and characteristics of 
language activities which either accept or deny the experiences of one or 
other partners to a conversation. Effective human communication does 
not tolerate the perpetuation of any language activity which seeks to 
exclude others.
It follows that acceptance of a particular conceptualisation of language 
has implications for its subsequent analysis. I accepted that:
... the study of language which is linguistics, is for so many, in no 
way different to or separate from the study of semiotics, that is the 
study of the way that meanings are made in social systems.
(Threadgold, 1986: 15)
Just as Threadgold asserts that ideologies do not 'float about without any 
relationship to discursive or linguistic form', then neither do other 
forms of proposition or meaning. Rather:
... a theory of language and linguistic tradition which concerns itself 
with ideology will be much richer than narrow approaches to 
linguistics and the philosophies of language which concern 
themselves only with systems of fixed signs, fixed meanings, or 
language as communication or well formed sentences.
(Threadgold, 1986: 16)
In exploring the relationship between social meaning-making practices 
(semiotics), and language and ideology as suggested by Threadgold, I 
engaged in a search for connections between the socio-historical 
conditions of the actors as manifested in the language they use and the 
language with which they are confronted.
Trials are literally 'wars of words' in which one side must win and in 
the struggle to define, trials are clearly battles about language itself. 
Facts in law are not objectively determined entities, but constructions 
created by persons engaged in interaction and negotiation. The 
adversary system encourages the use of trial tactics to prevent the judge 
and jury from correctly evaluating the trustworthiness of witnesses and 
to shut out evidence damaging to (one side of) a case. In this war where 
words are the tools for the construction of ’facts', there is clearly a need 
to understand them.
In order to respond to aspects of the research question which included 
issues, phenomenon, context and stance, I needed to establish a data base 
using a variety of techniques. These included observation, participant 
observation, interview, and empirical testing. It was also necessary to 
accommodate the variety of views and perspectives represented by the 
experiences of child-victim witnesses, social workers, lawyers, judges, 
magistrates, teachers, counsellors, administrators, and academics in a 
variety of associated fields.
This data base needed to be both inclusive and holistic. The 'whole' at 
issue in this study was the experience of the child victim witness in 
court. The holistic appreciation needed to consider how individual parts 
related to the broader whole - how the courtroom experience is part of 
the broader experience of society; how the child's experience is 
continuous in and out of court; how the deployment of language in cross 
examination relates to other settings; how the status of victim is 
perpetuated; how the experience of being a witness is manifested. The 
challenge was to recognise just what constituted 'data'.
3.2 RECOGNISING DATA
3.2.1 Deciding on the data
The way in which a problem or phenomenon is investigated is driven 
by perceptions of that problem and the likely ways in which its 
resolution can be approached. Just as language and thought are 
inseparably related, an approach to a problem limits, expands, or 
redefines the statement of that problem. It is at the point of planning 
and choosing tools and techniques of investigation that the relationship
between what we believe and how we shape and respond to the world 
comes into play.
To believe in the connectedness of a range of phenomena and investigate 
them only by conducting reductionist experiments focusing on isolating 
'X' factors, would lead to a schizophrenic knowledge. 'Wholeness' and 
'particularity' themselves represent many of the basic aims of research 
and investigation and often suggest conflicting directions. The 
particular, the detail, the final clue is only of interest insofar as it 
contributes to, creates or suggests a clearer, more understandable, more 
accessible story or model. The raison d'etre for being interested in 
parts, in analysing, categorising, cataloguing, testing, is that they 
provide us with a way of describing wholes.
In this study the data generated was suggested by the scope and nature of 
the aims of the study. There needed to be a range of data of different 
qualities and from a variety of sources. Even at the outset, interviews, 
observations, empirical testing, background and historical information 
were implicated, as were appropriate forms of analysis that might 
follow.
Standards of veracity flow from the quality of data generated, their 
subsequent analysis, and the propositions and connections which are 
drawn. Their success must be measured in terms of how well the 
problems have been investigated and how well such investigation either 
confirms, reflects or counters other credible propositions. My 
fundamental aim in this study was to achieve 'connectedness' rather than 
'objectivity'.
I was guided by Howe and Eisenhart (1990) who, in their consideration 
of standards for research, suggest the following guidelines:
• There should be a fit between the research questions and data 
collection and analysis techniques so that 'the data collection 
techniques employed (are) suitable for answering ... the research 
question entertained, (p 6)
Generally speaking, the method should follow the question rather 
than the method determining the question, although there will always 
be tension and movement between which drives which.
• Data collection and analysis techniques should be effectively applied 
and carried out. The characteristics of 'good' interviewing, 
appropriate sampling, relevant analysis and the like need to be 
adhered to.
• There should be a 'coherence' between background assumptions, 
states of knowledge and the existing research question. This applies 
to knowledge in the field generally but also encompasses the 
knowledge in the researcher's head which creates premises and 
assumptions. As Peshkin (1988) has argued:
Subjectivity is the basis for the researcher's distinctive contribution, 
which comes from joining personal interpretations with the data that 
have been collected and analysed. As with assumptions derived 
from the literature, subjectivities must be made explicit if they are to 
clarify, rather than obscure, research design and findings.
(Howe and Eisenhart, 1990: 7)
• The overall warrant of the research question, and the methods 
employed for resolving it, should be capable of viewing alternative 
explanations so that:
... [when] researchers explain the arguments by which some 
theories are rejected and by which disconfirming data are handled, 
their conclusions are more warranted than when they are not.
(Howe and Eisenhart, 1990: 7)
• The issue of value constraints, both external and internal, are dealt 
with by making explicit the values and contexts which inform the 
research and being willing to test such by making research both 
accessible to and testable by those affected by its production. This 
must involve fair dealing with the informants to the research on the 
one hand and reference to the 'communities’ they represent on the 
other.
3.2.2 Disparate data
The general conclusion reached by those concerned with the relationship 
of language and ideology, social structures and internalised 
psychological dispositions is that any analysis of language in use has to 
include reference to a broad range of phenomena and criteria which can 
make sense of what we are observing. Not all data will prove to be 
equally useful; nor will all data coming from different sources be 
comparable one set with the other. Atkinson and Drew clarify this thus:
... a fundamental idea in the research methodology which has been 
heralded as providing the key to such areas of social life, namely 
ethnography or participant observation, is that data should be 
collected from many different parts of the organisation being studied 
with a view to arriving at some sort of balance between the diverse 
and often conflicting versions of reality claimed to be oriented to by 
the subjects involved.
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 2)
However my expectation was that each set of data would embellish, 
challenge, or reflect other sets, thus it was necessary to decide on a 
general process for proceeding with the investigation, and a way of 
gathering data.
3.3 COLLECTING DATA
The data gathering procedure consisted of the following activities:
• Listening to counsellors and social workers who had experience of 
attending committal and trial court proceedings with sexually abused 
children.
• Interviewing these people and a range of other professionals who had 
protective contact with such children - namely, two paediatricians, 
five counsellors, and two police officers. Interviews were 
subsequently held with personnel directly associated with court 
proceedings, and involved one judge, one magistrate, two lawyers, 
and two public prosecutors. The interviews were open-ended but 
focussed specifically on the collection of perspectives and perceptions.
• Reviewing and analysing interviews.
• Collecting transcripts of court proceedings from a variety of courts at 
different stages of proceedings, all involving cross examination of 
children between the ages of 6-16 years.
• Collecting other transcripts and police statements and counsellor 
interview schedules to acquaint myself with other record formats.
• Searching through libraries and data banks for appropriate literature.
• Observation in court accompanied by a research partner so that 
parallel records could be kept and checked against each other.
• Being with four children before, during (both in court and in the 
breaks) and after court proceedings.
• Interviewing four children and three parents.
• Conducting an experiment to test an hypothesis on comprehension.
The mass of data accumulated by the above procedures was
conceptualised as pools of data, each of which could be analysed and
responded to.
3.3.1 The transcripts
Whilst calling for a broad research orientation in seeking to understand 
the social significance of courtroom interaction, Atkinson and Drew 
warn that:
... the much recommended unstructured techniques of observation 
are less well suited to the analysis of formal court proceedings than 
they are to the study of interaction in other settings. Thus, while 
descriptions of relatively short sequences of interaction or isolated 
quotations from informants can be fairly easily recorded in the 
ethnographer's field notes at the end of the day, the data of court 
hearings are more resistant to such methods of reportage. Sequences 
of interaction are frequently very extended and a single trial may last 
for days or weeks, and the significance and relevance of some 
particular utterance, or sequence of utterances, may not become 
apparent until it is too late for it to be recorded.
(Atkinson and Drew, 1979: 3)
Transcripts of court proceedings not only create a material substance of 
the proceedings but they encapsulate what otherwise might simply be 
lost in other less extensive accounts. However they are by no means a 
complete record of proceedings. Two important insights arise from 
this observation. One is that transcripts are significant pieces of the 
data in that they provide a continuous thread for the observer analyst. 
The other is that although the inputs of various witnesses may only be 
fragmentary and highly selective, these fragments may be used by either 
side to build up a version or story. The versions arrived at and 
postulated as truth may not be either recognisable and credible by any 
one participant. The transcripts, although not contextually complete, 
form the most extensive linear record. They are thorough in that they 
are continuous. Although transcripts are not the whole flesh, (indeed 
no documentary account of life ever can be), they are both the frame 
and the focus of the interaction and the analysis. The transcript can be 
regarded as a series of signals which both manifest and trigger aspects 
of relationship, context and history.
However the combination of interview data about the court proceedings 
combined with the long view provided by the transcripts of the court 
proceedings offered an alternative interpretation to that generated by 
the formality of the court transcript alone.
3.3.2 Interviews
As noted above, I interviewed a wide range of people connected with 
cross examination, on the premise that they might be able to contribute 
insights and perspectives which would lead to a fuller appreciation of 
the phenomenon under investigation. Open ended questions were asked
which challenged conventional expectations of the research process.
Based on work by Simmons (1981) I adopted interview as a data
gathering tool on the following grounds.
• case study research is an appropriate mode of inquiry.
• interviewing is a useful tool in case study research.
• the recording of people's subjective definitions of experience is a 
normal part of case study research.
• whereas structured questions are appropriate when you know what 
you want to find out, unstructured questions are preferable when you 
are not sure what you want to know but are prepared to depend on 
your capacity to recognise significant data and appearance.
• it is necessary to adopt an unstructured approach to interviewing in 
the study of social situations whose complexity has to be uncovered 
by research.
• unstructured interviewing offers more scope for involving the 
interviewee in the research.
• because interviewing is a most penetrative way of gaining 
information both from and about people, rules of confidentiality and 
subsequent use of material have to be clearly established for all 
participants.
3.3.3 Participant observer reflections
As a participant observer I had to recognise that:
• all observations are selective
• all observations are driven by theory
• different ways of recording observations permit and exclude different 
types of interpretation
• the observer is the first level of mediation. Once we create a record, 
that record is treated as the data.
During the course of this research I occupied a variety of roles and the 
nature of my participation changed accordingly. I was, at different 
times, all of the following: a participant committee member at local and
regional policy and case conferences; a courtroom observer; an 
interviewer of children, parents and adult professionals; a reviewer of 
transcripts; an organiser of access to materials; a research designer; and 
a partner.
3.3.4 Experimental data
As will be reported fully in Chapter Four an experiment was conducted 
to test the comprehensibility of nominated expressions as indicated by 
children's recall.
3.4 FROM PARADIGM TO TOOLS
According to Guba and Lincoln (1982: 56) 'the choice between 
paradigms in any inquiry or evaluation ought to be made on the basis of 
the best fit between the assumptions and postures of a paradigm and the 
phenomenon being studied or evaluated.' I therefore settled on the 
naturalistic paradigm which assumed:
... that all phenomena are characterised by interactivity. While 
certain 'safeguards' may reduce that interactivity to its minimum, a 
large amount nevertheless remains. It is fruitless to pretend that it is 
not there; a more intelligent approach requires understanding the 
possible influence of interactivity and taking it into account. This 
stance does not merely involve a trade off of less 'objective' data for 
the sake of more understanding. No data can be objective in that 
sense. What is important is to determine the perceptions of the 'data 
collector' and the effect of those perceptions on the developing 
information.
(Guba and Lincoln, 1982:40)
In this research project the 'data collector* was a human investigator 
who was collecting, categorising and analysing data from 'data 
producing' human beings. The personal determinants of perception, 
position and stance were themselves part of the data rather than 
interferences in the data.
I hoped that the intersection of data I was proposing would generate an 
appreciation not only of personal connections but also of social 
constructs, and it would show patterns of social behaviour through an 
analysis of the language used, particularly in the situation of cross 
examination of child victim witnesses.
3.4.1 Developing a sociolinguistic appreciation
As an exercise in applied critical sociolinguistics, an exercise seeking to 
change a social situation by informing and establishing a different 
perspective upon the language in use in that situation, I came to see the 
task as one that should explore ’how language is used to establish social 
context while simultaneously exploring how the social context influences 
language use and the communication of meaning’ (Bloome and Green, 
1984).
Given that there already exist a number of theories of language and 
frameworks of analysis, there was a temptation to base the current study 
upon a ’proven’ model.
Halliday’s systemic linguistics with its features of field, tenor and mode 
seemed to offer the most cohesive and extensive possibilities. Although 
I have used many of the insights of functional grammar arising from the 
concepts of 'context of culture' and 'context of situation', I chose not to 
adopt the extant analytical or descriptive frameworks for three reasons. 
One was that I was committed to a process of narrative inquiry and 
reflective response rather than a process of mathematical and 
diagrammatic analysis. The second was that although the analysis 
purports to be informed by ’context’, there is no recognition of the 
lived through experiences of the interlocutors. The third reason was 
that the system, because of its complexity and specialist qualities, is not 
accessible to the stakeholders I was interested to address. It was 
imperative for me to share the process and the results of this thesis with 
users; those people who were informants to the study.
Chomskian linguistics, by implication, has contributed to this thesis the 
concept of 'deep structure', and the impetus for the linguist to come up 
with ever better descriptions of 'what’s going on' in language. 
However, the material of Chomskian analysis is based on samples of 
speech which take place between speakers and hearers in an ideal rather 
than a real situation. The analysis is based substantially on the 
perceptions and intuitions of mature language users. The outcomes are 
layered descriptions of grammatical connections and patterns. There is 
no concern with a real social context, a concern which is axiomatic to 
this thesis. Although I also call on my own perceptions as an informed 
user of language, I also seek to inform a sociolinguistic description with 
a wealth of 'social' data; data about people's lives, intentions, needs, 
conditions and the effect of language upon these. In doing this I attempt 
to overcome some of the masking dichotomies vested in such 
distinctions as Langue/Parole, competence/performance, prosodic/ 
linguistic.
In functional grammar terms I sought to bring to bear a wide variety of 
characteristics and influences which might inform our reading of the 
text, in particular, the lived through experiences of a significant 
interlocutor. The acceptance of the concept of text as a material 
manifestation of language owes much to the philosophy of Searle.
The theoretical orientation of the thesis was to develop a description of 
language in use in a particular situation; a description which was as 
responsive as possible to the constraints, characteristics and influences 
of context. In the process of developing this description it was 
necessary to build up a personal and grounded theory about the process 
and nature of that description.
The process of the research, the kinds of data and the tools of analysis 
were developed in response to this and, whilst mindful of and informed 
by a variety of theories and procedures, was wedded to none.
The research process and the concepts which inform it accepts the 
following theoretical tenets:
• language is essentially social (Halliday);
• in order to understand what's going on when we use language, 
analysis should proceed at several levels (Chomsky);
• records of speech have a material existence which are analysable 
(Searle);
• the usefulness of the dichotomising distinction between langue and 
parole (Saussure), although historically useful, is now questionable;
• other linguistic analyses (Crystal's prosodic features for instance) 
which 'add' to the word record, tend to marginalise profound aspects 
of language use and understanding.
3.4.2 Triangulation
'Navigation' provides not only a working metaphor for carrying out 
research but also an historical basis for the procedures employed. The 
use of three 'sightings’ in order to plot a most likely position within a 
definite area of activity is a navigational concept which has been used 
for hundreds of years and takes two main forms.
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• Three sightings are taken by a single method and when the points of 
these sightings are joined up create a triangle within which the most 
probable position will lie.
• Plottings created from three different methods (eg. stars, land 
sighting, distance calculation) will supply three readings which either 
confirm or disconfirm each other.
The same calculation methods are employed by different readers in 
order that one provides a check on the other in terms of accuracy of 
calculation.
Methodological triangulation is at work when a researcher mixes data 
arising from different sources such as interview, observation and testing 
procedures. Organisational triangulation is operating when personnel 
occupying different positions and roles in the study contribute their 
perceptions. The use of statistical, narrative and taxonomic techniques 
provides another layer of triangulation.
Three outcomes may emerge from a triangulation strategy.
• C o n v e r g e n c e  occurs where different sources, methods, 
investigators or perspectives provide evidence that results in a single 
or uniting proposition about a social phenomenon.
• Inconsistency occurs when a number of perspectives arise which do 
not confirm a single proposition but instead suggest alternatives. 
These inconsistencies can be resolved by either clarifying the 
positions and premises from which they arise or by integrating them 
into a higher level of theorising.
• Contradiction provides the potential for greatest insight through its 
ability to negate one position or the other, or to revise, refine, 
reconstruct or create new positions and appreciations. Mathison 
indicates that these new positions become possible as:
All the outcomes of triangulation, convergent, inconsistent and 
contradictory, need to be filtered through knowledge gleaned from 
the immediate data, the project context, and understandings of the 
larger social world. [And in this way] we attempt to make sense of 
what we find, and that often requires embedding the empirical data 
on hand with an holistic understanding of the specific situation and 
general background knowledge about this class of social 
phenomena. This conception shifts the focus of triangulation away 
from a technological solution for ensuring validity, and places the 
responsibility with the researcher for the construction of plausible 
explanations about the phenomena being studied.
(Mathison, 1988: 16, 17)
This technique of triangulation appeared to be an appropriate tool in 
approaching the research question.
3.4.3 Observational Analysis
Within the range of techniques available to gather data, observational 
analysis is the tool which most obviously brings together the dispositions 
of the researcher with the context under scrutiny.
The notion that observational studies be regarded only as 'dust bowl' 
efforts intended to describe the nature of social interaction rather than 
explain it is challenged here. Such dismissive evaluation is neither 
accurate nor characterises the present field.
Direct observation and involvement by the researcher is inextricably 
linked to the tenets of triangulation. However some form of assessing 
the information gained by direct observation needs to be implemented 
by the researcher using such techniques.
Observational research thus benefits from the use of a broader range of 
assessment parameters than traditionally employed. Using multiple 
levels of analysis seems advisable especially when studying social 
activity in context.
3.5 REVIEWING THE METHOD
3.5.1 Validity
Validity reflects the traditional need to establish relationships between 
cause and effect in such a way that these relationships will be seen to 
exist over time and space. The naturalistic paradigm seeks indicators of 
dependability, that is, concepts which are connected and reflective of 
one another as well as transferable and credible according to a range of 
criteria.
The connectedness between aspects under study and the nature of the 
connection also operates within the framework of implied or explicit 
theoretical constructions. The essence of grounded theory and the 
validation to be expected from it lies in the ability to convincingly show 
the connection between aspects of the questions explored and to theorise 
about the nature of such, using either extant or emerging theory,
3.5.2 Useability and Accessibility
Research topics which purport to be grounded in notions of social 
justice and which use the precepts of action should be able to stand the 
test of useability. Upon completion of a research report it should be 
possible to use and apply the findings in a way which will have impact 
on the problem addressed. Naturally a vital prerequisite of useability is 
the accessibility of the process, concerns and outcomes. In the case of 
this study the group needing access was most obviously represented by 
lawyers, judges, professional child care workers, counsellors, doctors, 
and prosecutors, as well as educators.
I needed to consider this aspect of the research in the planning stages 
when developing the research questions, during the operational phases 
as the data emerged and were refocussed, in the concluding phases as 
outcomes were interpreted, and after completion in distributing the 
results of the study to different readerships.
3.5.3 Reliability
Reliability traditionally refers to the extent to which the 'results' of a 
study can be found in similar situations separated by time and space 
The reliability of this study is to be found in:
• The perceived existence of a particular discourse in a designated 
context.
• The perceived similarity between the characteristics of cross 
examination across court proceedings generally.
• The constancy of the results of the (experimental) testing program in 
other comparable situations.
From a range of reliability measures grew transferable results and the 
ability to generalise.
3.5.4 Generalisation; theory and practice
Generalisation can take a number of forms and is usually looked for in 
the form of statistical validation where experimental variables are kept 
constant. Other aspects of generalisation can be found in transferability 
of results and insights to other sites or situations, in consistency with 
logical argument and presentation, and in applicability to a range of 
theories and previously developed concepts.
Researchers and the people who study the subsequent research reports 
gain a kind of intuitive awareness of whether the interactions of the 
study can be replicated. Within the naturalistic paradigm one thinks in 
terms of how consistent the results are with other knowledge and how 
dependable they are given the data and procedures used to generate 
them, rather than considering results as a final end point for the 
research.
For any number of reasons a particular piece of research may not be 
able to be duplicated, but it may still be significant in generating insights 
into the conditions studied. For example there is a high possibility of 
this thesis informing the practice of classroom questioning.
3.5.5 Manifestation of method; thesis as narrative
In order for this research report to be accessible to all interested 
stakeholders, I needed to create a cohesive and informed narrative. 
Such an approach is consistent with the assertion that:
... humans are storytelling organisms who individually and socially, 
lead storied lives. The study of narrative is the study of the ways 
humans experience the world ... narrative researchers describe lives, 
collect and tell stories of them, and write narratives of experience.
Narrative is a way of characterising the phenomena of human 
experience and its study.
(Conelly and Clandinin, 1990: 2)
In order to start work on the task of creating such a narrative I needed 
to negotiate my way into the field of inquiry and in that setting, to 
clarify and reflect the concerns of those in the field. The narrative was 
written, not in accordance with a pre-planned plot, but in such a way 
that connections and revelations created new themes and plots.
3.6 ETHNOGRAPHY
3.6.1 The nature and usefulness of ethnography
Question and method are inextricably linked in ethnographic research 
and the method employed is as developmental as the questions being 
asked. Although the process can be made clear, the details of procedure 
are part of a changing responsive and reflective framework. If the 
question is problematic and the ground unclear then an emerging design 
is needed.
Ethnography is concerned with the implied or explicit theoretical 
grounds of the research questions being asked. It is more appropriate to
'finding out' and 'connecting' previously unconnected phenomena, than 
'proving' or 'confirming' a single theory or proposition. The theoretical 
assumptions underlying an ethnographic approach are as follows:
• It is a theoretically driven, systematic approach to the study of 
everyday life.
• It involves the elements of planning, discovery and presentation
• It is culturally driven and is 'guided by a concern for exploring the 
human condition to illuminate the nature of 'the social being'.
The goal of the ethnographer is to explore, describe and compare the 
cultures of different groups in order to gain understanding of 
similarities and differences among peoples and general processes ... 
ethnographers identify and explore the patterns of everyday life and 
the consequences for participants of being members of particular 
cultural groups.
( Zaharlick and Green, 1991: 4)
It is thus a deliberate inquiry process based on the general view that 
what goes on between people is both a reflection and a consequence 
of other cultural attributes. This orientation frames how the cultural 
phenomena are studied and explained and suggests what is regarded 
as data.
Just as a photographer must aim and focus a camera in order to 
capture a scene, so too must an ethnographer focus on what the 
theory suggests is important in order to describe, and possibly 
explain, some particular aspects of culture or even define what 
constitutes an holistic description of the culture.
(Zaharlick and Green, 1991: 5)
Ethnography may call upon the insights of different theories to 
explore the complexity of everyday life and in so doing develop 
creative insight that would otherwise not be available to a model of 
research which confined itself to theory confirmation.
• A comparative perspective is implied.
• The process of carrying out the research is typified by an interactive- 
reactive process.
• Ethnographic 'results' provide the basis for ethnology, that is, a 
comparison between groups beyond the immediate focus of the 
primary study.
3.6.2 A method to suit the situation
Ethnographers of communication not only focus on detailed analysis of 
the talk and actions between individuals in particular social contexts; 
they also depend heavily on participant observation and the use of 
whatever records can be collected. They use culture and its theoretical 
underpinnings to approach the study of everyday life. The focus on 
child victim witnesses revealed three kinds of 'everyday' experience, 
which constitute regular, predictable and expected social interactions.
The institution of the court is an everyday setting for the resolution of 
conflicts; individuals are exposed to this environment every day; and it 
is now an everyday occurrence that children experience the rigours of 
the courtroom and its procedures. Therefore the pool of data created 
by observing the institution, the individual and a specific group of 
people provides a clear and significant cultural picture.
Ethnomethodology aims to arrive at cohesive descriptions grounded in 
particular situations and to identify the possible transferability of these 
to other situations. This form of research is not so much a single 
method, but a stance which combines a number of empirical techniques. 
The basic theoretical question underpinning this thesis was not so much 
Why is the social order as it is?' but rather 'How are particular aspects 
of a perceived social order achieved?' In this particular case I wanted 
to explore the perceived effects of the language of cross examination on 
child victim witnesses.
3.6.3 Ethnography as research strategy
Whilst I was in favour of ethnography as a research strategy, the 
decision to use it did not restrict or determine what I would observe and 
record, or how I would interpret my observations. As Spindler 
explains, there are many ways information can be used and interpreted:
It is essential to have a model of relationships among phenomena in 
order to do sensible ethnography. Even if the object of the 
’ethnography' is to produce a 'straightforward', non-theoretical, 
non-technical description of events and behaviour in some setting, 
there will inevitably be many models of how the events relate to each 
other that will influence what is observed and recorded and how it is 
interpreted.
(Spindler, 1983: 97)
The test of ethnography is if an outside reader of an ethnographic 
report is able to anticipate and interpret the study as would one of the 
members of the society being studied.
The members that I was observing were child victims, lawyers, parents 
and medical and health workers, and as the shape of the study emerged I 
tested and referred to these members wherever practically and ethically 
possible.
In drawing connections between the details of individual experience and 
the overarching relationships, I needed to develop strategies for 
eliminating some of the information I collected by deciding what was 
significant and what was not. I also had to show how the point of view 
which I brought to the study evolved because of the study.
Since I was concerned with both details of relationships and details of 
their observation, I used a microethnographic perspective for my study. 
As Erickson (1984) says 'microethnography seeks to understand the 
culture of processes ... [and is] especially concerned with the face to face 
interactions of the participants'. My concern was the experience of 
child victim witnesses as viewed through verbal exchanges in cross 
examination. Clearly this was a socio-linguistic study, one concerned 
with both linguistics and society which Hymes describes as:
... interested in the use of linguistic data and analysis in other 
disciplines concerned with social life, and conversely the use of 
social data and analysis to inform linguistics.
(Hymes, 1974 in Berghoff, 1990: 2)
Cook-Gumperz (1990 in Berghoff, 1990: 3) discusses the relationship 
between language and ethnography thus: 'language enters into the way 
social order is created and maintained through interaction', and 
Berghoff writes:
Hymes (1974) has coined the term 'the ethnography of 
communication' to further specify microethnographics rooted in 
sociolinguistic theory. The task of the interpretive researcher is to 
make the familiar strange ... In order to make sense out of those 
aspects of our culture which we most take for granted, it is 
necessary to examine our social constructs. We can only come to 
appreciate the significance of everyday events in our own culture by 
taking an interpretive stance.
(Berghoff, 1990: 7)
I needed to bring together perspective, data, analysis and interpretation 
in order to construct an informed and cohesive account as a response to 
the research problem.
3.7 CONCLUSION ON METHOD
In creating a narrative I needed to apply a variety of appropriate and 
dependable analytic tools to the widest possible pools of data available. 
Method became a reflection of initial beliefs, not about the particular 
results, but about the nature of those results. The more flexible the 
research process was, the more likely would be different kinds of 
results. I had to make choices between prescribing the process of 
investigation and mapping the process of investigation.
In the end evaluators/researchers should not be troubled that they 
share a 'narrative and anecdotal style with the novelist and the 
journalist' and that 'lines between novels, newspaper articles and 
sociological research get blurred'. We should not be upset that the 
relativism we attribute to these other accounts of our human situation 
also characterises the accounts presented by evaluators/researchers.
(Rorty in Smith, 1988: 208)
There is no suggestion in an interpretive/hermeneutic approach that 
'anything goes' or that one's personal inclination is the basis of all 
interpretation. On the contrary, the research desire is to describe and 
examine phenomena in such a way that they are seen as part of a pattern 
of phenomena, and that the existing patterns connect with each other.
In collecting and connecting a range of data from a variety of sources 
and using myself as a filter I sought to combine different pieces of 
knowledge and data, to discern points of contact and tension between 
them and to create a patterned description. The elements of this process 
are:
• Clarify the question to a state that it is answerable;
• Suggest how this question is related or not related to other questions;
• Establish a variety of (types) of data;
• Develop a series of analytical procedures;
• Test hypotheses;
• Cross reference concepts ideas and insights;
• Create a description;
• Suggest connectedness of phenomena described.
The following chapter will report how these considerations of method 




I don’t think it makes no differents where you start the telling of a 
thing. You never know where you begun realy. No moren you 
know where you begun your oan self. You myt know the place and 
day and time of day when you ben beartht. You myt even know the 
place and ay and time when you ben got. That dont mean nothing 
tho. You stil dont know where you begun.
(From Riddley Walker by Russel Hoban, 1980.)
In this chapter I intend to share information, histories, activities, and 
responses to enable the reader to gain a clear understanding of the 
gathering and analysis of data according to the chosen research method. 
The chapter also provides enough information to enable readers to 
either retrace the process themselves or modify and adapt it for their 
own time, place and purpose.
I start by presenting a brief overview of the chapter. This is followed 
by a more detailed appraisal of the significant aspects of procedure. As 
the project developed, pools of data and analyses created insights and 
perceptions, so what otherwise might be regarded as 'results' emerged 
during rather than at the 'end' of the research process. The results of 
an empirical survey for example suggested further procedures and 
analyses. For ease of presentation however such results will be reported 
in chapter five even though some procedures were carried out 
concurrently and as a response to such results. This chapter concludes 
with the desired research process in place.
4.1 OVERVIEW OF THE PROCESS
The process of research started at the point of posing the research 
question. From there I needed to be informed and then to position 
myself amongst all the competing evidences and points of view. This 
made listening to, recording and gathering information about others' 
definitions and perceptions of the issues a necessary starting point.
In the early stages many of the informants made reference to the 
overwhelming, maddening effect of court proceedings and pointed out 
that what went on in court was unlike any of the other 'official' 
interactions, conversations or investigations to which the child victims 
were exposed. These other interactions included police investigation,
counselling sessions, FACS (NSW Family and Community Services) 
interviews and schoolteacher discussions.
Observation in criminal court proceedings in which children were 
involved as witnesses in cases of their own alleged abuse gave rise to:
• field notes
• an appreciation of atmosphere and interaction
• samples of speech, and
• my own supportive presence for children who I had been with under 
different circumstances. That presence led to further relationships 
with significant informants including prosecutors, caseworkers, 
police and doctors.
Whilst observation and work with informants was being undertaken, I 
collected the records of court proceedings as these represented the basis 
for the credibility, or lack thereof, of the participants. These records 
only exist if a case is sent to a higher court and thus become the basis 
for subsequent argument and review. Twenty six transcripts were 
accumulated from every possible level of proceedings (Committal 
Hearing, Criminal trial, and Appeal). The transcript data was treated 
and responded to in a variety of ways:-
• As reading - to acquaint myself with the style and other aspects of 
court language.
• As language data - which purported to be 'the record'. By its very 
existence it stood as the record of trial to go forward to the next level 
of court. All transcripts came into my possession with this status. As 
such they were the creators and transmitters of 'complete stories'.
• As language records - which contained words, phrases, sentences, 
expressions of ideas and attitudes, and assertions.
• As extensive hard copy records - which offered an opportunity to 
trace in a variety of ways the generation or dislocation of particular 
meanings as they occurred or were embedded throughout the text.
The need for an empirical study grew out of the desire to test the 
suspicion that many children did not hear much of what was said to 
them in court. Having accumulated a range of data using a variety of 
techniques, there was a need to summarise and refine it in order to 
make sense of it and to make it accessible to the participants and
protagonists. It seemed that the workings of language in the situations 
concerned could be brought together to form the descriptors for a 
discourse. In keeping with both the intention and the effect of such 
language the label 'the discourse of denial' seemed appropriate. This 
identification suggested that what goes on in such situations is not so 
much an aspect of 'legalese' but rather 'denialese'.
The detailed procedures reported in this chapter, and the way they 
appear as a list of operations, are artifacts of the reporting rather than 
of the recursive and evolving nature of the steps themselves. There was 
a constant process of cross referencing which accompanied the mixture 
of growing experience, reading, orientation, and perspective. In both 
the overall procedure and the setting up of the empirical testing 
program, the research problem dictated the specifications of the 
research instrument and it was unlikely that an already developed code 
would be found which met the specifications of the individual research 
problem.
The range of data to be brought together to create a single credible 
appreciation was dictated by the need to deal with elements of 
supposedly contradictory data as well as to address professionals 
operating from contradictory positions and perspectives.
A specially constructed testing program involving thirty (non-court) 
children between the ages of six and fifteen, responding to some fifteen 
hundred questions was set up.
The testing program was designed to settle upon units of meaning which 
were discernible from the responses and which could also be seen to 
intersect with the nature of the questions asked. Further, those units 
needed to be set out in a way that reflected educational knowledge about 
children’s language ability. The significant distinctions here are 
between 'some' meaning and 'the' meaning.
The results of the testing program were to be expressed in terms of 
children's abilities to 'make sense’ of nominated expressions. The actual 
aspects of the expressions which contributed or detracted from such 
sense was the subject of separate analysis. In an initial attempt to 
specify aspects of language which characterise cross examination which 
were special and may pose difficulty, a review of the transcripts was 
undertaken. This review focused specifically at the micro level of the 
phrases, sentences and expressions as they appeared in the transcripts. 
A further macro level analysis was undertaken of the transcripts. This 
revealed a series of 'themes' (about the children).
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The twenty six transcripts and over five thousand questions asked and 
responded to, form one set of data. Fifteen interviews with medical, 
legal and counselling personnel form another. A library of some 300 
books, articles and reports has become the literature base. Attending 
court, taking field notes and talking with child victim witnesses 
maintained the focus of the study.
Section 4.2 outlines the nature and extent of peer involvement, while 
Section 4.3 lists the interviews with a range of informants who carry 
with them a variety of, sometimes competing perspectives and roles. 
Section 4.4 describes the process of reviewing transcripts of court 
proceedings. All of these procedures informed the testing program 
devised to test the difficulty of court language. This is reported in 
section 4.5.




Membership Children at Risk Committee
Observation in Court
T
Interviews with Children and Parents (during court)
Testing Programme (non court children)
Intervie w/Consultation with practitioners
Collection and Analysis of Transcripts
Member checking
Collection and review of literature
(This representation suggests stacking information like a hypercard stack where all stacks are available by switching from stack to stack.)
4.2 PEER NETWORKING and PEER DEBRIEFING
Throughout the study, the partnership and criticism of colleagues has 
been significant from a number of angles. They have acted as:
• sounding boards for my emerging ideas.
• supports whilst I was dealing with disturbing and traumatic data.
• co-workers willing to respond to exercises in analysis
• collectors of data separate from my prejudices and perspectives
These functions were carried out by several people on a number of 
occasions, but the continuous participation of one, Roslin Brennan, is of 
greatest significance here. In addition to this significant partnership, 
there were other co-workers and colleagues who constantly reflected 
upon and responded to the emerging thesis.
During the collection of the data for this piece of research I attended 
The Children at Risk Committee in Wagga Wagga. This was an 
interagency group made up of people from the following organisations:
• Family and Community Services Counsellor and Child Protection 
Officer
• Private Practice Paediatrician.
• Catholic School Principal.
• NSW Child Sexual Assault Police Officer.
• Department of Health Doctor.
• Private Practice Lawyer.
• Women’s Refuge Nominee.
• Calvary Hospital.
• Community Health - Wagga Base Hospital.
• Child Psychologist and Counsellor.
Over a two year period, fortnightly or monthly meetings took place 
with these people, for whom the central concern was the problems 
which confront children in this community. The group focused on 
different issues and each person utilised and explored their own 
perspectives and experiences in an effort to develop an holistic 
appreciation of children at risk. Linguistic, social, religious, 
educational, medical and psychological perspectives allowed the group 
to view any given problem on several levels and from a variety of 
vantage points. Exchange, support and strength were the personal
benefits from this interaction. New contacts, interviews and references 
were the professional benefits.
This group allowed me to present ideas, worries and concerns knowing 
that they would be appreciated, developed and added to through both 
anecdotal and objective information. New dimensions to the problems 
associated with child sexual assault and the trauma of court were 
available and shared. Contacts with workers in the field (such as social 
workers, police officers, magistrates, paediatricians, child psychologists, 
Child Protection Officers and Counsellors) were all established through 
the professional generosity of members of the group.
See Appendix 2: CARS meeting minutes
The net effect of this association was that the aspects of language being 
studied and collected in court were related as fully as possible to the 
condition of the children of this study.
The testing program was similarly organised under the supportive 
umbrella of this group. School principals and teachers who were 
interested in helping with this project were suggested by group 
members.
The composition of the Committee was biased in favour of practitioners 
who work with children at risk. These workers invited me to 
participate intimately in a range of activities associated with the damage 
caused by court appearance and its possible repair. I was invited to be 
present at court cases for which field notes, records of interviews and 
personal impressions formed the supplementary pools of knowledge 
provided by these workers. Notifications, formal interview procedures 
and descriptions, files and cross references to children from different 
contexts allowed me to become part of a more total appreciation of the 
child and the court experience. Court and the linguistic stresses 
associated with living through such an ordeal could be juxtaposed beside 
other facets of institutional abuse and care which the child had to deal 
with leading up to their court appearance
This group of people also shared the trust which they built up with child 
victims. I was introduced to children before, after and during court 
cases and the dubious privilege of sitting on the periphery of another 
person's distress was facilitated by the strength of the relationships 
which these colleagues had built up with the children in their care. Such 
rare glimpses of other people's lives in disarray added passion and 
commitment to the completion of this research.
Collection of relevant transcript data was made possible through 
contacts made in these meetings. The complex set of negotiations, 
including safeguards, security checks, Ministerial approval, and 
anonymity, needed to gain access to the proceedings of committal and 
then trial, and finally access to the Department of Public Prosecutions, 
were aided by supportive members of this group. Although the clearing 
process took six months, the help, both physical and moral, which 
members of this Department offered, was overwhelming. Desk space, 
photocopying, file and case selection, good quality conversation and 
refreshing coffee were all part of the service which was offered both in 
Wagga Wagga and Sydney. Similarly members of the Police 
Department shared their perceptions, worries, concerns and 
desperations about the child as a victim and a witness
By choosing language as the medium for analysis, it was possible to 
involve and incorporate the perspectives of a variety of sometimes 
opposing practitioners. The focus on language and its use represented a 
common ground for a number of perspectives that would otherwise 
have been expressed in terms of rules and 'professional' practice. The 
participation of a wide variety of informants in the research project was 
made possible by concentrating on the medium rather than the content 
of procedures eg. rules of evidence, child advocacy. Collaboration, 
support and feedback were offered in various forms by a variety of 
people who were required as informants; people who had something to 
tell.
4.3 INTERVIEWS
At different stages throughout the study a wide range of informants 
were interviewed. These included:
• Judge (1)
• Magistrates (2)
• Practising Lawyers (4)
• Social Workers (5)
• Counsellors/Therapists (2)
• Children - before court or after court proceedings (4)
• Parents (3)
• School Teachers (3)
• Paediatricians (2)
• Hospital Staff/Health Workers (3)
• Police officers (4)
• Prosecutors (2)
All interviews were conducted in a flexible format, appropriate to each 
situation and informant, but I sought to collect the range of perspectives 
and insights surrounding the issue of questioning children in criminal 
court cases.
See Appendix 3: Sample interview questions
An 'outer circle' of informants is represented by the group of 
colleagues and friends who maintained a critical interest and whose 
perceptions of issues and data constantly informed the research work.
In my discussions with all those referred to above I was constantly 
mindful that:
Children are easily ashamed and intimidated both by their 
helplessness and by their inability to communicate their feelings to 
uncomprehending adults. They need an adult clinical advocate to 
translate the child's world into an adult-acceptable language.
(Summit, 1983: 183)
Very early in the interviews some concepts emerged which would 
become touchstones for further activity. It became clear that many 
workers in the field do not have available to them the tools of linguistic 
analysis which would enable them to describe court language. They are 
nevertheless able to cite examples of the 'inappropriate' use of language 
with child victim witnesses. Their concerns for the alleged victims of 
child sexual abuse are partially based on the need to pick up the pieces 
of a child's life after successive court appearances.
A child protection officer offered the following example of her 
frustration at the treatment of a child under her care. The cross 
examining lawyer persisted, (in her view), with a line of questioning 
phrased in language which seemed strange and was outside the capacity 
of the child.
He kept asking her for dates, and dates before the 11th of 
November. The 11th of November meant nothing to her. If he'd 
said 'after your birthday' which was the 4th of November she might 
have had a chance. Now, she knows when her birthday is. If he'd 
asked, 'After your birthday did something happen to you?' she 
would have said 'Yes’. But he just kept on saying 'before the 11th 
of November'. Well the 11th of November meant nothing to her, 
but he just kept on asking the questions.
Another child protection officer described how a child could recount 
the details of his assault in one context, with the help of anatomically 
correct dolls. When the child was confronted with questions during 
cross examination which contained highly technical terms for the sexual
organs, he became disoriented, distressed and was then unable to 
answer.
He took the bottom half of the doll's clothes off and was quite 
fascinated with the penis, and he medically showed us what 
happened ... and yet if you asked him a question like 'How far did 
he insert his penis into your anal area?' the child would just go 
'Huh'.
Similar questions asked of children during cross examination about the 
fine anatomical details of their assault represent, in the minds of those 
concerned with the welfare of child victim witnesses, unfair 
presuppositions about the language and emotional capacities of children. 
The reiterations and repetitions of questions with subtly altered 
language components appeared to confuse and degrade the child witness.
A number of people intimately concerned with the welfare of child 
witnesses articulated a widespread dissatisfaction with the architecture 
and physical organisation of the courtroom. Before any words have 
been spoken the child is confronted with an environment which is alien, 
unfriendly, oversized and threatening.
They go into a large gloomy building set up with archaic furniture 
and monopolised by men, to answer a case that invariably involves 
men. And unless steps are taken to allay those fears, it is very 
difficult for them to tell a story that involves highly intimate sexual 
details.
The anxieties expressed above highlight some of the problems associated 
with the cross examination of child victims of sexual assault. Strange 
language, strange architecture and strange people dominate the context 
into which the child is admitted. Individuals charged with the care of 
child victims are understandably disturbed by the effects which 
courtrooms and their contexts have on these children. In cases which 
are all about children, language does not appear to include the child's 
world.
4.4 TRANSCRIPTS
My initial perusal of one transcript gave rise to the following 
reflections.
The transcript of the proceedings to which the child is required to 
respond captures not only phrases and sentences but also the flow of 
language and thus the way topics, registers and expressions connect to 
build quite specific meanings. A question ’out of the blue' is different 
from a question which is part of an observable sequence. The use of 
one term in a number of different ways across and within questions may
be significant. Changing registers from formal to colloquial within the 
string of questions has an effect of its own. These notes and comments 
serve to alert us to some of the language strategies employed as the 
witness's credibility is examined. These strategies often have more to 
do with creating impression and effect rather than with clarifying 
evidence.
One of the contexts for a question asked in court is all the questions 
preceding it and, from the standpoint of the reader of transcripts, all 
those that come after it. As a reflection of this view of data, a transcript 
of a committal hearing of a thirteen year old girl, Beverley, is included 
as Appendix 4.
See Appendix 4: Sample transcript and notes
The transcript includes her examination by the prosecutor, her cross 
examination by the defence, interventions from the bench, and legal 
argument between bench and counsels.
It is a full word record of what happened in Beverley's presence. The 
transcript is interrupted when she is taken out of court and is resumed 
when she re-enters. To this record, some of my early notes, 
observations and queries have been added in an attempt to appreciate the 
language of the situation. This procedure led to the creation of a set of 
descriptors and indicators for that language and also gave rise to the 
testing program on children’s ability to 'hear' questions.
4.4.1 Responding to Review of Transcripts
This initial perusal of a single transcript pointed to some characteristics 
of cross examination and the position of die witness. As a word record, 
it clearly embodies tensions and concerns expressed by informants. It 
created a place to record and examine my own concerns, prejudices, 
unanswered questions. Because it was a concrete record which could be 
put ’on the bench' and worked on, it suggested the accessibility of all the 
other transcripts in my possession. Most significantly however my 
observation that there was, towards the end of the transcript, a 
discernible structure, (probably because it all happened within two 
pages instead of over fifteen or more). I saw that there were patterns to 
be found both within and between transcripts.
Consequently, without either the help or restraint of an existing 
taxonomy, I started searching throughout the whole transcript pool for 
features and characteristics unique to this situation. I was also 
motivated to reflect on the nature and uses of language generally, as 
well as its nature and use in the courtroom .
4.4.2 Reflections on transcripts
4.4.2.1 The conventions of court language
Court language is a world of its own where the normal conventions of 
communication have become subservient to a set of procedures 
established over generations. Some of these conventions are:
• the person examining the child frequently faces the bench whilst 
questioning the child
• questions are interrupted by procedural objections
• discussions of what the child has been asked and how that child has 
replied are discussed at length while the child remains present
• the alleged offender sits in a special place whilst all this is going on 
and frequently says nothing.
At best they appear foreign to the child. At worst, they seem 
intimidating and confusing. The rules for language use determine the 
interactions that occur between people. To a child these conventions 
must appear as though they are in the middle of an incomprehensible 
film script. People dressed in gowns and wigs, totally formal speech, 
people who sit and look blank for hours at a time, all overseen by a
someone to whom everyone defers for advice, guidance and resolution 
of disagreements.
Within such a tightly managed environment, language and the 
movement of the actors are the only variables. The scope for 
responding is very limited. The child witness has to cope with these 
limitations and translate the formalities of the environment into 
linguistic terms in order to deal with the language of the courtroom. 
The child is expected to respond in a precise and prescribed manner. 
Upon these responses his or her veracity is assessed.
4.4.2.2 An alien experience
The child has little room for negotiation or manoeuvre. The situation is 
alien to the child's previous experience of language where words have 
been used to learn about, explore, test and generally establish 
relationships with the rest of the world. This change in the use of 
language confronts child witnesses who can become the victims of a set 
of language rules which prohibit them from expressing themselves in a 
meaningful and truthful way. They are not permitted to tell their story 
in their own words and the restrictive questioning format frequently 
frustrates and confuses the child victim. The courtroom context and the 
language in particular quickly reinforces in the child's mind their role 
as the victim in the proceedings and members of the court generally do 
little to contradict this.
Language is the medium of exchange in the courtroom, which is steeped 
in traditions some of which are quite outside the normal language 
repertoire of both adults and children. It seemed useful to identify 
some of the linguistic features peculiar to the courtroom, and so a 
testing program was set up to assess children's ability to hear different 
questions.
The problem was, how might the distance between the child's language 
capacities and the language of the courtroom be described and 
displayed? This distance seemed to be most pronounced during cross 
examination of the child victim witness. In order to examine whether 
this distance actually existed and if so how it might be described, a 
testing program was created, using children unconnected with court.
4.5 THE TESTING PROGRAM
The basic premise of the test is that if a person can repeat a piece of 
language (text) then the language, its structure, vocabulary and length
are manageable and within the linguistic repertoire of the respondent 
(Clay, 1976). If they fail to repeat the text it is assumed that there is a 
mismatch (of some sort) between the speaker and the listener. It is rare 
to find complete understanding existing between speakers and listeners. 
However, in the courtroom this difference becomes a critical problem 
particularly when children are involved as witnesses.
4.5.1 Theory and format of repetition
Repetition of questions was the method used to determine whether the 
language of the questions asked was part of the language repertoire of 
the child. The theory and format for this methodology were based on 
the work of Marie Clay whose Record o f oral language uses a repetition 
model to observe aspects of a child's control over oral language and 
assess a child's ability to handle selected grammatical structures (Clay, 
1976).
One way to find out how much o f the structure of adult speech a 
child has learned is to ask him to listen to a sentence and to repeat it  
By having a child repeat sentences which represent a wide range of 
syntactic structures in English a teacher can learn as much in a 
relatively short time about his control of those structures as would be 
learned from listening to the child's spontaneous speech over much 
longer period (Clay, 1976: 9)
The premise which underlies Clay's work is that what is not reproduced 
accurately is not heard; what is reproduced accurately is heard, and 
there are variations in between. There are multitudinous factors which 
influence what is heard, and as Clay states:
No single linguistic criterion has been devised for predicating 
reliably the difficulty of sentences ... There are many factors which 
influence the difficulty of a sentence. An unusual word or ambiguity 
of meaning could easily cause an increase in difficulty greater than 
that produced by a change in grammatical structure or an increase in 
sentence length. The most reliable guide to difficulty is the nature of 
the child's response.
(Clay, 1976: 39)
The repetition mode was the basis of the test and was used to observe 
how children handled a range of court, school and counselling 
questions. If they could repeat a question accurately then both the 
language and length of the question were accessible. Only then could 
they attempt to answer the question. The testing program made no 
judgements about context, stress or victimisation; these aspects were 
considered separately. It was an assessment of whether these questions 
and their expression were part of the child’s repertoire. The children 
were not required to answer the questions but simply to repeat them.
To understand and then respond to a question presupposes that the 
language of the question is part of the language repertoire of the 
listener. Repertoire is a concept which includes both the syntax and 
semantics of language. Syntax embodies the principles of order which 
govern a language. It is a set of rules which develops and refines with 
age and allows us to communicate with other people. Words are not 
randomly combined, their choice is patterned by unstated rules. 
Grammars are only one attempt to describe the complex inter­
relationships between different word classes. All these rules are 
gradually absorbed without direct instruction and appear as the 
guideposts for effective communication and language. If certain syntax 
is not part of the repertoire of the listener then answering that question 
becomes a problem.
For example if someone asked the question: "Where were you today?” 
in an unfamiliar syntactic form such as: "Were today you where?", it 
would be difficult to respond because the unfamiliar syntax interferes 
with the meaning for which the listener is searching. On the other hand 
if the question was: ’Where were tot niigelster?' the listener would 
experience difficulty in responding because the words ’tot’ and 
’niigelster’ are not part of the listener’s semantic repertoire. Sensible 
meanings cannot be attributed to the words. Syntactic and semantic 
mismatches between questioner and respondent seem frequent in court.
The aim of this part of the study was to investigate the difference 
between the language repertoire of the child and the language repertoire 
demanded by the courtroom in cases of child sexual assault.
4.5.2 Gathering and using transcripts
Transcripts obtained from the Sydney and Wagga Wagga offices of the 
Department of Public Prosecutions were catalogued according to the age 
of the child witness. Twenty six transcripts were collected, in which 
children aged between six years and fifteen years gave evidence under 
cross examination. The majority of these transcripts were a record of 
Committal Proceedings, where transcripts had been made because the 
case was to proceed to the District Court level. In two instances 
transcripts were used which followed cases from the Magistrates Court 
to the Court of Appeal.














From these twenty six transcripts 5,654 questions were identified as 
being asked during the cross examinations of child witnesses.
The transcript questions for each age group were then combined and 
numbered sequentially. The age grouping allowed matching with the 
ages of the children tested, and also offered the opportunity to observe 
any differences in questioning style which many magistrates and lawyers 
claim to make as concessions to the language maturity of child 
witnesses.
The bulk of questions which the children in the testing program were 
asked to repeat were taken from actual court cases. However, it was 
decided to include the extra two categories of questions, 'Counsellor* 
and 'Teacher', to provide contrast rather than experimental control. 
The five 'Counsellor' questions for each age are specifically related to 
interview procedures for alleged victims of child sexual assault. Five 
questions appropriate to classrooms in which children of different age 
groups would find themselves were also collected. These questions 
show that different contexts and different reasons for asking questions 
exist and that information can be obtained from children by asking 
question in different ways.
4.5.3 Transcript questions
Two criteria were used to select questions from the transcript material 
available, thus creating two different sets of questions for repetition. 
One was arrived at by using random numbers. These are referred to as 
’Random lawyer' questions. The other set was created by selecting 
from the transcripts questions which, for a variety of reasons, were 
thought might cause difficulty for the listener. These are referred to as 
'Selective lawyer' questions.
• Random lawyer questions
To ensure that a representative sample of questions was chosen, a set of 
random numbers was used to find twenty questions from the total pool 
of questions for each age group of children. Each of the questions in 
the transcripts were numbered and then a set of random numbers was 
used to select twenty questions for each age group.
• Selective lawyer questions
Having read all the transcripts a number of times it became obvious that 
there were a number of hard to answer questions. A list of question 
types and lengths was developed and this formed the basis for the 
selection. These questions contained examples of court language and 
court style which are often confusing to the most competent of language 
users. These questions encapsulated and reflected some of the 
predominant linguistic concerns held for children trying to come to 
terms with the language of the courtroom.
These linguistic concerns are based on the assumption that for 
communication and information exchange to be effective there must be 
an adequate match between the language used by both conversational 
partners. If the gap between the two participants is widened by unclear 
speech, peculiar structure and unfamiliar vocabulary then one party to 
the conversation is excluded from the process of effective understanding 
(Hull, 1985). The questions for repetition in the 'Selective lawyer' 
group were chosen on the basis of the categories which contributed most 
to this apparent mismatch. The categories were developed from the 
transcripts rather than from any previously developed list or taxonomy.
For each age group of children twenty randomly chosen transcript 
questions and twenty selectively chosen transcript questions were listed. 
Five classroom questions and five counsellor questions were added to 
each pool and together, when randomly mixed, became the sets of 
questions which the children were asked to repeat.
4.5.4 Developing a coding format
In this study 'difficulty with the language' is initially defined in terms of 
the ability or inability to reproduce. The basis of that difficulty is the 
subject of later analysis.
The poles of the assessment, totally accurate reproduction and nil 
reproduction, are self evident. Totally accurate repetitions by the child 
indicated a total control over the language structures and vocabulary
contained in any given question. Nil reproductions indicated that for 
whatever reason the child did not have the capacity to hear and repeat 
the questions, and the question was outside their language repertoire.
However, I also wanted to find out about (and take into account) the 
fractures or breaks which occurred as the listeners struggled to recreate 
what they had heard. I decided that single element changes should be 
classified differently from multiple element changes. Some children 
imposed their own sense on questions which they found difficult to 
repeat, some maintained partial sense when repeating, while others 
simply regurgitated nonsensical strings of words. This analysis (of 
departures from the text of the original questions) was developed in 
terms of the fractures which children made to the flow of language of 
the question. These fractures could be isolated firstly in terms of 
whether, within any one given question, there was only one such 
fracture, or whether a number of these occurred. In the testing profile 
these become Single Element or Multiple Element changes respectively.
4.5.5 An example of a test profile
To make these points clearer and to give the reader a greater 
appreciation of the dimensions of this study, a testing profile for James 
aged 11 years, has been included as Appendix 5. All subsequent 
examples are taken from this profile.
See Appendix 5: Sample testing profile, James.
For example, James fractured question eleven in the 'Selective Lawyer' 
class. The original question was: "Well, you are not sure whether you 
said those things to the Principal which are wrong?" James only 
changed one element of this question when he repeated:
"Well you are not sure that you said those things to the Principal which 
are wrong?"
This fracture type was called a single element change to the original 
question because only one unit of the question had been changed in 
repetition.
Multiple element fractures occurred when a number of elements within 
the original question were changed by the child during repetition. For 
example, question thirteen in the 'Selective Lawyer' class was:
"All right, so between his patting you and his attempt or his trying to 
put his squash racquet in your bag there was nothing else, is that right?
James repeated the question in the following way.
"As you attempt trying to put his squash racquet in your bag there 
nothing else was there?" Within the repetition made by James there 
were seven fractures to the original question. These were: four 
omissions "all right", "so between his patting", "and his" "or his", one 
addition "as" two substitutions "is" for "was", "was there" for "is that 
right".
This represents a multiple element change to the original question. For 
the purposes of this analysis an element within a question was defined as 
being a chunk of language which could stand on its own and maintain 
some sense in isolation and without context. The task of analysing each 
individual word change within a question made by a child during 
repetition would be enormous and not necessarily productive or 
appropriate. Language is stored and dealt with in chunks. Some pieces 
of language naturally occur together given the rules of syntax governing 
the structure of our language. These naturally occurring chunks were 
taken as the elements which combined to form the questions offered for 
repetition. In those cases where only one word was changed, these were 
also regarded as elements.
Looking back at the example of James, repetition one shows James 
substituting the element "that" for the element "whether". This is a 
single element change consisting of only one word. A single element 
change consisting of more than one word is exemplified below. 
Question sixteen in the 'Selective Lawyer' class reads: "This terrible 
thing happening to you, if there was someone else there you'd 
remember it wouldn't you?" James repeated the question in the 
following way: "This terrible thing happening (Omitted "to you"), if 
there was someone else there you'd remember it wouldn t you?
The omission of "to you" is regarded as a single element, a single chunk 
of language that stands together as an utterance.
The decisions made thus far would have produced an extensive set of 
only quantitative data. These would have been expressed in terms of 
numbers and extents of fractures, as single and multiple element 
changes. Descriptive labels could also be attached, namely omissions, 
additions, substitutions, transpositions and reconstructions.
4.5.6 A qualitative approach to repetition responses
In order to come closer to a qualitative appreciation of what was going 
on between what was said and what was heard, the fractures were 
viewed in terms of how extensively they distorted the form and content 
of the original question. This assessment was expressed in terms of 
syntactic and/ or semantic dislocation. In most cases it is unwise to 
distinguish between the form and content of a piece of language, as a 
change in one necessarily occasions a change of some sort in the overall 
meaning, and thus the other. However, there are occasions when one 
word is substituted for another (semantic) and the overall structure 
(syntax) is left intact.
The following example illustrates how devastating such a change can be. 
The single element change maintains the structure and maintains sense 
but the meaning of the original question has changed.
Original Question: "Would it be incorrect to suggest that it was not so 
much a tripping, but because of the state of inebriation of yourself that 
you fell over?"
Repetition: "Would it be correct to suggest that it was not so much a 
tripping over, but because of the state of inebriation of yourself, that 
you fell over?" (Transcript 13 years)
4.5.7 The sense1 of a question
With this accumulation of qualitative, descriptive and quantitative data 
each incorrect response was then placed alongside the original text to 
see how far the reproduction reflected the sense of the original. 'The 
sense’ occurred when the sense of the repeated question reflected the 
sense of the original. The following sample of James's repetition 
demonstrates this.
Original Question. "Well you are not sure whether you said those 
things to the Principal which are wrong?"
Repetition: "Well you are not sure that you said those things to the 
Principal which are wrong?"
4.5.8 'A sense1 of a question
'A sense’ occurred when the repeated question made sense but not the 
actual sense of the original. For example:
Original Question: "Well on the week before you made this statement 
to the Principal you said that one night you were in the kitchen?"
Repetition: "Before you made this statement to the Principal you said 
that you were in the kitchen the night before?"
4.5.9 'No sense1 of a question
*No sense' occurred when neither the actual sense of the original, nor 
another sensible expression was repeated. When read alone the 
repetition was nonsense. For example:
Original Question: "You went for a swim there, I am putting to you, at 
Cronulla Beach?"
Repetition: "You went for a swim there you put at Cronulla Beach?"
The coding format developed to collate and display all the types of data 
collected, appears as Appendix 6.
See Appendix 6: Blank coding format
4.6 ADMINISTERING THE TESTING PROGRAM
Three schools in Wagga participated in this testing program; one male 
high school, one female high school and a co-educational primary 
school. The teachers were asked to select three children in each age 
group according to their perceived language abilities: one above 
average, one average and one below average language user in each age 
category. I thus obtained a representative range of general language 
abilities from a cross section of three schools.
Each child was introduced to the testing format individually. The 
purpose of the study was explained in terms of the researcher wanting 
to find out more about different questions children are asked. The 
whole exercise was not presented as a test of their ability and it was 
made quite clear to children that inability to repeat questions accurately 
must not be construed as failure. A number of practice questions were 
given to establish comfort with the format.
After the child was settled and comfortable he/ she was asked to repeat 
the nominated questions. The questions from each category were 
presented in mixed order. Enunciation, intonation and speed of asking 
were kept as uniform as possible.
When the nominated list was finished each child was asked to comment 
upon the questions in terms of their ease and difficulty for repetition. 
The whole session was tape recorded so as to avoid intrusive notetaking 
and the tapes were used to assess the differences between the repetitions 
and the original questions. These were scored in terms of fractures and 
their types. These were then coded onto the data display sheet for each 
child and for each of the thirty children these analyses were organised 
according to the categories of question types.
The range of procedures outlined in this chapter produced a variety of 
data. Observation, participation, interview, testing and reflective 
material were reviewed and analysed to produce three distinctive sets of 




Once all the data had been collated, a method for dealing with it was 
needed. The initial analysis took several forms ranging from the 
statistical to the search for descriptors and themes.
The results of the data collection and its analysis led to the development 
of a linguistically specific tool which could be used to examine and 
describe the extent and the effect of language in use. This operational 
outcome is reported in Chapter Six and is a response to the totality of 
the results reported here.
Three sets of results were generated by the collection and analysis of 
data. The first (5.1) is a range of results from the empirical study 
which showed, amongst other things, the validity of the claims that the 
children did not understand 'about half of what was said to them in 
court. The statistical calculation of 43% for expressions (across all age 
groups) which were not accurately responded to confirms that children 
have a poor understanding of the discourse as a whole. The collection 
of 'random lawyer’ questions was chosen at random from all the 
available transcripts and provides the clearest link with the concern of 
this thesis. The other categories of 'counsellor', 'teacher,' and 
'selective lawyer' serve as points of comparison and emphasis to the 
central finding. Strong as this result was however, it was still 
unfinished, because the details which contributed to the lack of 
comprehension had not been specified other than in a general sense.
By comparing characteristics of the language samples which the 
children in the testing program failed to hear with the characteristics of 
the 'selective lawyer' sample, a second set of results (5.2) was 
generated. These results highlight particular aspects of language and 
seek to relate the test results with the experiences of the child victim 
witness. Without any attempt at proportional representation, I created a 
list of aspects of the 'language of cross examination’. These may be 
perceived as rhetorical tactics and strategies which have debilitating 
effects upon comprehension (as shown in the results of the testing 
program). The list showed :
• the context of situation (eg. lawyers examine children on police 
statements)
• context of the text (eg. lawyers change topics) and
• context of words, phrases and expressions (eg. semantic and syntactic 
features of language generate meanings).
The list is an initial collection of aspects of linguistic expression which 
characterise the interactions and constitute this second collection of 
results for the study.
A third (5.3) set of results has been made possible by a macro level 
review of the ’themes’ about children which were either expressed or 
implied in the large pool of transcripts available. These results 
encapsulate certain cultural understandings about children as they are 
manifested in the process of cross examination.
All three sets of results contribute to our understanding of the 
experience of the child victim witness under cross examination and the 
significant role of language. In reporting these results I have sought to 
interpret them in the light of:
• my membership as an adult language user
• my appreciation of a wide range of literature on the effect of 
linguistic constructs upon comprehension
• my understanding of the condition of being a child victim witnesses
• my experiences as an educator in the field of literacy and language 
development, and
• my synthesis of interviews with a range of stakeholders.
5.1 TEST RESULTS
The results of the testing program can be read either for individuals or 
the 30 children as a group. I first present, by way of illustration, the 
scores and profile of one child (James). This is followed by an 
accumulation of features of the testing profile for all children, and then 
a summary of the results overall.
5.1.1 James and his scores
See Appendix 5: Sample testing profile for James
• Selective lawyer questions
Within the 'Selective lawyer' questions James did not accurately 
reproduce any of the original pieces of text. Therefore his score in the 
'total reproduction' category was zero.
James altered two questions by single element changes. One of these 
changes was an omission and one was a substitution. Both these changes 
resulted in James generating syntactically and semantically whole pieces 
of language and while these changes did not produce The Sense' of the 
original question, they resulted in 'A Sense'. He altered the questions 
but his alterations maintained a language form as well as a discernible 
meaning. As a percentage of the total number of 'Selective Lawyer' 
questions offered for repetition, the two single element changes which 
James made preserved 'A Sense' in 10% of the cases. James changed 
multiple elements within four questions. He omitted fifteen elements, 
added two elements, substituted eight elements and transposed one 
element. These changes resulted in an even division between 
syntactically and semantically dislocated pieces of language, with half of 
his reproductions being unlike 'normal' language.
With these dislocations James produced two reproduction which had 'A 
Sense' of language, and two which had 'No Sense’ of language. 
Therefore, the multiple element changes which James made to four 
questions resulted in 10% maintaining a 'A Sense' of language (as a 
proportion of the total number of questions within the 'Selective 
Lawyer' category) and 10% having No Sense' of language. James 
failed to attempt any reproduction of fourteen out of the twenty 
'Selective Lawyer' questions. Therefore 70% of the total number of 
questions offered for repetition had No Sense' for James.
• Random lawyer questions
Within this category, James accurately reproduced eight questions, 40% 
of the total number of questions offered for repetition within this 
category.
None of the changes were single element changes and four shifts in 
repetition contained multiple element changes. These multiple element 
changes consisted of eleven omissions, one substitution and one 
transposition. Within three questions the multiple element changes 
which James made resulted in syntactically and semantically dislocated 
pieces of language. Therefore only one out of the four repetitions in 
this category had 'A Sense' of language and three contained 'No Sense' 
of language. James preserved 'A Sense' in 5% of the questions, and 'No 
Sense' in 15% of the cases. James failed to attempt repetition of eight
questions. Therefore a total of 40% of the questions had 'No Sense' for 
James.
• Teacher questions
Within this group James accurately reproduced three out of the five 
questions and therefore maintained 'The Sense' in 60% of the questions 
offered. The remaining two questions were altered on a multiple 
element basis with three omissions, one addition and three substitutions. 
Both questions which were altered in this way resulted in syntactically 
and semantically acceptable pieces of whole language. One of these 
questions preserved 'The Sense' of the original question and one 
preserved 'A Sense'. As a percentage of the total number of questions 
offered for repetition, the multiple element changes resulted in the 
maintenance of 'The sense' in 20% of cases and 'A Sense' in 20% of 
cases.
• Counsellor questions
James accurately reproduced all the questions within this category 
thereby maintaining total sense in 100% of cases.
5.1.2 James and his profile
The above description of how James handled questions of different types 
is now a profile which can be presented and analysed in different ways. 
If we use the format discussed by Marie Clay, only totally accurate 
reproductions should be scored as reflecting those language structures 












If we accept that ability to repeat questions is an accurate reflection of 
the synonymy between the language of the question and the language 
repertoire of the child then the counsellor questions are perfectly 
matched, the teacher questions matched in 60% of cases, the random 
lawyer questions matched in 40% of cases and the selective lawyer 
questions are completely outside James's language repertoire.
However, this level of analysis has been further refined to admit other 
dimensions of language ability. By analysing the types of repetition 
shifts which James makes, it is possible to observe how James deals with 
questions considered by the court to be suitable to his age but which 
may nevertheless be outside his normal language repertoire.
Within the 'Selective lawyer' class 70% of the questions appear to be so 
ill matched that he makes no attempt to repeat them. 30% of the 
questions offered for repetition are changed, two thirds of these have 'A 
Sense' of language, and one third has 'No Sense'.
Within the 'Random lawyer’ selection of questions 40% preserved The 
Sense' of the original question, 5% had 'A Sense' of language and 55% 
had Wo Sense' of language.
Within the 'Teacher' grouping 80% preserved the total sense of the 
original question and 20% had an independent 'A Sense'.
The 'Counsellor' questions produced total sense in all cases.
5.1.3 Categories of repetition shifts
5.1.4 The analysis of the repetitions of 30 children
An analysis identical to the one just outlined above was carried out for 
each of the 30 children involved in the testing program and an overall 
profile of the results in the form of a graphic display is presented as 
Appendix 7.
See Appendix 7: Graphic summary of testing program results
5.1.5 An overview of the results
The four graphs represent the responses which children made when 
asked to reproduce questions presented as a mixed list. Three children 
aged between 6 and 15 years, of high, middle and low general language 
ability, were represented.
Types of Questions and Responses
i. Counsellor questions in all but one instance were reproduced with 
the sense left intact. Some element of challenge is obvious, 
indicated by several instances of single element changes, which 
were nevertheless reproduced with the original sense of the
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question. This is an expected result from an activity designed to 
include the sensitivities of the respondents to the fullest possible 
extent. It should be noted here though, that we are looking not at 
individually tailored questions but a genre of questions asked in a 
counselling situation which children unconnected with that situation 
are asked to reproduce.
ii. Teacher questions displayed a variety of responses. This may 
reflect the classroom orientation of teacher questions where 
regrettably a proportion of children are always left out. There is a 
definite entrance, according to these results, at the age of 10, of 
children who lose their grip on the language of the questions asked 
by teachers. Overall The Sense* was reproduced 80% of the time, 
’A Sense' was reproduced 10% of the time and 'No Sense' was 
evident 10% of the time. In an educational context a developmental 
perspective is acceptable when reviewing children's achievements 
in language and learning, and it is not generally expected that 
children will make 'The Sense' of all that is said to them the first 
time. It is enough that The Sense’ is made most of the time and 
that 'A Sense' occurs so that 'The Sense' if appropriate can be 
worked towards. Special provision has to be made for children 
who fail to grasp sense either fully or partially.
iii. Random lawyer questions showed that, according to the unstressed 
children of die testing program, the sense was evident around 60% 
of the time while 'The Sense’ was missed 40% of the time. These 
questions are usually asked in a context which operates according 
to strict rules of procedure aimed at generating precision and 
accuracy. 'A Sense' however sensible, is not acceptable yet appears 
around 20% of instances and 'No Sense' is evident the other 20%. 
The greater amount of the No Sense' score is due to no attempt at 
reproduction being made. These questions were not heard well 
enough to even make a stab at reproducing them.
iv. Selective lawyer questions supported the selective choice of 
questions, with only some 15% being capable of reproduction with 
'The Sense'. A third of these required 'creative editing', as shown 
by the maintenance of sense in spite of single and multiple element 
changes. Around 30% displayed 'A Sense' and over 30% of all the 
questions were lost to the hearers. The least affected age group on 
both the lawyer selections, it should be noted, were the six year 
olds. This may indicate an echoic response where their hearing 
was not impaired by a search for meaning. If nothing else this 
differential shows clearly the frailty of interpreting in only one 
way, in only one situation, children's responses to questions.
From these profiles organised according to the age of the children tested 
there are some obvious results. For example those repetitions across 
question types which preserved ’The Sense' of the original question 
create a continuum of question difficulty. This reflects the synonymy 
between the language of the questions and the language abilities of the 
children tested.
1. The language of the counsellor group of questions most closely 
paralleled the language abilities of the children. They are thus more 
likely to be answerable because the questions themselves are accessible 
to the children.
2. The language of the teacher generated questions is ranked next in 
terms of the match between the language of the questions and the 
language repertoire of the child with the exception of the six year old 
age group.
3. Questions chosen from the transcripts using random numbers, the 
random lawyer questions, appear next in the continuum.
4. Selective lawyer questions showed the greatest mismatch between the 
language of the child and the language of the question. The following 
tables in Appendix 8 display the figures to substantiate these statements.
See Appendix 8: Tables of testing program responses
5.1.6 A continuum of question difficulty
5.1.7 The questions and their rankings
It is clear that the ranking of the questions in terms of ease of repetition 





This is no surprise, given the intentions of the different questioning 
modes. Individuals involved with the counselling of child victims of 
sexual assault are concerned with giving children a format for talking 
through traumatic events. They are concerned with preserving the 
mental welfare of the child so they ask questions which offer maximum 
freedom of expression, in language with which the child is comfortable.
Within a classroom, teachers ask questions for different reasons, 
ranging from assessment of what the child knows to a method for 
exploring new concepts and information. When teachers ask questions 
the focus ideally remains with the child. The questioner tries to match 
what he or she knows about children with the language and style of 
questions asked.
5.1.8 The transcript questions - an analysis of sense
In a courtroom questions are asked for very different reasons.
• They display information.
• They are the weapons of combative legal interactions.
• They are used to call the credibility of the witness into question.
• They are competitive illustrations of legal skill and language 
manipulation.
The extent to which children can deal with the language of these 
different questioning formats has been illustrated. The issue which 
needs to be addressed is the magnitude of the mismatch between the 
language of the lawyer and the language of the child, and the features of 
lawyer language which can account for this mismatch.
If attention is focused on the differences between repetitions which 
preserved 'The Sense' of the original question and those which 
contained 'No Sense' of the original question it is obvious that the 
questions generated by the transcript material posed problems for a 
significant group of children. There is also an obvious difference
between the lawyer questions which were randomly chosen and those 
which were selectively culled from the transcripts. The selectively 
chosen questions represent a pool of lawyer questions which display 
most clearly some of the language characteristics which are only 
common to a courtroom. These characteristics will be explored in 
more detail later in this chapter (5.2). The extent to which children 
could repeat questions which have these characteristics is clearly 
displayed by the general lack of success which all children had with the 
selectively chosen class of lawyer questions.
The extent of the mismatch between the language repertoire of the child 
and the language of any particular questioning category can be 
measured by looking at the percentage of inaccurate repetitions which 
produced 'No Sense’. Most frequently the Tío Sense' category was 
identified by the obvious lack of syntax of the piece of text produced by 
the child. Because the syntax had been interfered with, the meaning of 
the text was unclear or confused.
The extent of this mismatch can be shown in the following way.
The three eight year old children tested had zero scores for 'No Sense' 
for both the Teacher' and the 'Counsellor' categories. The language of 
these two questioning categories seems to be within the language 
abilities of these three children. The 'Random lawyer' questions 
produced 'No Sense' in 27% of cases whilst the 'Selective lawyer' 
category of questions had Tío Sense' in 53% of instances. It therefore 
appears that 27% and 53% of questions in both these categories were 
outside the language repertoires of these children.
5.1.9 A consideration of 'A Sense1
So far the results of the testing program have only included two 
categories of responses; those which preserved 'The Sense' of the 
original question offered for repetition, and those which had Tio Sense 
as independent pieces of text. However, some shifts in repetition while 
not preserving The Sense' of the original question, were syntactically 
and semantically acceptable pieces of text and exemplify the child s 
imposition of meaning on difficult text to create A Sense.
5.1.10 'No Sense1 and mismatch
The immediate implications of the established mismatch as displayed by 
the results in the 'No Sense' category of repetitions should now be
examined, as these form the springboards to a more detailed and 
expansive appreciation of the child as a witness in court.
'No Sense' responses indicate that the language of the question is outside 
the repertoire of the child's language capacities. If the child can impose 
no sense on a question, the corollary must be that their responses in 
court to questions of that type are of dubious value. This reflects on the 
lack of insight on the part of the questioner rather than calling into 
disrepute the credibility of the child. The questioner has the power to 
competently match the language of the questions with the language 
capacities of the witness. The respondents are instructed that they have 
no responsibilities other than to answer questions truthfully and to the 
best of their abilities. They have no capacity to negotiate and no 
opportunity to express their frustration at not understanding questions. 
The interactions between the lawyer and the respondent are prescribed 
by tradition and protocol which seem to perpetuate language mismatch. 
It appears that the processes of the law can proceed with no 
acknowledgment of the fact that child witnesses can be disenfranchised 
by language.
5.1.11 The cumulative effect of linguistic mismatch
Another issue which arises as a consequence of the mismatch between 
the language of the lawyers and the language of the children, is the 
cumulative effect on the child of being confronted by questions which 
do not linguistically form part of their speech repertoire. Confusion, 
frustration and despair are understandable reactions on the part of any 
person to a combative sequence of ill matched questions. If language is 
the pre-eminent mode of display in the establishment of truth in court 
then it seems to exclude the child victim. Language mismatch in this 
context implies a form of secondary punishment.
I would speculate here that the more extensive and prolonged the 
mismatch between lawyers and children, the more likely it is that the 
whole interaction between witness and cross examiner will become 
confused and disjointed. Ripples of distress spread across questions 
which may be perfectly matched to the child’s language abilities but the 
history of past difficult questions inevitably leads to the break-down of 
the child witness. These break-downs have been attributed by observers 
to a number of causes:
• the presence of the alleged offender in court,
• the architecture of the courtroom,
• the male dominated environment, and
• the lack of support which the child feels.
I would suggest that all these factors could be accommodated by the 
child if the language with which they were confronted was sympathetic 
to their level of development and acuity. However it is not and the 
effect of being confronted with questions outside the child's language 
capabilities seems to account for some of the pressure which produces 
distress. The point at which the mismatch between the language of the 
lawyers and the language of the children becomes critical and causes 
effective communication to completely break down should also be 
considered.
5.1.12 Types of responses available to children
The more constrained the questioning format used by the lawyers the 
less likely it is that this mismatch will be observable. If a child has been 
asked to answer (only) 'Yes' or 'No', the answer offered by the child 
tells the questioner nothing about the child’s appreciation or hearing of 
the question. If you are offered two options and you have been told to 
choose one, it is quite possible to reply without having heard the 
proposition which demands your response. The 'I don't know' response 
is the only other option available to the child when confronted with a 
question. This response is often used to call the credibility and 
reliability of the child into disrepute. The speciousness of this argument 
will be discussed in more detail but it is worth noting here that this 
response may represent a reaction to a question which is not matched 
with the language capacity of the child witness. If the child has not 
heard the question, or if they do not feel able to answer definitely either 
'Yes' or 'No', the only alternative that remains is the neutral linguistic 
territory provided by the 'I don't know' response.
5.1.13 Taking directions from the testing program
The results of the testing program can now be translated into the arena 
of those wider concerns expressed for child victims appearing as 
witnesses in court in cases of sexual assault. What do the results of the 
test and a close examination of extant transcript material tell us about 
the linguistic treatment of children in court? What aspects of language, 
particular to the courtroom, contribute to the mismatch between 
children’s language abilities and the language of the lawyers? How and 
why are these language characteristics employed by members of the 
legal profession and how justifiable is their usage? Are the stories 
which children tell of their assault given due weight and consideration? 
What provisions are made for relatively inexperienced language users 
who appear as witnesses?
A considered response to these questions will lead to an informed 
answer to the research question ’How is language used to deny the 
experience of another human being and how is this signalled 
linguistically?' In the following section (5.2) I attempt to identify the 
characteristics of hard to hear speech whilst drawing on insights about 
the state of child victim witnesses.
5.2 ASPECTS OF LANGUAGE IN CROSS EXAMINATION
One of the concerns expressed by people interviewed who work with 
victims of child sexual assault is the devastating effect which court 
appearances have on these children. The alien environment, the male 
domination of the legal profession and the formality of the courtroom 
are frequently identified as forces contributing to the disquiet and 
distress of the child victim witness. Those same social workers, 
paediatricians and counsellors find it much more difficult however to 
articulate the features of language which supposedly mitigate against the 
perceived rights of the child. They find it easier to express what they 
know of the events and details surrounding the assault. Their anxieties 
about the strange language which pervades the courtroom are deeply 
felt but unclear in their expression.
Most people do not have the tools of analysis required to decode and 
translate this language. They recognise the effects which strange 
language has on die child witness. They can cite some of the more 
obvious techniques and tactics which give courtroom language its own 
private flavour to such an extent that for many, courtroom language is a 
dialect. The communication gap created by this difference is dependent 
on the language competence of the novice participant and the level of 
specialisation of the dialect which is being used.
To understand how it works it was necessary to collect samples of 
courtroom language, identify the most striking aspects of the language 
which characterise the interaction, and explore how these characteristics 
might produce confusion and distress in the minds of individuals. As 
foreshadowed in Chapter Three the organisation of the aspects of 
language themselves was not constrained by the use of a pre-existing 
taxonomy and the organisation of aspects here arises from the transcript 
data.
The following aspects of lawyer language have been selected from the 
twenty six transcripts collected for this study. They have been chosen 
for their discrepancy value. They display ways of asking questions 
which I see as outside the normal competencies of many adult users of 
the language, and which pose mismatch difficulties for children who are
already under stress in court. They include some of the aspects of the 
'Selective lawyer' questions which the children of the testing program 
found most difficult to hear.
The list of language aspects which are specifically court related is a long 
one. For the purposes of generating some immediate and suable results 
I have concentrated only on the following thirteen. The aspects and 
their labelling are grounded in the transcripts and do not represent 
either a cohesive description, a set of mutually exclusive criteria, or 
categories of equal or like status. The list represents a pool of results 
which invite further exploration and refinement in order to answer the 
research question.




5. Unclear or confused expressions
6. Specific and difficult vocabulary
7. Unclear anaphora
8. Use of police statements
9. Quoting of the child's words
10. Quoting of other people's words
11. Repetition of previous response
12. Time, space and location questions in cases of multiple assault
13. Embeddings
Each feature identified is illustrated with examples. The elements of the 
mismatch between the speaker and hearer are explored as are the 
implications of this mismatch for the child victim witness. I have made 
the descriptions as 'common sense' as possible in an effort to allow 
access to a variety of stakeholders who, although they may be convinced 
that aspects of language do indeed drive certain results, are unqualified 
and unwilling to adopt a 'pure' linguistic description. The description 
also seeks to admit, in an effort to embrace contextual information, the 
experiences of the child victim witness and other aspects of stakeholder 
orientation. My assertions and connections are sometimes speculative in 
that they depend on my own perception of 'what's going on'. My 
perceptions are informed and influenced by my status as a competent 
language user, my immersion in the court experience, and my 
discussions with a wide range of informants. I also sought to check 
those perceptions with a variety of people involved and uninvolved with 
the court experience.
5.2.1. Use of the Negative
Simple negatives, complex negative constructions and negative 
expressions appear frequently in the transcripts. They appear to be 
placed in unusual positions, and it seems their function is to break up 
and fragment the content of questions. Ostensibly they are included to 
add precision to the question, but their effect is often confusing to those 
not familiar with their format. Negative expressions are common in 
everyday language, however it is unlikely that anyone except lawyers 
uses the negative form so widely, or in such particular ways.
In asking a large number of questions in the negative the child is 
required to refute or agree with that range of negative expressions. A 
conversation dominated by negative constructions requires constant 
transposing. The person on the receiving end of such a dialogue may 
begin to doubt the value of their participation in the interaction.
There are a number of patterns which determine the ways in which 
lawyers incorporate negative forms in the questions they ask. The 
grammatical structure of these negatives, and their position in questions, 
conforms to an unwritten set of rules which are outside the normal 
language capacities and experiences of both adults and children.
• Insertion of negative form
The first way in which the negative is used is when a negative 
expression is placed symmetrically between two pieces of information. 
The negative expression itself is totally lawyer specific and is a likely 
cause of confusion and mismatch. The example below is a model for 
this particular use of the negative.




The insertion of the negative form "did you not" generates three 
questions in one question. It can be unclear which part of the question 
the child should respond to as she is confronted with three possible 
questions to answer. These are:
1. Did you have a bruise?
2. Was it near your breast?
3. Do you remember that?
In offering one response the child automatically excludes possible 
answers to the remaining two questions. It is not possible to link, with 
any degree of confidence, the child's 'no' response to any particular part 
of the question.
• Negative as rhetoric
The negative is also used as a rhetorical device in court where the 
negative construction is generally placed at the end of the question as the 
following example shows.
Q. "Now, this happened on a Friday, was it not?"
A. "Yes."
(Transcript 7 years).
Its inclusion creates a number of options for the relatively 
inexperienced language use, who is trying to come to terms with the 
basic content of the question. Does the "was it not" imply that the 
question means that 'it did happen on a Friday?' The child is confronted 
with the issue of how to answer. The level of complication spawned by 
this rhetorical question marker is unnecessary to the issue of either 
'happening' or 'Friday'. It does not add to the weight of the answer 
given by the child; the tendency would be to detract from it.
Confusing questions are likely to produce confused answers. The issue 
of confusion becomes critical when the question being asked is full of 
options for response. The following example typifies how this 
confusion can become entrenched by the addition of a negative 
rhetorical tag.
Q. "When Mr Smith asked you if you could remember anything about 
a towel you said you could not remember anything about a towel? 




The rhetorical use of the negative form also appears without any other 
supporting question content. Frequently children are asked questions 
such as 'Is that not true?' Most users of the language would find it 
much easier to answer the question 'Is that true?' than to respond to its 
negative rhetorical counterpart.
There is a higher likelihood of mismatch when the negative rhetorical 
form is used since it requires double processing before any answer is 
given. Because of this potential for mismatch, there is also a greater 
likelihood that the response given by the child will be mismatched with 
the intention of the question being asked.
• Uncommon use of the negative
The following example illustrates another specific use of the negative in 
court. It is representative of that class of question which is prefaced by 
an uncommon use of the negative. The subject of the action is placed 
after the negative form. This construction rarely appears in everyday 
language. It is most unusual to hear questions such as Did not Susan go 
to Macdonald’s last night?' or 'Did not Peter hit you with the stick?' 
The purpose of including the negative form at the beginning of a 
question is to reinforce its status as carrying the primary meaning thrust 
of the whole question. However, because of its unusual form it is 
predictable that it will cause some immediate concern in the mind of the 
respondent. Its strangeness is immediately apparent.
Q. "Did not Phoebe have an accident with the horse about ten days 
before this, have some bruising. Remember that?"
A. "Oh yes, she had one just here"
(Transcript 11 years)
The insertion of "Did not Phoebe ..." unnecessarily overloads the 
content of the question being asked. If the questions were rephrased to 
bring it more closely into line with the language abilities of the child, it 
would probably appear in this form.
Q. "Did Phoebe have an accident with the horse about ten days before 
this, have some bruising? Remember that?"
The content of the question has in no way been prejudiced by the 
dismissal of the negative preface to the question. The omission of the 
negative improves the linguistic precision of the question and changes it 
into a more comprehensible and manageable form for the child to deal 
with. It removes that element of linguistic mysticism which confronts 
the listener when unfamiliar and outdated forms of expression are used. 
It becomes a much more inclusive way of obtaining information 
required by the court. To answer the question above in its original 
form requires the respondent to think clearly about the implications of 
answering a question asked in the negative. In the example given the 
possible interpretations which could be imposed are:
1. Phoebe did not have an accident with the horse.
2. Phoebe did have an accident with the horse.
It is not a true negative but a rhetorical device used to reinforce the 
impact of the questioning process. It is doubtful that this level of 
language sophistication falls within the repertoire of the child witness. 
If the child hears the 'not' as a true negative rather than as a piece of 
rhetorical jargon, then the child has to decide whether Phoebe did have 
an accident or not. If she did, then the child will then have to decide 
how to best express this fact given the negative restraints of the question 
format. Does the child say 'yes’ or 'no' to this part of the question? If 
the answer is 'yes', what she is actually saying, in linguistic terms, is 
'Yes. She did have an accident with the horse'. lif the child has acquired 
the linguistic subtlety to recognise the 'not' as a rhetorical marker, then 
the answering pattern would be reversed. The four possible options for 
response imply that this form of questioning is inappropriate if the 
conditions of precision and clarity are to be satisfied. However, 
experimental evidence casts a more definite light on this assertion.
• Multiple negatives
The inclusion of multiple negatives in questions makes them difficult for 
even the most experienced language user to answer with confidence. A 
thirteen year old responded with 'I don't know’ to the following:
Q. "And do you remember another occasion your father, or your 
stepfather, asked if you were playing sport, did you say no?"
A. ”1 don't know".
(Transcript 13 years)
The inclusion of negatively loaded terms such as 'deny' and 'dispute' 
may also pose problems for child witnesses as the following extract 
indicates.
Q. "Do you deny going to Cronulla Beach with Martin and your 
brother before November 1985?"
A. "What does deny ..."
Objection 
Question allowed
Q. "Now go back to Cronulla Beach. I am putting it to you that you 
and your brother on a school day went to Cronulla Beach with Martin 




• A generalised effect
Questions with negative terms which do not contribute to semantic 
clarity may confuse children, frustrate their attempts to tell the truth, 
and generally reduce their level of confidence in court. Given that child 
witnesses in cases of sexual assault are generally nervous, reluctant, 
upset and unsure of themselves in an adult dominated courtroom, the 
extra pressure created by asking questions in ways which only serve to 
reduce semantic clarity in the pursuit of rhetorical force is an example 
of how language mismatch can be used to discriminate against the child.
5.2.2 Juxtaposition
Communication is generally characterised by the development of ideas. 
An explicit effort is made to link these ideas especially when the people 
speaking to each other are relative strangers. In many everyday 
interactions the unspoken conventions for changing topics of 
conversation are accepted. There is generally an obvious link between 
what has just been discussed and the new item of conversation on the 
agenda. It is common to hear people say, for example, '... speaking of 
such and such ... did you read about... did you know... have you seen...' 
If these cues are left out communication becomes disjointed and 
possibly frustrated. Someone is inevitably left stranded.
• A lack of linkage
In court there is no provision within the language to establish linkages. 
The cross examiner jumps from topic to topic and the child witness is 
expected to keep pace. The juxtaposition of questions seems 
inexplicable as topics are jostled randomly. The effects of this are most 
critical when intimate details of the child's alleged sexual assault are 
questioned, and then juxtaposed with general and more objective 
questions.
• Changing topics
A change of topic requires some kind of marker to accommodate a new 
context for the interaction. The practice of juxtaposing unrelated topics 
excludes the possibility of any transition time. Without this 
accommodation time it is likely that the child will become disorientated, 
confused and unclear about the general line of questioning. The greater 
the frequency of these shifts from the personal to the objective, the 
greater the cumulative effect of the confusion will be. The rapid shift
from the highly personal and traumatic to the details of acquaintances, 
for instance, as shown in the following example requires die child to 
leap from one subject to another at an often alarming pace.
Q. ’’That was after he had stripped you?"
A. "Yes"
A. "And you had your legs together?"
A. "Yes"
Q. "And then you said he tried to put his finger in your vagina. Did he 
put his finger in your vagina or on your vagina?"
A. "In my vagina, in my vagina?"
Q. "Inside, you felt it inside did you?"
A. (No verbal answer)
Q. "Did he do anything else to you?"
A. "No"
Q. "Do you know Frank Murphy?"
(Transcript 14 years)
Frank Murphy has not been mentioned previously, and his identity in 
the case is not established subsequently.
In the example given above the pattern of questioning shifts from a 
highly personal recounting of the details of the alleged incident of 
sexual assault to a question about whether the child knows a particular 
person. The rapidity of topic change from vaginal penetration to 
known acquaintances requires a cognitive and contextual leap. The 
cross examiner has not provided the child witness with any adjustment 
time or any preliminary discussion about the subject change. However 
in court children are expected to change from topic to topic at a pace 
determined solely by the cross examiner, with sometimes no cues as to 
why these questions are being asked. Little or no effort is made to set 
the stage for the child's processing of topic changes.
The following example illustrates starkly the kind of conceptual leaps 
demanded by the use of this particular technique. A thirteen year old 
boy, allegedly the victim of multiple assault, has answered fifty 
questions relating to the fine anatomical details of his assault. The topic 
suddenly changes, and then reverts back within the space of one 
question.
Q. "And that you say that he puts his penis into your bottom about, 
what, fifty times?"
A. "Yes".
Q. "On that occasion when Mum went to, being the night that 
Mum went to the Youth Group you were at Clareville?"
A. "I have made a mistake there, it wasn't Clareville, it was West 
Hampton."
Q. "It should be West Hampton. You did not see the defendant at any 
time when he put his penis in your bottom, did you?"
A. "What do you mean?"
Q. "Well you did not see his penis go into your bottom?"
A. "No".
5.2.3 Nominalisation
Nominalisation refers to the language process where an action is 
objectified so that neither the agent nor the recipient are mentioned.
The environmental clearance campaign that was instituted in the pursuit 
of public safetyr is possible as a claim only because someone previously 
talked about 'the cutting down o f the trees' as being 'an insurance 
company requirement'. Both the claims are a long way from their 
alternative expression which exposes the relationships involved as in 'I 
am cutting down the trees because the insurance company manager told 
me I have to'.
• The process in court
Nominalisation in the courtroom is often achieved by changing the verb 
in a piece of spoken text into a gerundive. For instance the text 'Susan 
hit Bill's leg’ could be nominalised by changing the verb 'hit' into its 
gerundive form 'the hitting of the leg’. Susan and Bill are implicitly 
removed from any discussion of this leg which has been hit. We now 
have no prejudices about who did the hitting and whose leg actually got 
hit. Both people have been effectively removed from the discussion as 
have any decisions about the consequences of the action. It is a less 
personal statement which has put a distance between the recipient of the 
action and the person responsible for the action.
* Processing nominalisations
Linguistic theory indicates that nominalisations are more difficult to 
process then their equivalent verb forms (McCawley, 1970). In the 
Charrows study of (jury) instructions, nominalisations were not well 
understood. The mean percentage of correct replies for instructions 
relating to nominalisations was 29 percent, as compared to nearly 40 
percent for all instructions not containing them. Moreover, 
removing nominalisations significantly improved comprehension of 
instructions.
(Danet, 1980: 485)
The results of this research are more significant when one considers that 
children (young and inexperienced users of the language) are being 
confronted with linguistic forms which pose comprehension problems 
for adult language users. The impact is even greater for the child when 
one considers that the status of a juror in the courtroom is ostensibly 
that of objective observation of the proceedings in the case, while the 
child's status as the alleged victim and then primary witness exposes her 
to interrogation, impeachment and disputation.
• The effects of nominalisation
This technique can be used by cross examiners to preserve the status of 
their client. It would seem that the purpose of this line of questioning is 
to maintain objectivity. A child confronted with nominalised questions 
may feel discounted and disenfranchised from the events about which 
they are being questioned. Objectivity is a difficult mode for adults to 
operate in when discussing personal problems or shattering events. One 
can only assume that this is much more the case for children who are 
being asked to give details of their own sexual assault as though they had 
been watching it from the vantage point of a surveillance satellite.
• Telling examples
Q. "Did you have to step out of them (pants), what happens as regards 
that?"
A. "Yeah I stepped out of them a bit."
Q. "Now did you resist that in any way?"
A. "Mmm."
Q. "The actual taking down of the pants?"
A. "A little bit, I was scared."
(Transcript 12 years)
Q. "She was laughing. Well you do not think too much about that 
yourself did you? You were not troubled by that were you?"
A. "The massage of the b reas t"
(Transcript 12 years)




Q. "Now just stop there. Did you tell the police what is in that 
statement about the matter, about the touching of the boobs?"
Q. "How many times did it happen this tickling of the vagina?" 
(Transcript 10 years)
Q. "He never hit you at any time or about any time that these particular 
acts that you have spoken of, the sucking of the penis or th e  
putting of the penis in your bottom, occurred, is that right?"
A. "It happened, like when that was not happening, yes I'd get hit, yes. 
(Transcript 14 years)
A. "Yes I told her.”
(Transcript 11 years)
• Distance and nominalisation
In the examples offered above young children, unused to the 
sophisticated distancing device of nominalisation, are being asked to 
answer questions about the details of their assault as though they had 
been watching rather than participating. Given the highly personal and 
traumatic aura which surrounds incidents of child sexual assault, the 
process of nominalisation can only be construed as adding to the 
language pressures exerted on the child in court.
5.2.4 Multifaceted questions
Perhaps one of the most obvious examples of specifically lawyer 
language is embodied in long and complicated questions which are often 
asked of children in court. They consist of convoluted preambles, 
confused centres and rhetorical endings which invite no response. 
These questions produced the highest degree of mismatch in the testing 
program. This is not surprising when the amount of information 
processing required by some of the following examples is considered. 
Their sense would defy the most articulate of language users.
Q. "Now do you say that whatever it was that happened, or whatever it 
was that happened to Dianne, you were in the toilet at the time and 
you obviously heard something, did you?"
A. "Yes."
(Transcript 11 years)
Q. "Well I know, I understand what you say you have been talking to 
her today but you see what I am asking you to do is this, that 
statement suggests that you said those things that you now say are 
wrong to the police. Now did you say it to the police or did you 
not?"
A. "I don't know."
(Transcript 9 years)
Q. "So the first time you got smacked for telling stories you still told 
stories and got smacked again. So it didn't make any difference to 
whether or not you told any stories did it?"
A. "No."
(Transcript 7 years)
Q. "And did your mother ever say to you that if somebody asks you the 
questions I am asking you, you should say that we didn’t say what 
was going to be said?"
(Transcript 10 years)
• A common form of multi-faceted questions
The examples of multifaceted questions given above reflect their 
common form. Frequently they begin with a word such as 'well', 
'now', so' as if they are the result of a set of experiments from which an 
hypothesis has been extracted. They contain a number of ostensibly 
already established facts, presumably offered by the child witness at an 
earlier stage of the proceedings, and they are finalised by rhetorical 
questioning markers which invite no response because of the tone in 
which they are delivered to the child. Long and complicated questions 
are difficult enough for the child witness, but when they are 
accompanied by rhetorical devices the child has no options for reply. 
Rhetorical questions are display boards for other people's information 
and have little to do with the answer given by the respondent.
• Multiple option questions
Multiple option questions are one of the most common forms in which 
multifaceted questions appear in the cross examination of the child 
victim witness. In these cases the child is confronted with a question 
which contains a number of options. However the instruction to answer 
'yes' or 'no' and the requirement to keep responses short and to the 
point reduces the negotiability which the child has in this context. The 
child could conceivably disagree with a number of the options offered 
by the cross examiner in any one question, or agree with a number of 
the options, but the child does not have the opportunity to express this. 
Considering that everything that the child says can be called back at a 
later stage, this is a strategy which creates oral evidence of a particular 
kind which cannot be gone back on in the proceedings.
Q. "Okay after Mum had gone to work, did you have tea before she 
went or did you have tea after or what was the set up?"
A. "Before."
(Transcript 12 years)
The multiple option questions are frequently characterised by long 
strings of words with complex interrelationships existing between the 
ideas expressed in them. It is quite conceivable that the child witness 
may agree with some of the propositions contained in any one question 
and disagree with others, and yet their is no provision within this mode 
of questioning for the child to express these views.
Q. "The only reason that it did happen was because you were scared of 
what might happen if you didn't allow it?"
A. "Yep."
(Transcript 12 years)
Q. "And you told the policeman that Daddy said 'Mum's coming'. Now 
that is not true is it. Do you remember telling the court here just a 
few moments ago, you said "Mum's coming". That is true is it not?" 
A. "Yes."
(Transcript 7 years)
Q. "Well did he take hold of you and make you do anything? Did he 
grab hold of your hand and do anything with your hand?"
A. "No."
(Transcript 14 years)
Q. "And is this the position Peter, that whenever the defendant puts his 
penis in your bottom, as you say you were always on the bed and 
Steve was out of the bed?"
A. "Yes."
(transcript 14 years)
Q. "Now after your father tried to get you to put your willie into his 
bottom, you say that he put his willie into your bottom?"
A. "Yes."
(Transcript 11 years)
5.2.5 Unclear or confused questions
Many members of the community experience an immediate sense of 
intimidation when confronted with anything legal because of the 
specificity of the language used in the legal context. The public are 
usually generous in their interpretations of language and willing to
tolerate shades of meaning in the language which they use and respond 
to. The law operates according to a completely different set of 
principles. Words and phrases are the embodiment of the law. 
Meanings and interpretations have been prescribed by generations of 
legal argument, precedents and established conventions. Legal language 
is bound by these histories, with specificity, precision and established 
questioning protocols being the hallmarks of courtroom interactions. It 
is therefore surprising to find examples of badly phrased, confused, 
unclear and indecipherable questions being addressed to young children 
in court. There is no obvious pattern underlying this lack of clarity, but 
if the following examples are an accurate representation of this class of 
questions the child victim witness will experience a great deal of 
difficulty in decoding their meanings.
Q. "Were you the first to go into the shower that, after tea that night or 
not?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "At any stage whilst you were in the bathroom did he ever enter the 
bathroom that previous week?"
A. "Only about two or three times, not more than that."
(Transcript 11 years)
Q. "Well I know, I understand what you say you have been talking to 
her today but you see what I am asking you is this, that statement 
suggests that you said those things that you now say are wrong to 
the police. Now did you say it to the police or did you not?"
A. "I don't know."
(Transcript 10 years)
5.2.6 Specific and difficult vocabulary
Every profession has its language conventions which are particular to it. 
Science, medicine, engineering and the law are examples of professions 
which use vocabulary and technical terms particular to the discipline. 
Within the law, words are the display boards of guilt and innocence and 
their usage is controlled and pre-determined in a totally specific way.
Anyone who has been confronted with a legal document knows that it 
needs the translation skills of a solicitor to allow the reader to come to 
terms with the actual content of the document. Unlike other contexts 
where language is used, each word and phrase has generally only one 
meaning. Language does not have the flexibility and open ended 
interpretation which most of the rest of the world is used to. It is a 
private language with its grammar and its meanings arrived at by 
tradition and generations of usage. Children in court, as relatively
inexperienced language users, find the specificity of language 
disconcerting and very unlike their experiences of the rest of the world. 
The intensity of this mismatch discriminates against them.
• Specificity of legal language
The specificity of language usage is determined by unwritten formulae 
and tradition. The novitiates in the court context do not have the 
opportunity to express their lack of comprehension. The pace, the 
format and the protagonists allow no time and space for those who do 
not comprehend. Few adults and even fewer children reply to a 
question by saying that they do not understand or by asking for the 
question to be repeated. There is an underlying expectation in 
courtrooms that answers must be given even if they are ’I don't know'.
• Use of specific terminology
There are a number of different kinds of linguistic specificity reflected 
in the language of the courtroom. The first of these is the use of terms 
whose meaning is understood only by those acquainted with court 
procedures. These may be individual words or phrases. These pieces 
of legal terminology are used ostensibly to clarify interactions and 
procedures, to argue points of law and to preserve the already agreed 
format for the conduct of cases.
• Arguing points of law with specificity
Q. "Now the envelope, I'll withdraw that, the park that you were in, 
has it got a fence around it?"
This example was taken from the cross examination of a seven year old 
child. The use of such terminology implies that the child is expected to 
understand the meaning of Til withdraw that'. In the context of the 
courtroom this piece of language has a totally prescribed meaning, that 
of taking back the immediately preceding piece of text. It is 
questionable whether it is realistic to expect that a child should also have 
this understanding. If they do not know how can they be expected to 
reference the term 'that' in any way? How do they know what the 'that' 
refers to, assuming that they can assign a meaning to the word 
'withdraw?'
"I suggest to you that all of this is figment of your imagination". 
(Transcript 7 years)
Q. "Well Peter didn't stay and you ran away, you ran away, I mean, I 
withdraw that. You didn't run away and Peter stay. You say Peter 
ran away and you stayed?"
A. "Yes Peter did run away."
(Transcript 7 years)
Q. "And is it possible that when he came into the bedroom it was about 
9 o'clock and not just a few minutes after 7 o'clock?'
A. "I've forgotten."




Q. "You went for a swim there I am putting to you at Cronulla Beach?"
A. "No."
(Transcript 10 years)
Q. "You went to, went and got into the car outside your home, I 
withdraw that, whereabouts in relation to your home, did you get 
into the car on this morning?"
A. "Well on the, when?"
(Transcript 10 years)
• A private language
The meanings of the examples above exist only in the province of the 
courtroom and their privacy of interpretation excludes the child, yet the 
child is expected to answer questions which include such expressions.
• Vocabulary specificity • its effects
Some questions asked of child victim witnesses contain individual words 
which are appropriate for sophisticated adult language users but which 
have little meaning in questions directed to young children. The 
following display some of these vocabulary mismatches.
Q. "And if that statement was made in the latter part of April?” 
(Transcript 11 years)
Q. "See, Daddy did not interfere with you on this day, did he?"
A. "No."
(Transcript 7 years)
The prosecutor intervened at this stage and asked the following 
questions.
Q. "The last question that Mr. Smith, this man here asked you, was that 
Daddy did not interfere with you on this day. Do you know what 
he meant by that?"
A. "No."




Q. "Are you denying that it happened?"
A. "What does deny mean?"
Bench: "I wonder if she understands the word deny?"
(Transcript 10 years)
Q. "I am sure he might have been, but I am suggesting that 
notwithstanding where your father was you telephoned the house 
where Max was living, is that true?"
A. "No."
(Transcript 10 years)
The words used in these questions which would have caused some 
vocabulary problems for the children are 'latter' (child 11), 'interfere' 
(child 7), 'deny' (child 10), 'notwithstanding' (Child 10). Even if they 
had heard these words used before coming to court it is unreasonable to 
assume them to have these specific meanings as part of their vocabulary.
5.2.7 Unclear anaphora
Despite the ostensible precision and clarity of lawyer language there are 
a number of clearly identifiable areas of sloppiness. In an attempt to 
preserve the formality of the language used in court, lawyers appear to 
sacrifice brevity and clarity for complication and confusion. This is 
reflected in the examples given in the section immediately above. 
Paradoxically lawyers also omit whole chunks of information on the 
assumption that the witness has immediate access to the topic which is 
under examination. They replace these chunks with pronouns or other 
referencing markers in the expectation that the respondent will be able 
to recognise the item which they are referring to.
These types of references to things mentioned earlier, are known as 
anaphora. For example the question:- 'did you hit the boy with the 
large red handled hammer with a tempered steel head?' would probably 
be streamlined in repetition by removing the chunk 'large red handled
hammer with a tempered steel head', and replacing it with the pronoun 
’it’. Provided that the original question has been asked, and the refined 
anaphoric version was repeated next in the sequence, there would be no 
confusion about what the pronoun 'it' referred to. It would be clear to 
the respondent that the question, ’Did you hit the boy with it on Tuesday 
or Wednesday?' was a question relating to the hammer and when it was 
used.
• Courtroom anaphora
In the courtroom, anaphoric references are often unclear. The main 
cause of this confusion is the difficulty involved in establishing the 
actual referent implied in the anaphoric replacement.




It is very difficult, even with the advantage of time for reflection and 
the printed transcript, to establish exactly what the 'those things', 
anaphorically referred to in this question, relate to.
5.2.8 Use of police statements
As well as asking the child witness about evidence given at an earlier 
stage of the case the cross examiner devotes a great deal of questioning 
time to the content of the police statement which the child made after 
the disclosure of the alleged sexual assault. Time delays in court 
proceedings mean that this statement may have been made between three 
months and two years earlier. If the case of alleged assault proceeds 
through the District Court and further, the time period involved 
increases accordingly. A child may have been allegedly sexually 
assaulted and made a Police Statement when they were 7 years of age. 
Two years later, at age 9, they are questioned in court about the fine 
details of this statement.
While the law's delays are applicable to both adults and children 
involved in litigation, two years in the life of a young child is 
significant in terms of experiences and vital learning. Everything that 
we know about child development highlights the fact that change typifies 
emotional, physical, social and cognitive growth at this stage of any 
persons life. The differences between a 7 year old child and a 9 year
old child are much more observable in all spheres than the difference 
between a person at age 32 and age 34.
The rapidity of change is clearly seen in the types of language 
structures, vocabulary and uses to which language is put by the 
developing child. Ways of saying things, the words which the child uses 
and the concepts which underlie these expressions develop and change 
rapidly. Mastery of language does not magically appear; it is a process 
which continues long after a child has acquired the ability to speak. It is 
dangerous to assume that because children are able to express 
themselves they have a competence which parallels that of the mature 
adult speaker. This is clearly not the case since some facets of language 
maturity are not reached until late adolescence.
These issues of child development generally, and linguistic development 
specifically, are overlooked by many courtroom protagonists. The 
language of cross examination in particular takes little account of the 
characteristics of the emerging language user. Structures, vocabulary, 
tone and context reinforce the status of the child as an inferior and 
immature speaker of the language. These language differences between 
the developing and the developed speakers are entrenched and 
strengthened by the ways in which questions are asked. Few concessions 
are made for the learner. The child witness is expected to conform and 
then respond to an unknown pattern of language without the prior 
experience, the developmental capacity or the linguistic maturity 
necessary to understand it.
• Police statements and the child witness
Ideas about child development are overlooked during cross examination 
in many subtle but destructive ways. The extensive citing of Police 
Statements by cross examiners and the uses to which the children’s 
answers are put reflect a dismal lack of appreciation about childhood 
cognition. To return to words which were written down according to a 
prescribed formula for admittance into the court, and which were said 
perhaps two years earlier under circumstances of stress and trauma, 
denies the possibility that the child has changed. The legal magnifying 
glass which is used to scrutinise the child's words, as recorded by the 
Police, closes in around the words alone. Given the childhood context 
of change and development, it is unreasonable to expect anything other 
than confusion and distress to be the response to detailed questions about 
scripted events which occurred so long ago in the child's life.
Child witnesses in court generally attempt to answer all the questions 
which they are asked. They take their instructions from the magistrate 
or judge most seriously. The following example shows how the
juxtaposition of answers given in the ’here and now' and answers in 
response to questions about a Police Statement given at a much earlier 
stage can be used to imply that the child is lying about the details of the 
alleged assault.
Q. "Just have another look at the statement will you, and have a look on 
page 2 of your statement. You see there is nothing in there about 
telling Lisa on the Thursday night he had touched you there?"
A. "No."
(Transcript 12 years)
It is understandable that the child witness may feel as though the cross 
examiner is trying to trick her, confuse her, or imply that she is not 
telling the truth. The question, preceding the one above had been about 
who this child had told about the alleged assault. The preceding six 
questions had dealt objectively with who the child had told. The police 
statement was then produced and implications drawn that she was lying 
because she had not mentioned these incidents in her police statement. It 
is doubtful that the child appreciates the legal weight attached to a Police 
Statement. Neither does the child understand the implication made by 
the cross examiner here, that if information is not included in the Police 
Statement it cannot be considered to be true. To the best of her ability 
the child is answering the questions put to her. The legal subtleties of 
relatively weighted pieces of evidence are not within the experience of a 
twelve year old girl. She has fulfilled her obligations and the only 
response she receives is the imputation that she is not telling the truth. 
These dynamics are unwritten, unexplained and only serve to confuse 
and distress the child.
The following example shows how one child attempted to explain why a 
particular piece of information was not included in her statement. The 
cross examiner’s response indicates that he is not really interested in the 
child’s reasons for omitting this evidence, but that he is more involved 
in displaying the child’s ostensible inconsistency about the details of the 
alleged assault.
Q. "Did you say this that you did not tell that to the police?"
A. "Yes I told her before 'cause I didn't have a chance to tell her, I told 
her..."
Q. "Now just stop there..."
(Transcript 11 years)
There is a common pattern for integrating the evidence contained in a 
child's Police Statement with the other evidence obtained from the child 
witness. This pattern reflects no obvious concern for the age of the 
child, their possible level of development or their general emotional
well being in court. Children frequently break down in court and their 
distress is usually associated with this part of the proceedings. The 
following example shows how the juxtaposition of police statements and 
current evidence was orchestrated by a successful cross examiner.
It concerns an eight year old boy allegedly assaulted twice by his 
stepfather. According to the information available on the transcript the 
alleged assaults took place when the child was 5 and 6 years old. The 
strategy is structured something like the following:
•. establish that two incidents of assault took place.
• establish the time between the two incidents in the child’s mind.
Q ”How long after the first time did he ask you to go upstairs the next 
time?”
• The child replies understandably that he does not know.
• Cross examiner suggests some time options.
• Child chooses one of these options.
• Details of the abuse are elucidated.
• Introduction of the police interview.
• Signing of the police statement by the child confirmed.
Q. "And you say that you haven’t seen any mistakes is that right?"
A. "Yeah, no mistakes".
• Document handed to the child.
• Goes over preceding evidence about details of the alleged assault 
again.
• Quotations from the statement which directly contradict what the 
child has been forced into saying.
Q. "So what's the position, did it happen the next day or did it happen 
the next year?"
A. "As I said the next day but then I must be wrong if it said on my 
statement".
Q. "You made a mistake?"
A. "Yes."
Q. "A big mistake, is that right?"
Child breaks down 
(Transcript 8 years)
Child returns
Q "You see these things I've been putting to you Peter, they're just too 
big to be a mistake aren't they?"
A. "I don't know what you mean"
Q. "What I'm saying is you're not telling the truth?"
A. "I’m telling the truth".
The number of questions which were asked relating to this issue is one 
hundred and one. Yet if we refer back to the response to the first 
questions asked about the time period between the two alleged incidents 
the child initially replied ’I think, I don't know but I just know that he 
told me to go upstairs'.
Q. "Well do you know how long, was it a couple of days later or a 
week or months or a year or what?"
A. "I think it was one day, I’m not sure".
Q. "You think it was one day?"
A. "Yes, I'm not sure."
The child had admitted that now he could not remember the time period 
involved yet it was used as a given fact by the cross examiner. The 
child's lack of confidence in remembering the time period involved was 
used to call all of his evidence into question.
5.2.9 Quoting of children's words
Every word spoken in a courtroom has its particular worth. The line 
'... anything you say may later be used as evidence in court' has a 
particular relevance to the child victim witness in cases of sexual assault. 
Frequently what the child has said in response to one question is used in 
another context to verify the particular piece of evidence and approach 
it from a different angle.
Q. "And is that because of what you told us that he threatened to, not 
just bash you, but bash, I think your words were, all of you?"
A. "The family."
Q. "Remember that you told us before the lunch break that you had 
never been out with Martin before this particular day, 8th of 
November, do you remember saying that, before lunch, do you 
remember or do you not?"
A. "No."
(Transcript 10 years)
Q. "Do you recall just before lunch saying to the court that you had 
your tracksuit pants on when you sat in his lap?"
A. "No I said that I had my tracksuit pants off."
(Transcript 9 years)
Q. "On the second time he asked you said he used these words 'Come 
on please take your pants off do you remember saying that?"
A. "Yes."
(transcript 9 years)
These are not questions about what happened, but about what was said 
about what happened. Children find it difficult to wade through this 
web of ambiguity. The child is also being asked to comment on what 
can be termed linguistic assertion. They are not being asked a direct 
question but rather they are required to think about something which 
they have said on a different occasion in response to a totally different 
question.
If we return to the second example given above we see the child is being 
asked about both remembering evidence given before lunch as well as 
the actual context of that evidence. Further, the final part of the 
question 'do you remember or do you not?' requires only a 'yes' or 'no' 
response.
The wisdom of asking two questions in one is again called into question 
as is the validity of asking the child to refute evidence given at an 
earlier stage of the proceedings. If we consider the actual number of 
questions which a child is asked in any one session in court, we realise 
that the child is being asked about a response to one or two or three 
questions out of a possible five hundred. The pace of interchange 
between questioner and respondent places a great deal of strain on the 
child's memory for detail and time sequencing as does asking specific 
questions about responses given at other times in the court hearing. 
Many articulate and confident language users would not be able to 
accurately and truthfully answer questions about interchanges which had 
occurred two to four hours earlier in the day.
Returning to the second example given above, the child may in fact not 
remember that she answered in this way T>efore lunch', and therefore 
she would be obliged to answer 'no,' as she did. The implication is not 
that she did not say it, or that it wasn’t true, but only that she did not 
remember this one response out of her preceding five hundred. 
However, this leeway is not tolerated and her 'no' response can be used 
by the cross examiner to call her evidence into disrepute. Her 
credibility is diminished not by her ability to substantiate her story, but 
by her inability to respond to the connections imposed by this form of 
questioning.
5.2.10 Quoting of other people's words
Another feature of lawyer language which appears in the cross 
examination of child witnesses in cases of sexual assault is the quotation 
of other people's words incorporated into the questioning format. 
These questions are often prefaced by the words 'I put it to you' or 'I 
suggest to you' and are assertions on the part of the cross examiner
rather than questions directed to the child witness. The subtle 
distinction between a rhetorical assertion and a question is a difference 
which children cannot be realistically expected to appreciate. This 
device allows the cross examiner to introduce information which might 
otherwise be inadmissible, but it does so at the expense of the credibility 
of the child. It is unrealistic to expect the child witness to recall the 
exact words of conversations which took place perhaps two years 
earlier, yet these are the questions they are being asked. Since most of 
these questions only offer the possibility of a yes/no response the child is 
further constrained. Their capacity to negotiate about the content of the 
quotation is refused by the structure of the question as the following 
examples illustrate.
1. Q. "And I suggest to you that when you got on the bike Daddy said 
'Look get off, you’re not allowed to ride it in the house'. Is that true?” 
(Transcript 8 years)
2. Q. "I put it to you that those conversations on the Monday and 
Tuesday that I have spoken to you about he said to you 'I am working'. 
What do you say to that?"
(Transcript 11 years)
3. Q. "And when was it that Sue said 'Did he touch you?' was that in 
the bathroom or where?"
(Transcript 12 years)
The apparent precision of the words quoted in the questions above can 
be mystifying rather than clarifying for the child witness. The fact that 
they may be part of the hypothesis testing technique used by the cross 
examiner is not understood by the child witness.
5.2.11 Repetition of previous response
Children's responses to questions are often repeated by cross examiners. 
The following examples illustrate how this is done.
Q. "And is that because of what you have told us that he threatened to, 





The repetition by the cross examiner of the answer offered by the child 
('the family') reduces the impact of the child's answer. It is not done to
check the child's response (because it is a clear and understandable 
answer), but to hold the child’s answer up to more scrutiny and possible 
disbelief. In everyday conversations the same practice occurs. For 
instance imagine a conversation between two fishermen about a third 
fisherman.
Harry: "Fred caught a five kilo trout."
Pete: "A five kilo trout?"
Harry: "Yes a five kilo trout."
Pete's repetition of Harry's words are more likely an expression of 
disbelief than an expression of amazement or interest. Tlie fact that 
Harry sticks to his story may mean that Fred really did catch a five kilo 
trout, but Pete's question has introduced an element of doubt into the 
conversation. Similarly in a courtroom the repetition by the cross 
examiner of clearly expressed responses given by the child witness casts 
doubt on the accuracy of these responses.
5.2.12 Time, space and location questions
Cases involving multiple incidents of assault pose a particular set of 
problems for the child witness. Cross examination is not renowned for 
establishing the context within which such questions are framed and this 
becomes critical when questions about different times, details and 
locations for assaults are asked. The language and structure of these 
questions reflect the mismatch between the precision demanded by the 
court and the set of painful experiences which characterise the evidence 
of the child witness, who has been assaulted consistently over a long 
period of time.
In instances of multiple assault, the law selects one or two incidents 
which are the substance of the prosecution case. These incidents may be 
representative of a hundred such assaults in the child's mind, and yet the 
child is expected to remember with total accuracy the time, location and 
details of just this select few. This selectivity is endorsed by the cross 
examiner who deals with the selected incidents in the most precise 
detail. The following examples show how inadequately the context for 
these questions is presented and how the language used by the lawyers 
serves to reinforce the confusion already firmly established in the mind 
of the child witness who has been the victim of multiple assaults.
Q. "I'm sorry, you might not understand me, the first time and then it's 
finished, how long until the next time that your father puts his penis 
in your vagina?"
(Transcript 7 years)
Q. "Now which class were you in when Dad asked you to go upstairs, 
were you in the class for the first time or first class for the second 
time?”
(Transcript 8 years)
Q. "I mean if something happens today and something happens 
tomorrow, you're not going to say they're about a year apart are 
you?"
(Transcript 8 years)
Q. "Well when you were in first class for the first time and when you 
were in first class for the second time those are a year apart aren't 
they, not one day, one whole year at least, that's right isn't it?" 
(Transcript 8 years)
Q. "When was the last time he did this to you before the one we have 
been speaking of? We have been speaking of just one in February, 
obviously, when was the last time he interfered with you before 
that?"
(Transcript 12 years)
Q. "And on none of these 11 or 12 occasions, prior occasions was, to 
use the expression, was he ever sprung?"
(Transcript 12 years)
The examples offered above reveal a passion for details of time, yet the 
ability to describe a time frame must be related to a context and yet this 
is absent from all of the questions. Similarly, the tone and content of 
these questions makes no allowance for the developing sense of 
chronology of the child witness. These questions require an adult 
perception of time and events which is inappropriately imposed on the 
child witness. Under circumstances of minimal stress where the event is 
not characterised by fear, physical pain or trauma children have 
difficulty accurately establishing a time frame for incidents in their 
lives. Given the emotional damage associated with multiple cases of 
assault, it is even more unrealistic to devote time and energy to the 
process of fine questioning about temporal, spatial and physical aspects 
of abuse. The only predictable responses will be those of confusion and 
distress aggravated by poorly constructed and restrictive questions.
5.2.13 Embeddings
The language which cross examiners use is sometimes compressed. 
They have the ability to squeeze a lot of information into a single
questions indicated earlier when the confusion created by multifaceted 
questions was discussed.
However there is another dimension to these compact questions which 
requires exploration, because not only are they multifaceted in their 
content but their syntactic structure mitigates against a clear 
understanding of them by individuals not totally immersed in the 
language style of the courtroom.
The feature which makes these compact questions so difficult for the 
novice to understand is the fact that they do not maintain the normal 
pattern of speech conventions. They are more like their Latin models 
rather than normal English speech. For this reason they pose a 
particular problem for the child witness who is unlikely to be familiar 
with either their history or form.
The technique which is used to compact information within any given 
utterance is referred to as embedding. It is a process of wedging more 
content and connections in a piece of language by the use of certain 
syntactic devices. For example the question 'Did you see the dog run 
over the road with a bone in his mouth, looking everywhere for place to 
bury it?'. This is right branching, and reflects the most common 
pattern of embedding which occurs in English speech. The primary 
foci appear early in the utterance and the more complex qualifications 
and expansions occur after it. However this question could be rephrased 
by moving the phrase 'run over the road' to the end of the question. 
The question would then become 'Did you see the dog, with a bone in 
his mouth, looking everywhere for a place to bury it, run over the 
road?’ The rearranged question is a left branching construction because 
the complexities precede the verb, rather than follow it. This would be 
even more so if the interrogative marker 'did you see’ were also placed 
at the end.
Left branching sentences pose a greater strain on the listener than do 
right branching sentences. This was shown by Charrow and Charrow in 
1979 when they investigated the comprehensibility of oral instructions 
given to the jurors in court. The results of their research have been 
reported by both Danet and O'Barr who summarised Charrow & 
Charrow's findings.
William O'Barr informs us that most English sentences tend to be 
right branching where the verb comes early in the sentence complex 
constructions following it. Many jury instructions are expressed as left 
branching sentences. (O'Barr, 1982). Danet reports that:
embeddings were inversely related to comprehension; modifying 
instructions to reduce embeddings sharply increased comprehension 
in sentences containing three or more embedded clauses.
(Charrow and Charrow, 1979 in Danet, 1980: 486).
Embeddings increase the stress on the respondent in court. If the child 
witness is confronted with questions containing a number of embedded 
pieces of information it is likely that comprehension will decrease and 
deteriorate as the number of embeddings increase. If the technique for 
embedding does not conform to the normal speech and conversation 
patterns of English, the comprehensibility of the question will be even 
lower. The fact that adult jurors had difficulty understanding speech 
which was characterised by left branching embeddings confirms that 
children will find the task of comprehension daunting.
The following examples of left branching embeddings have been 
selected from the transcripts of children under cross examination.
Q. "Taking you back to the time when you were living in Sydney, when 
you first met Fred, at that time and throughout the period that Fred 
was living with your family, he used to work as a baker, didn't he?" 
(Transcript 9 years)
Q. "At or after you finished seeing Mum at the hospital, were you 
walking home?"
(Transcript 9 years)
Q. "You had not seen him at all. Now it would be incorrect to suggest 
that whilst you were up between the buildings and this was 
occurring that the only noises coming from you were moans of 
pain?"
(Transcript 15 years)
Q. "All right, so between his patting you and his attempt or his trying 
to put his penis in your vagina, there was nothing else, is that 
right?"
(Transcript 11 years)
Q. "This terrible thing happening to you, if there was someone else 
there you'd remember it wouldn't you?"
(Transcript 11 years)
Q. "How far was the trampoline from you when you were first helped 
on the bike by Mr Brown?"
(Transcript 7 years)
Q. "If I asked you to promise me to tell the truth, will you tell the 
truth?"
(Transcript 6 years)
Q. "When you started playing with it, was it wet or dry?"
(Transcript 6 years)
The examples given above cover an age range between six and fifteen 
years and illustrate different methods of incorporating left branching 
embeddings in questions directed to child witnesses. In each it is 
possible to see how these questions could be rephrased to more closely 
parallel other more comprehensible English speech patterns. The 
rephrasings are an issue of style and would not prejudice the content of 
the questions. The questions would simply become more 
comprehensible.
Questions which incorporate a number of left branching embeddings are 
a feature of lawyer language. They appear constantly in all the 
transcripts studied. They contribute to the confusion described by the 
child witnesses in cases of sexual assault and interfere with the child's 
search for meaning and sense in court.
5.2.14 Responding to the aspects of language identified
The preceding aspects of language appear to be significant contributors 
to the denial of meaning of the child victim witness under cross 
examination in cases of sexual assault. These are clearly identifiable 
features of language which in one way or another exclude. When each 
of the tactics is combined with another, the result is a strategy which 
creates confusion and wrests credibility from the child victim witness. 
That it seems to be a verbal assault on the victim witness suggests that 
the listed aspects might be valuable as a functionally organised display 
of language behaviour.
In response to this suspicion, I developed a framework which created 
the possibility of reviewing and displaying these developing connections 
and concerns. I was also alerted to the possibility of reviewing the 
transcripts at a level other than that of sentences and phrases.
The thirteen aspects outlined above are an accumulation of 'micro 
features' of the language. Review of transcripts and the associated data 
at a 'macro level’ produced the evidence of 'themes'; continuous 
propositions which run throughout the text. The next section (5.3) of 
this chapter provides a set of results expressed in these terms.
5.3 THEMES IN CROSS EXAMINATION
In the transcripts, the identification of themes about children represent a 
set of results complementary to the results reported in 5.1 and 5.2. 
Because they draw upon the developing insights provided by the 
previous results, the results here are more interpretive and reflective. 
They suggest a cultural and psychological context within which the 
questioning of cross examination of child victim witnesses takes place.
A trial is a very complicated communicative process with many 
variables simultaneously at work.
Quantitative techniques applied to natural language tend to assume that 
every instance of a term is of equal importance and effect to every 
other...this is not so...the strategic use of just one term in the right 
context can have a devastating effect (Danet, 1980: 211).
This effect is a function of the histories and intentions of the 
participants, the perceptions of the observers and the seriousness of the 
outcomes for the parties.
In the process of investigating a phenomenon or series of phenomena 
there emerges the inclination and need to order and interpret an 
otherwise amorphous body of data. If our aim also is to impose meaning 
on whatever grouping or patterning arises, that is, making sense of these 
phenomena in terms of how they relate to other phenomena, we will be 
searching for continuous threads of meaning in our data. In a piece of 
music, a painting, a dance or a social relationship we will be able to 
discern 'themes', that is assumptions and shared meanings upon which 
the discourse is both mounted and driven. Even a post modem display 
of some sort makes the statement that 'classical order and relationships 
are not being stated here'. Some discourses will only proceed on the 
assumption of expected sex related behaviour..and as such become the 
embodiment of 'themes'. Such themes will also serve as the bridge 
between the lived experience and the stories of that experience. These 
need not be elaborate fabrications but simple strong structures which 
form the conceptual links between experience and its expression.
One of the outstanding features of language and its analysis is that 
within discourses one is able to produce, project and identify themes. 
These are story lines which arise from one or other of the interlocutors 
or which arise as an admixture of their interaction. In criminal court, 
sides are taken, and story lines presented and defended. The themes 
thus created are a function both of supposed 'facts’ and also ’stances' 
which one or the other parties can be shown to have - lazy, drunken, 
unreliable, provocative. The 'kind' of person you are, or can be shown 
to be, thus becomes central to the assessment, by judge and jury, of 
individual credibility. The establishment and maintenance of 'themes' 
thus becomes an essential part of the fight for credibility.
Generally speaking, if Scotsmen can be regarded as mean, and here we 
have Scotsmen, we are probably confronted by a person who is mean. 
Such themes, as in this example and in the transcripts under 
consideration, can be created from side comments, statements, and in 
some cases by omission.
'I put it to you that everything you have said is a total pack of 
... sorry, I'll ask that question again'.
Such expressions are only possible because they capitalise on ideas and 
notions that exist in the general fabric of social relationships. If the 
cross examiner presumes the witness's victim status he will have much 
more ammunition for undermining his/her credibility.
The themes which were given voice in the proceedings reviewed were 
ones which cast children as manipulative, unreliable and fantasy prone 
beings. Such generalisations are unwarranted and serve only the 
dynamics of prejudice and punitive discrimination. The assertion that 
children as a class, are reliable truth tellers, is similarly untenable for 
the same reason. In an effort to appreciate the nature and effect of 
language in the situations under scrutiny, the extrapolation of these 
themes adds another dimension. The macro level analysis can be placed 
beside the micro level examination of the individual linguistic features. 
These themes are drawn out under the headings 'telling lies' (5.3.1), 
'fantasy and reality (5.3.2), 'memory' (5.3.3) and 'motives ’(5.3.4). 
Themes can be created by explicit statements, triggered meanings, and 
overall structure.
To appreciate the implications of linguistic composition of the themes it 
is necessary to place lawyer language within the broader context of the 
total court proceedings, and examine the impact that language mismatch 
has on the protagonists within the court. The magistrate at the 
committal stage, and the judge and the jury at higher court hearings 
have to make decisions based on the information displayed to them by
the prosecution and the defence in unison with the witnesses. If the 
alleged victim is one of these witnesses and also a child whose language 
abilities are outstripped by the language repertoires of the interrogators, 
the status of the child and his/her evidence is inevitably reduced.
In a combative arena where the format for questions is determined by 
the questioner, inequality in language usage and expertise confers lower 
status on the respondent. Any confused responses given by the child, 
the inevitable tearful and emotional breakdowns, and any examples of 
conflicting information offered, all confirm the child's lack of 
credibility within the corporate mind of the court. The fact that this 
credibility gap has been partially created by a language mismatch 
between die lawyer and the child witness is either tacitly acknowledged 
as acceptable practice, or it is an issue which has fallen outside the 
province of those concerned with the administration of justice.
The tendency to doubt the credibility of children falls conveniently into 
slots already present in the community's ethos. Children are thought of 
as being prone to fantasy; their ability to differentiate between reality 
and imagination is considered to be poorly developed; their memory for 
detail is regarded as being far below that of adults; and generally their 
evidence is to be treated with scepticism unless their outstanding 
performance in court dispels this predisposition.
5.3.1 Theme 1: Children are inclined to tell lies
The most stark example of questions which reduce the credibility of the 
child occur when the cross examiner asserts directly that the child's 
responses are untrue. These assertions either appear as single dramatic 
interpolations or as the result of a subtle line of questioning. These 
questions are intended to call the truthfulness of the child witness into 
disrepute, and although the legal technology for achieving this end 
varies, the effect of the campaign against child credibility is the same.
The following examples taken from the transcripts display the language 
levers which are used to directly impeach the evidence given by the 
child victim witness.
In this first example the preceding four questions had dealt with living 
arrangements and then the tone of the questioning altered:
Q "And you are telling the truth up there, are you, on the witness 
stand?"
A "Yes"
Q "It is not all a pack of lies?"
A "No”
Q "You are not fabricating this evidence just to support your mother, 
or have a go at your father in some way?"
A "No, I am telling the truth"
(Child 12 years)
Q "Now you said you used the term ’bull artist'?"
A "Yes"
Q "Are you absolutely certain that was the term that you used?"
A "Yes"
Q "You have no doubt about that?"
A "No"
Q "Could you have said the words You're a big fat liar?"
A "Yes"
Q "And not the term *bull artist'?"
A "Yes, I could have"
Q "See, you could be mistaken about a lot of the evidence you are 
giving could you not?"
A "Yes"
(Child ten years)
"You're getting a bit mixed up because it wasn't the truth?"
(Child 11 years)
"I put it to you, you have made up this story"
A "Beg your pardon?"
Q "About what the, you say the defendant did to you and made you do 
to him, you made it up, have you not?"
A "No"
Q "You have made it up because you have been upset and angry with 
the defendant from time to time, have you not?"
A "No"
Q "It is a ... of lies. I am sorry I withdraw that, he will not, it is all 
lies, is it not?"
A "No"
(Child 13 years)
The suggestibility of the child witness is explored during cross 
examination by a line of questioning which is meant to imply that either 
the child's counsellor or the police have coached the child to give 
acceptable answers. The fact that the child witness has been permitted 
to read her Police Statement is assumed to be prejudicial to the case. 
Adults have access to their statements but children are expected to recall 
events that happened perhaps two or more years ago with no reference 
to the words they used or the facts which they cited. Preparation for 
court seems to be an implied luxury reserved only for adults. This line
of questioning appears in the majority of transcripts studied and it is
firmly based on the implicit but unexamined theory that children are
more suggestible than adults.
Q "And I take it that you spent a lot of time with each of those police 
officers before coming to court today, have you not?"
A "Yes"
Q "And have they gone through the evidence that you would give this 
morning with you?"
A "Yes"
Q "And have they told you what to say in relation to certain questions?"
A "No"
Q "Have they told you the sort of questions they were going to ask 
you?"
A "Yes"
Q And how many times did they ask you, tell you what questions they 
were going to be putting to you?"
A "Only once"
(Child aged 10 years)
5.3.2 Theme 2: Children have difficulty distinguishing 
between fantasy and reality
One of the explanations for the low credibility of the child witness is the 
often cited tendency of children to revert to fantasy, and their inability 
to make clear distinctions between what is real and what is part of their 
make believe world. This theory leads neatly into a widespread belief 
that children fabricate claims of sexual assault.
No one disputes the fact that children do have a fantasy world, just as 
adults do; only adults don’t talk about it very much. However, 
children's fantasies are generally within the realms of their literate, 
emotional and social lives. It is unusual for a child to fabricate sexual 
encounters because these are beyond their expected levels of maturity 
and experience. Nevertheless the ethic of the lying and manipulative 
child who creates fantasy incidents of sexual abuse to punish an innocent 
and unsuspecting adult remains a prevalent attitude. The examples 
which follow show how this idea is woven into the fabric of cross 
examination.
In one case the cross examiner asked the child witness aged seven years, 
one hundred and twenty one questions about her propensity to make up 
stories, and the kind of punishment she and her brother received when 
her father, the alleged offender, suspected such stories.




Q "Those stories are what you think about in your head?"
A "Yes"
Q "Do you make up stories that are sometimes not true?"
A "Yes"
Q "Do you make up stories from what is inside your head?"
A "Yes"
Q "You think about things and you tell them to others and they are not 
true. Is that right?"
A "I write it down on paper"
Q "You write it down on paper. OK. You make up stories on paper?"
A "Yes"
Q "Do you sometimes make up stories when you tell other people?"
A "Sometimes but most of the time I tell the truth"
Q "But you don't always tell the truth?"
A "Only when I am making up stories".
(Child 7 years)
and so it continued for another one hundred and eleven questions.
A similar line of questioning was pursued at the outset of the cross 
examination of an eleven year old boy.
Q "You write essays at school, Donald?"
A "Beg your pardon?"
Q "Do you write essays at school?"
A "Urn, no"
Q "Do you know what an essay is?"
A "Yes, a long story"
Q "You don’t write stories at all at school in English or anything like 
that?"
A "In English, we just write stories but not really long ones".
Q "And are you pretty good at making up stories?"
A "Oh, with my imagination just little stories, yeah"
Q "So you've got a fairly good imagination?"
A "Yeah"
Q "And see I suggest to you Donald that all this is in your imagination" 
A "No. No it isn't"
(Child 11 years)
It is not surprising that in cases of multiple assault, the memory for 
detail which is demanded by the cross examiner is often unclear. This 
is not just an affliction of childhood but a patterning within memory 
which is a human characteristic. The inability to accurately recall the 
minute details of repeated instance of sexual assault is not an adequate 
criterion for downgrading the credibility of the child witness.
The cumulative effect of such an assault on the credibility of the child 
witness frequently forces the child to break down or become distraught. 
The consistency and unrelenting questioning format which is followed 
by the cross examiner is illustrated by the following example which 
involves a child of eleven years of age. The child by this stage of the 
proceedings had already answered two hundred and forty questions 
directed at him by the prosecutor and two hundred and ninety questions 
posed by the cross examiner.
Q "Would you read paragraph 9 to yourself, did you read it?"
A "Yes"
Q "Do you agree that what I read to you appears in that document 
signed by you?"
A "Yes, but when I was reading the statement and I can't remember 
that Dad tried to enter me at Churchill Street".
Q "But you see when you read your statement the other day, you didn't 
see anything wrong with your statement did you?"
A "No"
Q "And you signed that document is that right?"
A "Hmm"
Q "And when you went home you had a look at it and you didn't see 
any mistakes?"
A "No"
Q "And you can read, you’re a fairly intelligent lad aren't you, you’ve 
got to answer yes or no, you're not allowed to say hmm"
A "Yes"
Q "So that would be something that you would pick up isn't it, an 
intelligent lad like you, wouldn't it?"
A "Yes"
Q "But you didn't pick it up because what you’re telling His Worship 
isn't the truth?"
A "Yes it is"
Q "Well why did you make the mistake?"
A "I'm not sure. I just can't remember reading it in the statement"
Q "Well did it happen in that way?"
A "Not that I can remember"
5.3.3 Theme 3: Children have poor memory
Q "Well that could be something you'd remember wouldn't it, you see 
the position Donald I suggest to you, you’re not telling the truth?”
A "lam "
Q "Well do you know why you made the mistake?"
A "No I just can't remember any of the statement"
Prosecutor: Would Your Worship take a short adjournment, the boy's 
obviously distraught.
5.3.4 Theme 4: Children operate from devious motives
In a number of transcripts studied it became clear that the cross 
examiner tried to ascribe other motives to the child for disclosing 
alleged incidents of sexual assault. The implication was that the child 
fabricated a story to punish a parent or relation who did not indulge the 
child's whims and fancies or who was in conflict with another parent or 
sibling. The following shows how this line of questioning develops:
Q "And this is the, this October, 1984, that's the only time that your 
father has done anything like that to you, isn't it?”
A "Yes"
Q "And your mother has been deceased since 1978?"
A "Yes"
Q "And your father bought you up?"
A "Yes”
Q "And you were in relation to being grounded, you didn't like not 
being able to go with girl friends to the movies in town?"
A "mm"
Q "That's right isn't it?”
A "Yes"
Q "And your father didn’t like you going down to Coolamon on your 
own and roaming the streets on your own did he?”
A "No"
Q "And you were unhappy and angry about that, weren’t you?"
A "Yeah"
Q "So apart from the reason of the allegations that you have made here, 
you had reason to be unhappy and angry with the way your father 
was looking after you, didn't you?"
A ”mmm" (no verbal reply)
Q "Because he wouldn't let you do what you wanted to do?"
A "Yeah”
Q "And you didn't like it?"
A "No"
Q "And that's the reason you didn't want to go home?"
A "No" (Child 13 years)
In this example, as in many similar examples, the right of the cross 
examiner to suggest various alternatives to the evidence given by the 
witness is considered acceptable legal practice. The extent to which the 
child witness appreciates this facet of the law is doubtful.
When the child is not aware of the motives behind such lines of 
questioning, the conclusions which they draw are hurtful. They have 
had their suitability as a witness scrutinised at the outset of the case. 
They are therefore presumably aware of the importance of the court 
and its demands for absolute truth and accuracy. Yet they are still 
subject to suggestions which are quite outside the parameters of any 
other evidence which they give. One magistrate tried to explain the 
legal assumptions upon which such impeachments are based when he 
said to a distraught 11 year old:
Bench: "Mr Brown is asking you, is when we say 'putting to you' he is 
suggesting that something happened, now if you say that it didn’t 
happen, I think the easiest thing for you to say is 'yes' so perhaps 
if, I know that you have already said that the phone call didn't 
happen, is that right?"
A "Yes"
Bench: "Now he is suggesting some other things to you that might I 
suppose remind you that it might have happened, now I suppose it 
is hard to understand why he says these things to you when you 
say it didn't happen, that's hard to understand isn’t it but he is 
allowed to do these things and if you say it didn't happen, all you 
have to say is 'no', okay, or if it did say 'yes’, now do you follow 
that?"
A "Yes"
5.3.5 Responding to themes about children.
Lawyer language generally, and questions which confront the credibility 
of the child specifically, mitigate against a belief in the competence of 
the child victim witness in cases of sexual assault. The attitude of 
suspicion which surrounds children appearing in court has a long and 
complicated history. In recent times the myth of the untruthful child 
can be traced to a cluster of French psychoanalysts who disputed 
Freud's original theory of child sexual assault being responsible for 
later life neuroses in females. Freud withdrew his theories, under 
pressure from Charcot, who described children with deplorable 
antecedents as being prone to constructing fantastic stories about 
perfectly respectable human beings and upstanding members of the 
community. The idea has persisted and many adults still assume that 
children are more untruthful than truthful.
The perception of the child as an impure and lesser version of an adult 
was entrenched by Victorian ethics. The child was considered to be a 
miniature adult whose childish ways had to be modified to ensure that 
they would become civilised members of the society. As children their 
rights and abilities to tell the truth were questionable.
Today the community is generally still sceptical of the child’s ability to 
tell the truth. This attitude is focused clearly when the discussion 
concerns child sexual assault. Disclaimers of child credibility range 
from anecdotal instances of children exploiting adults, to questions 
about the child’s ability to perceive accurately and report truthfully. 
Society still has a model for child performance which is a derivative of 
adult experience.
5.3.5.1 Themes reflect perception
Children are expected to perform in an adult way yet at a much reduced 
level of competence and efficiency. The inherent appreciation of the 
differences between children and adults are considered by the 
community to be quantitative rather than qualitative. As a child 
develops, they get more of the same until they reach adulthood. This 
way of thinking about children is based on ideas of childhood 'deficit'. 
Children are thought of as socially, emotionally and intellectually 
inferior to their adult models and their validity and reliability as 
individuals is reduced in direct proportion to their age. This way of 
thinking precludes any serious consideration being given to the issue of 
child credibility. As long as child development is seen as having little 
integrity, the inferior status of the child will remain entrenched.
To evaluate child credibility it is necessary for the community as a 
whole to appreciate the many stages and faces of child development. In 
a courtroom few provisions have been made to accommodate the world 
of the child. The language used by the law is perhaps the most glaring 
example of the uncompromising imposition of adult models on 
individuals whose age and development put them outside the language. 
The existence of a mismatch between the language of the speaker and 
the language of the hearer is attributed to the general incompetence of 
the child witness whose credibility is reduced by implication.
Roland C. Summit (1983) in an article called 'The child abuse 
accommodation syndrome' adds another perspective to the discussion 
about child credibility. He maintains that society's values are in several 
ways stacked heavily against the child victim witness. First, the child 
has a great deal of difficulty accepting the abuse of love and power by a 
trusted adult. Second, the translation of this abuse during disclosure is 
restricted by the likely absence of language and concepts to express the
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necessary details in a convincing and credible way. Third, the legal 
system bolstered by community attitudes:
... allows the child one acceptable set of reactions to such an 
experience. Like the adult victim of rape, the child victim is expected 
to forcibly resist, to cry for help and attempt to escape the intrusion.
By that standard almost every child fails. The normal reaction is to 
play possum, that is to feign sleep, to shift positions and pull up the 
covers ... When there is no place to run they have no choice but to 
try and hide. It is sad to hear children attacked by attorneys and 
discredited by juries because they claimed to be molested yet 
admitted they made no protest or outcry ... A victim will be judged 
as a willing accomplice unless compliance was achieved through 
overwhelming force or threat of violence. Adults must be reminded 
that the wordless action or gesture of a parent is an absolutely 
compelling force for a dependant child and the threat of loss of love, 
or loss of family security is more frightening to the child than any 
threat of violence.
(Summit, 1983:183)
5.3.5.2 Research in child memory
Two factors are primarily responsible for the ethic which underlies 
attitudes towards child credibility in the courtroom. These are 
concerned with the generally unreliable status of children's eye-witness 
memory, and their seemingly high level of suggestibility to outside 
influences, comments and coaching. These two propositions underscore 
much of the thinking which produces the consistent attack on the 
credibility of the child witness during cross examination. The extent to 
which these propositions have external validity, apart from the strength 
of those who espouse them, has stimulated a great deal of debate over 
the past ten years. This work culminated in 1987 with the publication 
of a book entitled Children's eyewitness memory (Ceci, S.J. et al. 1987) 
which the editors maintain
... grew out of a 1985 American Psychological Symposium that was 
devoted to the issue of children's eyewitness memory. The book 
comprises a collection of chapters that lie at the crossroads of 
psychology and criminal justice.
(Ceci e ta l . ,  1987: v)
The conclusions which are drawn at the end of each section support the 
ability and integrity of the child witness to accurately answer questions in 
court.
A comprehensive review of the literature on this topic turns up a 
prodigious volume of material. The extensive research, the numerous 
experiments involving tests of memory under conditions of stress and 
non stress and the compilation and comparison of already extant data 
reflects the interest in this subject, particularly in the United States.
It is difficult to find a path amongst all this information, but there are 
certain arguments which reappear as themes in these studies. The 
theory that children are more susceptible to suggestion has been 
challenged by Loftus and Davies. An analysis and description of some 
of the major research undertaken led them to conclude that it is one 
thing to claim that children are suggestible, but quite a different matter 
to claim that they are more suggestible than adults. (Loftus and Davies, 
1984)
A description of the processes by which information is stored in 
memory and then retrieved (acquisition, retention, retrieval) is seen by 
the authors as explaining the reasons why children, and adults, may 
focus on remembering different details surrounding an incident. Some 
researchers have actually maintained that children's memory for detail 
may in fact be more accurate than adults' because their level of the 
sophistication of cognitive inferences and value judgements which 
pervade the mature memory.
Research on the recognition memory abilities of children compared 
with the skills of adults has shown that there are typically no age 
differences in performance, with children as young as five years of age 
performing as well as adults. The differences in memory abilities are 
clearer when the mode of recall is altered. When given free recall tasks 
young children may require external cues or prompts if they are to 
retrieve or recall past events. (Marin et al, 1979).
As expected the number of items mentioned increased linearly with age. 
Some studies indicate that the patterning of memory is established as 
early as first grade. The paradigm by which information is allocated to 
memory seems to remain constant from this age onwards. Although 
significant developmental differences exist in the amount of information 
recalled from simple stories, the pattern of recall for story grammar 
categories is highly consistent across age from first grade to 
adulthood.(Saywitz in Ceci et al. 1987)
The effects of stress on memory capacities have also been a subject of 
research, with children in an information clinic participating in memory 
related tasks. The study involving an inoculation demonstrated that 
children were not equally suggestible about all types of information. 
Their suggestibility was greater for characteristics of the room in which 
the event took place or the physical characteristics of the 'culprit'. 
Interestingly, across the studies, children never made up false stories of 
abuse even when asked questions that might foster such reports. 
(Goodman, et al in Ceci et al 1987).
The pervasive attitude that children are more susceptible to suggestion 
than adults has been a subject of controversy for some time. Despite the 
fact that this issue has not been resolved, in a number of purely 
experimental contexts children and adults performed equally well on 
tasks designed to rate their relative suggestibilities. Also, the workings 
of the human memory are now better understood, as are the factors 
which influence the strength of a memory or its susceptibility to 
alteration. However, memory is more likely to be as individual a 
characteristic as personality, with just as many internal and external 
factors controlling its development. Some of the factors which 
contribute to the relative strength or weakness of a memory have been 
identified as acquaintance with the predominant theme of ¿he situation 
or event, the linguistic ability to translate experience into memory, the 
significance or focus of the experience, and the emotional intensity 
associated with the event.
Once a memory is in place it does not reside in the mind in splendid 
isolation. All images, experiences, ideas and emotions are integrated 
into an already existing mental pattern which may be changed or 
modified depending on the type of new information received. Memory 
is a constantly changing dimension of human intellectual activity, it 
almost goes on without our knowledge. Given this framework, no one 
is free from the slight of suggestibility.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have set out three kinds of result which emerged from 
testing, analysis, and review. The results are qualitatively different 
from each other and the latter set on themes (5.3) are more reflective 
than the previous two. The set on aspects of language (5.2) is 
interpretive and in cases speculative. The first set, derived from the 
testing program, (5.1) is empirical. An informed response to the 
research question requires an appreciation of a wide variety of 'results' 
which together might describe 'language in use'. The next chapter is 
devoted to the development of a taxonomic description which frames all 
three kinds of results reported in this chapter. Along with the 
accompanying responses and within the wider psycho social context of 
the child victim witness I present a description which conceivably 
delineates the 'discourse of denial'
CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION
Lawyers are masterful language users. They may not be aware of the 
intricacies of their language usage at a conscious or descriptive level but 
they have at their disposal the benefits of fine training in the use and 
abuse of words, phrases and structures. Their careers are built on 
words since these are the currency of the law. They know how to 
choose their words and structures to gain maximum effect, and they are 
skilled at using the words of others for their own (and their client's) 
benefit. In few other contexts are words and their meanings so tightly 
prescribed. To the child, a relative novice on the continuum of 
language use , the distance between the language of court and their own 
experiences of how and why language is used must appear immense. 
The confusing effect of lawyers' language use is clearly expressed in the 
following excerpt:
... when do you get a chance to say something?... I'm only fifteen and 
it’s hard for me to match their level of talking when you want to put 
something across. Some of the words they use, the long words that 
they might use, and you might not even know the meaning of ... and 
they sit there and they don’t tell you and they expect you to answer
(15 year old male witness)
The combination of confusing language features and the pervasive 
themes discussed in the previous chapter suggests a powerful linguistic 
force so clear and discrete that it may be described as a recognisable and 
specific discourse. The discourse operates to deny the meanings and 
experiences of the child victim witness and depends on linguistic tactics 
and strategies (which I have classified according to fifteen categories of 
speech construction) as well as the many strategies that lawyers use in 
cross examination. These factors form the basis of the discourse of 
denial.
Austin (1962) pointed out the performative value of utterances. He 
showed that concepts of truth and falsity don't help the researcher 
describe and analyse this aspect of language. Rather he explored the 
conditions under which the performance of an utterance is effective or 
ineffective. Labov and Fanshel (1977: 188) further stress that 
conversational analysis which focuses only on turn taking systems misses 
some of the essential links among the utterances of that conversation. 
There is need for an expansion in the analysis to take into account the 
intent of an interlocutor's speech.
In this chapter I provide a brief rationale for the category description 
chosen (6.1) after which I propose a descriptive taxonomy for the 
'discourse of denial' (6.2), followed by a response to the identification 
of the discourse (6.3).
6.1 DEVELOPING A DESCRIPTIVE TAXONOMY
6.1.1 The taxonomy in context
The arena of criminal courtroom adversity and the action of cross 
examination offer the opportunity to view, review, and analyse the 
properties of language which admit or deny, which heal or injure, to the 
point where one can theorise about the connections between the 
conditions and the consequences. I needed to understand more precisely 
the patterns connecting abusive activity, linguistic manifestation, and 
further abusive activity.
I therefore searched for a taxonomy which would:
• encapsulate and present the connectedness between conditions and 
consequences to students of the court system, practitioners, language 
analysts and educators.
• build on the devices proposed by others who have worked on 
'language in the courtroom' studies (Atkinson and Drew, O'Barr, 
Danet, Valdes, Penman) and which can be seen as an extension of 
extant devices used by linguistics. These linguistic devices are 
represented by the systemic system of Halliday, the taxonomic 
framework of Valdes, the linguistic indicators of Ghadessy, or the 
single aspect orientation of Cashion (eg 'politeness') and O'Barr (eg 
'power').
• create a description accessible and comprehensible to a wide variety 
of stakeholders.
• create some indicators and instances of meaning-denying behaviour 
which may be viewable in situations other than court.
6.1.2 The format of the taxonomy
I chose a narrative, transferable format rather than a mathematic or 
graphic one. It is accessible and challengeable and purports to be a 
taxonomy which displays the underlying single orientation of the cross 
examiner. It is focussed upon the 'aspects of language use which are
characteristic of cross examination' referred to in the preceding 
chapter. It is also concerned with the tactics and strategies of cross 
examiners.
I needed to classify and display all of the language data in a cohesive and 
connected way. I also needed to relate back to data and analyse them in 
terms of initial concerns and perspectives. Since the relationship 
between language use and psychological effect is of the essence, it was 
necessary to show the nature of this connection.
The fifteen categories of speech construction proposed in the taxonomy 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed a single string of words 
may contain examples of several designated meaning-denying 
constructions within another more pervasive construction. This is true 
for instance of a 'nominalisation' or a 'passive' occurring not just in 
cross examination over 'what happened' but rather on 'what was said 
about what happened'. The nature of cross examination is such that a 
substantial part of the questioning is about verifying the veracity of an 
earlier record, a police statement or a record of interview. The 
construction of 'meta - conversation' is therefore:
• a significant construction to include in the taxonomy
• an indicator of the combination of abstract activity (talking about 
what was said to have happened) with concrete, physical precedents 
(sexual abuse) and outcomes (disbelief and all that flows from that)






This is a linguistic label which highlights the 
aspect of the speech sample under consideration.
This describes the language characteristics which 
explicate the label (construction) suggested.
This is a speech sample extracted from the 
transcript material. It is perceived as a singular 
example of an act of speech which, because of an 
identifiable feature or characteristic, contributes 
to the general aim of reducing credibility of the 
interlocutor.
This describes how particular meanings are 
created and parties positioned in terms of whether
possible meanings and participation are 
accommodated or excluded or otherwise affected. 
Effect on witness This is the perceived effect on one party to a
'dialogue' - the child witness. This effect is 
suggested as a result of a combination of 
perceptions which take into account the state of 
mind of the witness and how he/she is situated in 
the discourse.
Because all samples are subject to this uniform descriptive format it 
becomes possible to compare and combine descriptors. What follows is 
the summary which itself becomes the data base upon which to ground 
the discourse of denial.
6.2 CATEGORIES OF THE TAXONOMY
Construction 1: Negative rhetorical
Character A question form is used which requires only
confirmation or silent assent as a response and in 
which a negative expression is used to create that 
question form.
Sample Q: "Now you had a bruise, did you not, near one of
your breasts, do you remember this?" (Transcript 
12 years)
Q: "When Mr Smith asked you if you could 
remember anything about a towel, you said you 
could not remember anything about a towel? The 
first time? Is that not right?" (Transcript 15 
years)
Operation The conversion of what is essentially a statement
into a question form and then back into a statement 
by the insertion of the 'not' allows the whole 
expression to go forward as a question - a request 
for information. It creates the illusion of choice 
but implies also that the speaker already has the 
necessary information and insight, and is merely 
seeking a simple endorsement or refutation of the 
insight. However refutation, although it is inferred 
as an option, requires the careful dissection and 
refutation of a number of embedded propositions.
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The onus for the refutation and the subsequent 
careful presentation of the elements that constitute 
the content of the refutation rests with the child 
witness. The witness is a child.
The rhetorical form, as it remains unrefuted, adds 
weight to the notion that the lawyer can continue to 
be the ’story maker’.
Effect on witness The consequence of this is that the hearer is
restricted in the options for answering for a 
number of reasons:
• The rhetorical nature requires only assent in 
some form.
• The negative form is more difficult to 'unpack' 
and then reprocess.
• The part of the question that might be 
’answered’ is not clear.
• The confusion of propositions on the one 
hand with the form urging assent, supports the 
’wisdom’ of a single response (Yes/No) and the 
likelihood of that response being a 'yes'.




Many sub propositions are contained in the one 
question utterance.
Q: "Well did he take hold of you and make you do 
anything? Did he grab hold of your hand and do 
anything with your hand?" (Transcript 14 years)
Q: "Well I know, I understand what you say you 
have been talking to her today, but you see what I 
am asking you is this, that statement suggests that 
you said those things which you now say are wrong 
to the police. Did you say it to the police or did 
you not?" (Transcript 9 years)
Q: "So the first time you got smacked for telling 
stories you still told stories and got smacked again. 
So it didn't make any difference to whether you 
told stories did it?" (Transcript 7 years)
A single 'sentence' utterance appears as a single 
question but in a multifaceted question a series of 
propositions are put and it is not clear to the 
listener which 'question' should be answered. It is 
further muddied by the confusion surrounding 
which possible answer satisfies which one of the 
plethora of embedded questions which pose as one. 
With so many options to choose from the hearer has 
difficulty knowing which 'facet' or question 
requires a response.
Multifaceted questions can be long and complex 
involving layers of clauses. They can include 
convoluted preambles, confused centres and 
rhetorical endings. The unifying feature however 
is that when an answer is given, the control to 
interpret which sub question it most easily serves 
remains with the cross examiner.
Multifaceted questions can also elicit an "I don't 
know" response. This is significant in so far as "I 
don't know" represents a possible number of 
distinctly different degrees of knowledge ranging 
from "I have no knowledge of one or many of the 
propositions posed" to "I don't understand how all
the propositions fit together" to "I don't know how 
to respond to the question" to "I am not 100% sure 
of one or a number of the propositions."
Also when any answer is given the questioner may 
then choose which 'question' the response is linked 
to. This technique serves the examiner's purposes 
well. It allows for the free reconstruction of a 
story confirmed by the answers of the witness.
Effect on witness Witnesses are constrained by circumstance, tone and
position to answer something to a barrage of 
options. By answering at all they either choose 
something from the barrage for themselves or they 
respond as they feel expected to. Either way the 
explication of the response is left to the 
interpretation of the cross examiner and those 
listening.
Unclear options place the hearer under a great deal 
of strain. The hearer either has to unpack the 
whole construction or take a risk and gamble that 
their response will match the appropriate part of 
the question.
Having produced an answer, the topics included in 
the question are then seen to have been covered 
making it difficult, if not impossible, to revisit them 






Lack of grammatical and/or semantic 
connection
The syntactic connections between parts of an 
expression are unclear as are the connections 
between individual meaning elements.
Q:"Were you the first to go into the shower that, 
after tea that night or not?”
A:"Yes”.
Q:"At any stage whilst you were in the bathroom 
did he ever enter the bathroom that previous 
week?” (Transcript 11 years)
Words and phrases are joined in a contiguous way 
due to the lack of adequate connectors. This makes 
it difficult to apprehend the sense of the question.
The form of delivery, an intonationally complete 
question, implies a sense. However a scrutiny of 
content contradicts what is only an impression of 
sense. Incomprehensibility is a linguistic choice 
wherein the sound of a relationship can be 
maintained but remain unsupported by words, 
phrases or constructions which together make sense. 
Occasionally the expression collapses or tangles and 
reveals the lack of meaning.
The responsibility for finding sense in nonsense is 
shifted to the witness, and as the child does not 
recognise that this doesn't make sense to adults 
either, they assume their own inadequacy. The 
hearer is isolated by the fact that what is being said 
'sounds' like language, but makes little sense. Such 
expression is difficult to respond to without 
challenging the comprehensibility of the question.
When and if an answer does come there is no way 
of deciding what it is an answer to. In needing to 
formulate an answer the hearer imposes their own 
meaning on a confusing question. Where this is the 
case there is no opportunity for the respondent to 
display or explain what the constructed meaning 
might be. The propensity to 'make sense' creates a 
communicative isolation for the witness.




Topics of unequal significance are placed alongside 
one another. Topics which have no obvious 
sequential ties or markers are similarly linked by 
proximity to each other.
Q:"On that occasion when Mum went to, being that 
night that Mum when to Youth Group, you were at 
Clareville?"
A:”I have made a mistake there it wasn't Clareville, 
it was West Hampton".
Q:"It should be West Hampton. You did not see the 
defendant at any time when he put his penis in your 
bottom, did you?" (Transcript 13 years)
Q:"That was after he had stripped you?"
A:"Yes".
Q:"And you had your legs together?"
A:"Yes".
Q:"And then you said he tried to put his finger in 
your vagina. Did he put his finger on your vagina 
or in your vagina?"
A:"In my vagina. In my vagina."
Q:"Inside, you felt it inside did you?"
A:(no verbal answer)
Q:"Did he do anything else to you?"
A:"No".
Q:"Do you know Frank Murphy?"
(Transcript 14 years)
N o te : Frank Murphy has not been mentioned 
previously and his identity and relationship to the 
case is not established subsequently. In fact he 
disappears off the questioning stage immediately 
following this introduction.
All expressions are juxtaposed beside something 
else but this category suggests a juxtaposition which 
does not flow for either syntactic or semantic 
reasons. Meanings are not connected in an 
accessible, sense-making way. Unmarked topic 
changes, parenthetical statements unrelated to the 
main expression, additions and insertions made in 
an apparent attempt to create clarity through 
'loading on' of more detail, repetition of previous
answers used as leads into another unrelated topic, 
all exemplify the operation of juxtaposition.
Highly emotive experiences are often juxtaposed 
beside non emotive experiences; mundane 
experiences are placed beside living personal 
situations. In this way all events are made to appear 
of equal importance and what sometimes emerges as 
a list of unrelated details serves to create a 
'linguistic fog'.
Because the examiner has control over both the 
creation and dispersal of the 'fog', he/she can 
choose to increase the density and volume or blow 
it away at will revealing a free standing and 
disembodied detail.
Effect on witness Because neither time nor topic markers allow the
hearer to make sense from the discontinuity, the 
'listing' of unrelated topics creates a 'linguistic fog' 
within which the display of general versus specific 
experience becomes obscured.
The effect on the hearer is disorientation, as the 
speech of the questioner creates continuity in the 
temporal/spatial sense, but lacks cohesion in a 
meaning creating sense. The disorientation of the 
hearer leaves topic control in the hands of the 
questioner who can remain remote or unflustered 
while the witness is thrown off balance. The 
constant adjustment and readjustment to topics 
creates strain, disallowing time for either reflection 
or intellectual re-appraisal.
By the style of questioning, the witness is lead to 
respond as though each topic within a string has 
equivalent status. The result is discrimination, 
upset, inability to answer and confusion.
C h arac te r Restates a continuous experience as a single event.
Sample Q:"When was the last time he did this to you before
the time we have been speaking of? We have been 
speaking of one in February, obviously, when was 
the last time he interfered with you before that?" 
(Transcript 12 years)
Q: "I'm sorry you might not understand me, the 
first time and then it’s finished, how long until the 
next time that your father put his penis in your 
vagina?" (Transcript 7 years)
Construction 5: Specific/Multiple Questions
Operation Asking questions about a specific event in the
context of continuous assault operates to disallow 
the experience of memories or expressions of a 
continuous experience of multiple episodes.
Effect on witness The witness is forced to forget all the other
occasions of alleged assault and focus on the one 
event which the cross examiner is dealing with. The 
process of continuous assault makes the clarity of 







Questions can be asked in such a way that answers 
which are predictable to the examiner are elicited. 
These questions and answers set up a particular 
tempo and rhythm.
"I don't know” x 53 times 
"No” x 100 times
Having set up a musical flow to the interaction, the 
examiner creates another dimension to the sound of 
the interaction and as in other musical activities, he 
or she can conduct that sound. This can be done by 
creating a lulling continuity, a sharp fire rhythm, 
and most significantly by interrupting that flow for 
particular effect.
The witness allows the examiner to control the flow 
of interaction by responding in a similarly 
rhythmical way. The consequences for letting the 
'music take over' are varied.
If elicited continuously the response "I don't know" 
will echo in the minds of those listening as a 
recapitulated theme. A string of rhythmically 
arranged "yes"s or "no"s (whether about substantive 
issues or not) also creates a sense of the questioner 
being in charge of the story with little refutation or 
critical appraisal being offered by the witness. 
Given the propensity of witnesses to co-operate, this 
presents an opportunity to hand themselves over as 
the music makes a sense of its own.
Rhythms of speech can be used to develop rapport 
and comfort and are successfully employed in the 
process of hypnosis or during the singing of a 







Repetition of a response
Q: "December last year, and was that a weekend or 
week day?"
A:"I can't remember."
Q:"Cannot remember. Were the circumstances 
much the same then as they were on the last 
occasion you can remember?"
A:"Yes, it was the same just about every time." 
(Transcript 8 years)
Q:"And is that because of what you have told is that 
he threatened to, not just bash you but bash, I think 
your words, all of you?"
A:"The family."
Q:"The family?"
A:"Yes." (Transcript 12 years)
The cross examiner repeats a word or phrase 
uttered by the witness.
95% of witness responses are "yes", "no", "I don't 
know". On the few occasions witnesses utter words 
or phrases other than those, they are often repeated 
by the cross examiner. This has the effect of taking 
over the response.
The contribution of words or phrases other than the 
formulaic "yes/no/I don’t know" can be the 
foundation, albeit a pebble, of alternative narrative. 
This does not sit well with the general process of 
cross examination for two reasons:
• the alternative narrative may compete with the 
one being built
• the idea that there may be an alternative is in 
competition with the process of creating a single 
narrative.
By repeating the witness's words the cross examiner 
absorbs them for accommodation or dismissal. The 
witness cannot say anything in their own right with 
independence and assertion. Their statements are 
not accepted.
This device allows the cross examiner to reduce the 
credibility of any response offered by the witness. 
Credibility rather than information is at issue here.
Construction 8: Meta Conversations
Operation
Sample
To examine what was said about what happened.
Q:"Just have another look at that statement will you, 
and have a look on page 2 of your statement. You 
see there is nothing there about telling Lisa on the 
Thursday night that he had touched you there, is 
there?” (Transcript 12 years)
Q:”Did you say this that you did not tell that to the 
police?”
A:"Yes I told it to her before 'cause I didn't have a 
chance to tell her...."
Q:"Now just stop there...." (Transcript 11 years)





Q:"To yourself. Now the contents of that 
paragraph are not true, are they?"
A:"No."
Q:"And did you tell the Police the contents of that 
paragraph?"
A:"Some of it."
Q:"Well you tell us what you told the Police and 
what you did not tell the Police in that paragraph?" 
A:"I told her after he had a look at my boobs, but 
not rubbing me on the fanny."
Q:"Yes."
A:"Didn't tell them that I asked him for my pants, 
he didn't have the, he’d been holding them in his 
left hand. These pants I've got on. I've got the 
pants, but he didn’t have them....the girl looking 
through a mirror on them and a flower pot but...." 
Q:"Speakup. Speak."
A:"A little girl looking through a flower pot, with a 
flower pot and he gave them back, but he didn’t 
have them anyway. I said: ’Geez you're rude Bob.' 
but I didn’t say and he goes: 'Why?' And I said 
'Cause you're rude.' He left the bathroom. That 
last bit I didn't say."
Q:"Well did you say 'Geez you're rude Bob.' Did 
you say that?"
A:"No."
Q:"Did you tell the Police that you had said that?" 
A:"No. I don't know. I can’t remember."
CHILD BREAKS DOWN. (Transcript 11 years 
old)
Operation It puts the cross examiner in the position of power
because he/she possesses all the information in a 
written form and can select and quote from it 
w henever they choose and in whatever 
configuration they choose. They indulge in an 
historiographical exercise where they alone have 
access to the primary source materials. The witness 
has no hard copy to refer to and no time to reply. 
Where the content is of no significance it is difficult 
to keep the memory distinction between 'that' and 
'the reporting of that'.
Effect on witness Experiences on which the proceedings are grounded
and based are not recognised by the witness. They 
are so far removed from the trauma of the actual 
event that they are not remembered with the clarity 
demanded by the cross examiner's reference to 
police statements etc which have been recorded in 
other places by other people. This is frequently the 
time when the child victim witness breaks down in 
the courtroom.





Players in an action can be presented as acting or 
being acted upon, or remaining anonymous.
Q:"And when, as you say you were frightened, 
what happened next?"
Q:"The door was then closed behind this person. Is 
that what you're saying?" (Transcript 8 years)
By re-locating a player in relation to an action, the 
player can be cast as being directly involved, 
responsible for or peripheral to that action. One of 
the primary functions of passive voice construction 
is to make one of the actors anonymous and to 
reduce the agent’s sense of acting upon (something). 
Bolinger tells us that:
... the most useful - and dangerous function - of the passive is 
to enable the speaker to keep silent about who performs the 
action: ’the cars are loaded here' says nothing about who does 
it - which is fine if who does it is not important, but misleading 
if it is, unless something else fills us in.
(Bolinger, 1980: 28)
Like many others he has also observed that:
Deliberate use of the passive comes easy to officials who want 
their acts to have the ring o f higher authority and not to appear 
arbitrary ... the fact that the agent is unexpressed enables the 
transfer to be made by sleight-of-hand, and a quality is 
imputed that only reflects the prejudice.
(Bolinger, 1980: 86)
By maintaining the focus of action on the person 
being spoken to, the dynamics of 'victim blaming' 
are brought into play both for the interlocutor and 
for other listeners. In a context where initiation by 
one party is of the essence, non recognition of an 
actor and the action for which they are responsible 
requires the other party to re-frame their 
appreciation. Further:
Contending with the non-propositional is difficult because it 
has to be done propositionally, and the defenders can always 







A series of qualifying subordinate clauses occur 
within a 'sentence'.
Q:”Taking you back to the time when you were 
living in Sydney, when you first met Fred, at that 
time and throughout the period that Fred was living 
with your family, he used to work as a baker, didn't 
he?" (Transcript 9 years)
Q:"At or after you finished seeing Mum at the 
hospital, were you walking home?" (Transcript 9 
years)
Q:"How far was the trampoline from you when you 
were first helped on the bike by Mr Brown?" 
(Transcript 7 years)
By adding clauses which qualify either the nature or 
the identity of the actor or action, the sense can 
only be apprehended after careful scrutiny.
Supplying an answer to a question containing 
embedded clauses also elicits an implicit response to 
both propositional and non-propositional 
expressions. Bolinger (1980) warns:
It will no longer do to imagine that well-defined words and 
propositions are the bulk o f language and the rest can be 
ignored or easily held in check. They are the hard, bright core 
of communications, but are dimmed by the fog around them 
and much of the time are scarcely visible.
(Bolinger, 1980:71)
Because an answer to one proposition can be taken 
as an answer to another witnesses often do not know 
which question to answer However they are 
constrained to answer and then have no redress if 
their answer is assumed to be to another part of the 
question The witnesses are out of control of the 
interpretation which their response is used to 
trigger. Beyond the feature of multi-facetedness is 
the feature of implied proposition.
Construction 11: Backward referencing
Character A pronoun is used to refer to a noun which was
spoken earlier in the utterance.
Sample Q:"Well you are not sure whether you said those
things to the police which are wrong?" (Transcript 
11 years)
Q:"So, you told us that you don't remember, do you 
remember saying that a moment ago?" (Transcript 
10 years)
Operation The referent which is the focus of the question is
placed (grammatically) at a distance.
By pronominalising anaphorically, a referent 
occurs before and at a distance from its marker. By 
the time the marker and its significance in framing 
a response is indicated, the object or action to which 
it refers is part of speech history and thus has to be 
retrieved and re-connected. It also creates another 
layer in the generation of meta-conversation where 
something actually stands for something else.
Effect on witness Use of this device makes the hearer work harder at
identifying what the 'it' might refer to. This places 
extra strain on the hearer. The witness has to deal 
with an abstraction rather than a specified referent. 
Both noun and pronoun are 'words', therefore if 
there is a difference between them it is a difference 
of 'realities'.
The interlocutor has a responsibility to connect a 
substantive concept with its referent. The hearer 
becomes responsible for making sense of the 
speaker's expression. The direct consequence is 
extra load on the hearer because of this created 
obligation.
The strain of connecting words, references and 
reports to something experienced is further 
mediated and the opportunity to talk about the 






What might otherwise be presented as actions 
(involved in identifiable parties acting and being 
acted upon) is presented as agentless happenings/ 
operations.
Q:"Now just stop there. Did you tell the police 
what is in the statement about the matter about the 
touching of the boobs?” (Transcript 11 years)
Q:"He never hit you any time or about any time that 
these particular acts that you have spoken of, the 
sucking of the penis or the putting of the penis in 
your bottom occurred, is that right?” (Transcript 
14 years)
By creating a 'thing' rather than a 'process' this 
expression alienates the sense of a person doing and 
a person being done unto. Use of nominalisations 
avoids any emotional involvement or responsibility 
for items being discussed or reported.
In examination this operates to deny the 
involvement of one party in maintaining the 
'victim' status of the other, and creates a sense of 
'objectivity'. This implies impartial appreciation 
and eliminates and protects the anonymity of an 
agent.
Nominalisations are more difficult to process than 
their equivalent verb forms (McCawley, 1970). 
Danet (1980) reports that in jury instructions, 
nominalisation were not well understood. The 
mean percentage of correct replies for instructions 
containing nominalisations was 29 per cent, 
compared to nearly 40 per cent for all instructions 
not containing them. Removing nominalisations 
significantly  improved comprehension of 
instructions. (Charrow and Charrow, 1976)
The hearer is eliminated from the action by the use 
of nominalisation. To the child witness nominalised 
questions disenfranchise them from describing 
events in their lives and discount their experiences.
Nominalised expression alienates the hearer from 
this action in such a way that they become 
disembodied occurrences. The reporting of 
experience, the creation of any narrative, requires 
the teller to either position themselves in the story 
(by language and role) or to chose a suitable 
medium (a puppet) to 'tell' the story for them. In 
all cases the construction of a cohesive and 
comprehensible narrative require the clear, 
embodied identification of the teller in the story. 
Nominalisation denies this opportunity.





A string of words is uttered but the fact that a 
response is required is not made obvious at all.
"I put it to you you're telling a lie." (Transcript 8 
years)
By not indicating the purpose or nature of an 
interaction one party remains in command while the 
other is left contextless. Unmarked questions 
achieve this by leaving dormant the eventual 
requirement of the interaction. Even obvious 
questions contain little sense of asking for unknown 
information or requesting a sharing of ideas. 
Barnes and Todd (1980) suggest that after all the 
question/statement distinction is not a fruitful one. 
In cross examination this is certainly the case. In 
'unmarked questions', what might otherwise appear 
as 'questions' appear for what they are - statements.
Because the kind of response required of the 
witness is not indicated the witness is isolated and 
their role is undefined as the conversation proceeds. 
When a response is eventually asked for they must 
review words that were uttered in an unclear 
context.
Unmarked questions confirm the underlying effect 
that the cross-examiner is telling the story and that 
the witness's response is peripheral.
Character Induces or obliges the hearer to answer in
agreement with the content of the question being 
asked. It achieves this by opening the question as a 
statement that stands for fact.
The indication that a response is required appears at 
the end of a string words which otherwise appears 
as a statement. Tagging usually draws its 
affirmative power by combining a negative form 
with a positive one.
Sample Q:'T mean if  something happens today and
something happens tomorrow, you're not going to 
say they're about a year apart, are you?" 
(Transcript 8 years)
Operation The hearer is not cued into the linguistic nature of
the unfolding expression until it is 'too late'.
English has a pattern of tagging that is used to 'get around' the 
defences o f a hearer in several ways. The most familiar is the 
tag question, which pleads for agreement by pretending to 
offer the hearer a choice between a positive and a negative 
answer. The tag has the opposite polarity from the rest o f the 
sentence (if one is negative the other is affirmative, and vice 
versa), it is in question form, and it consists of a pronoun and 
an auxiliary (or a form of the verb to be):
It will be all right, won't it?
He hasn't a chance in the world, has he?
You like him, don’t you?
It wasn't Jill, was it?
The intonation of the tag can be either rising or rising-falling - 
the latter for when one is pretty sure of the hearer’s agreement
This same device of reverse polarity is used in questions 
without tags, to appeal for agreement or just to state something 
that is so obvious that agreement is assured. The question is 
negative, and the expected answer is affirmative:
Isn't it a nice day?
Wouldn't you like to try some of these almonds?
- but by overreaching itself, 'appealing' sometimes becomes 
the opposite; the question is insincere and is taken at its real 
value. (Bolinger, 1980: 84)
Effect on witness In order to answer otherwise (other than agreeing)
the hearer has to dispute the fact which formed the
Construction 14: Tagging
preface to the question itself. This is almost 
impossible given the staging of courtroom 
proceedings during the process o f cross 
examination. The respondent has to process the 
statement as a question in order to make a response.
Because hearers are not cued in, their reading and 
interpretation of the meaning of the expression is 
diminished. Because meaning in print or speech is 
developed by the reader or listener actively 
accumulating and recreating information and 
connections, cues are constantly needed to 'make 
sense'. Without these cues hearers are excluded 
from the discourse.
Sample Q:HNow this happened on a Friday, was it not?"
(Transcript 7 years)
Q:"Now you had a bruise, did you not, near one of 
your breasts, do you remember that?" (Transcript 
12 years)
Q:"When Mr Smith asked you if  you could 
remember anything about a towel you said could 
not remember anything about a towel? The first 
time? Is that not right?" (Transcript 15 years)
Q:"And do you remember another occasion your 
father or your stepfather, asked if you were playing 
sport, did you not say no?" (Transcript 13 years)
Operation A tag at the end of a statement to signal that a
response is required can be phrased as a negative 
construction This shores up the statement quality 
by creating a challenge to deny the statement rather 
than an invitation to confirm.
This use of the negative construction at the end of a 
sentence is a rhetorical device. It gives the 
questioner status as the possessor of knowledge and 
places the respondent in the position of having to 
defend themselves.
Effect on witness Agreeing is generally emotionally easier than
disagreeing and this construction capitalises on this 
human propensity. To do other than agree is to put 
the witness in the position of having to (rudely) 
deny the proposition and subsequently defend their 
opposition. This course of action, if only faintly 
apprehended, enforces agreement. This leaves the 
control of the narrative with the cross examiner.
Construction 15: Negative Tagging
6.3 RESPONDING TO THE DISCOURSE OF DENIAL
6.3.1 How language creates denial
The function of cross examination is to deny the meaning of the witness. 
It seems this is aided by combining specific aspects of language with 
social and cultural preconceptions in a situation of threat and authority. 
They combine to create a specifiable genre of discourse elements.
The data presented so far have identified several ways in which 'reality' 
is created by the defence; a reality which requires that the allegation of 
sexual assault is perceived by the observers and the victim as a non-issue 
rather than just a different version of the truth. For the 'reality' of the 
defence to be sustained the 'reality' of the child's allegation must be 
denied. This is a feature of adversarial court proceedings.
The aspects of language which create denial may be classified in the 
following ways:
• As in foreign languages, differences in codes and registers can be 
viewed through specialised lexicon, unusual grammatical structure 
and lexical density.
• Roles and actions are changed by the manipulation of themes and by 
juxtaposing topics and comments, subjects and objects. These effects 
are created by the use of passive constructions and nominalisation.
• Simple statements of negation can lead onto accusations of lying.
• Use of triggers specific to the situation can cause anxiety.
• Embedding and lengthy and disconnected statements can cause 
confusion.
• Ownership of information can be influenced by claims made and 
establishment of themes.
Adversarial combat in the criminal court requires that the outcome is 
expressed in terms of winning or losing, thus tactics and expressions are 
used that are devoted particularly to that outcome, for one side or the 
other. Questioning attempts to establish the case for one side in these
terms.
The exercise or denial of one side or the other is a counterpoint to 
situations of secrecy and threat at the heart of most sexual abuse cases. 
The experiences of the abused child have already been severely filtered
by threat and secrecy, by guilt and powerlessness, and the task of the 
cross examiner is to strengthen and perpetuate the filter so that the felt 
experiences of the child become unrecognisable both to observers and to 
the victim. For sociologists generally the question is to understand:
... more concretely how this 'social filter' operates, and how it 
happens that it permits certain experiences to be filtered through, 
while others are stopped from entering awareness.
(Fromm, 1960: 99)
The question for the student of language in use is "what are some of the 
devices, techniques, connections, patterns of language which either 
admit or deny certain experiences?" Language itself, as a constructor, 
definer and perpetuator of reality, is a filter and the language 
(discourse) of denial is a more highly articulated and finer filter. When 
die filtering becomes fine experiences clog and in extreme cases remain 
unperceived by the conscious, but not unrecorded or unfelt.
Whether or not subtle affective experiences can arrive at awareness 
depends on the degree to which such experiences are cultivated 
(recognised) in a given culture (interaction or situation). There are 
many affective experiences for which a given language has no word, 
while another language may be rich in words which express such 
feelings... In a language (or register or discourse) in which different 
affective experiences are not expressed by different words, it is 
almost impossible for one's experience to come to awareness, and 
vice versa. Generally speaking, it may be said that an experience 
rarely comes into awareness for which the language has no word.
But this is only one aspect of the filtering function of language.
Different languages differ not only by the fact that they vary in the 
diversity of words they use to denote certain (affective) experiences, 
but by their syntax, their grammar, and the root meaning of their 
words. The whole language contains an attitude of life, is a frozen 
expression of experiencing life in a certain way.
(Fromm et al, 1960: 100)
Whorfian linguistics, critical linguistics and adherents to the general 
notion that ideology resides in language, share common premises here 
with psychoanalytic theory. This kind of linguistic determinism would 
not be found in contemporary 'language in use' literature as it 
increasingly stakes its credibility on 'contextualising' texts and thus 
taking more account of the descriptions, experiences and orientations of 
participants and the history of the situation in which they are being 
studied. On the other hand the psychoanalytic literature reflects its own 
involvement with the experiences, reflections and consequences of a 
person's existence, and recognises the significance of language in this.
Another aspect of the filter which makes awareness possible, or not, is 
the logic which directs the thinking of people in a given culture. Some 
connections are assumed to be natural or acceptable or predictable 
whilst others are not. There is a cultural logic which drives and
perpetuates the propositions ’women are hysterical’, ’aborigines are 
lazy', and 'children are prone to lie and be forgetful’. This cultural 
logic filters (that is, allows for or excludes) a whole range of 
propositions and their corollaries. The basis of court proceedings and 
the adversarial situation creates and draws on a particularly dualistic 
concept of the world. It finds its expression in the extraction of ’yes' 
and 'no' answers, strings of which are put together to create the desired 
'reality' and more significantly, to cast the witness in a single role, that 
of 'accuser'. The sexually abused child may have a range of roles and 
feelings associated with the accused, many of them 'positive', yet only 
one role is allowable in this context
Aside from language and logic, a further aspect of the filter suggested 
by Fromm is the content of the experience and this is particularly 
significant in situations where taboos are in place. Fromm et al (1960: 
102) suggest that 'every society excludes certain thoughts and feelings 
from being, thought, felt and expressed. There are things which are not 
only 'not done’ but which are even 'not thought'. Children placed in a 
situation of talking about taboo experiences feel threatened by societal 
pressures and the possibility of ostracism. Those experiences which 
cannot be filtered through to awareness remain unconscious. Unless a 
person is to become insane '...he has to relate himself in some way to 
others. To be completely unrelated brings him to the frontier of 
insanity.' (Fromm, 1960: 104)
That fear of being utterly alone is the most effective agent in 
preventing conscious awareness of taboo feelings and thoughts. Cross 
examination of victim witnesses consolidates the taboos and guilt's 
already in place. It embodies the dynamics of denial and causes the 
often unobserved consequences from the mild 'child breaks down' (and 
cries), to the more obvious expression of hurt '16 year old girl 
miscarries on court-house steps'.
On many occasions the victim develops amnesia as a reaction to the 
unacceptability of what is being demanded of them sexually (that is, the 
act of abuse itself), socially (the secrecy and guilt surrounding the 
abuse), and psychologically (the reaction of others in the child s 
environment).
Many children in court are perceived to be 'cold and calculating, 
'manipulative', or 'not nice kids at all'. What appear as descriptors of a 
condition to the educator and the psychologist, are perceived by the 
public, judge and jury as being the very characteristics which reduce
their credibility.
The denial of meaning is of such profound significance to the social, 
psychological and physical organism, that when it happens with 
predictable and patterned incidence it can legitimately be regarded as 
socially purposive.
6.3.2 From cross examination to degradation
I suggest that the denial of meaning attempted through the process of 
cross examination reflects the universal 'ceremony of degradation' 
identified by Garfinkel who suggests that:
Just as the structural conditions of shame are universal to all societies 
by the very fact o f their being organised, so the structural conditions 
of status degradation are universal to all societies
(Garfinkel, 1973:91)
The evidence of this thesis confirms the degradation observation in that 
the child victim witness is shamed both by the events of the past and by 
the actions within the court. By identifying such devices we may be 
providing not only 'description' but the basis for 'resistance'.
6.3.3 Resisting denunciation
The power to resist the oppressive actions of others is directly related to 
one's own ability to attribute meaning to one's own existence. Bruno 
Bettleheim developed this theme as he observed individuals and groups 
coping with the pressures of extermination camps. Recognised as one of 
the world's greatest psychologists he observed that:
... any trauma proves (to the victim) that in some respect the 
integration one has achieved fails to offer adequate protection. If the 
trauma is utterly destructive...then it demonstrates that the integration 
of one’s personality has failed the crucial test of its validity”.
(Bettleheim, 1979: 39)
Being a victim is itself a mark of failure and induces guilt and shame, 
and reduces the individual's sense of power, including the power to 
resist. Isolation is a corollary to victimisation and all the foregoing 
describe the psychological and social status of sexually abused children. 
Religious groups, clubs and gatherings of people who come together for 
'a common cause' resist the forces of oppression and often find that the 
act of establishing the group is the first step in healing members. 
Groups generate their own meanings and individuals adopt such 
meanings. To deny an individual or group the expression of meanings 
they have created is a final assertion of power and domination. Tlus 
concept is starkly realised in conflicts over language use in colonial
situations. The right to converse, record and present in one's own 
language is often denied by those seeking to dominate. The cultural and 
psychological colonisation which follows such restriction occurs 
throughout the world. The imperialist enterprise, predicated on the 
domination of one by another, is put into operation by negating, 
devaluing and denying meanings of die 'opposition' and often the first 
line of attack is to restrict the use of the 'opposition’s' language. Just as 
meaning can be constructed through language so it can also be taken 
away. When this happens one's power to resist is diminished and 
acquiescence to the 'counter' force becomes more likely.
The denial of personal experiences by suggesting or stating that victims 
are 'just making it up' has effects and parallels in a numb«* of arenas. 
In order to commence the process of healing victims of war, rape, 
imprisonment and natural disaster need the acceptance of those around 
them and the opportunity to tell the story in their own way. The 
process of cross examination of child victim witnesses does everything 
but allow this process to occur, with predictable consequences.
The patterned but predictable behaviour of children under cross 
examination is that they ^reak down'. The situation generally works to 
ensure that outcome. The procedure followed in this study took into 
account insights coming from a variety of sources. The operational 
problem for this study has been how best to represent the forces and 
interactions which are at play during the process of cross examination, 
and how best to make that insight accessible to others. The aim was to 
develop a series of descriptions which convinced the reader that there is 
a definite (punitive) connection between what is said to the child victim 
witness and serious resulting hurt. That description is now encapsulated 
in the expression 'discourse of denial', the descriptors of which have 




I have presented a taxonomic description of 'the discourse of denial' and 
discussed some of the possible implications of its identification. The 
identification of a discourse which can be seen not only to be punitive 
to the child victim witness but antithetical to the aim of discerning truth, 
has been informed by a range of research processes. This has been 
possible by bringing together otherwise disparate pools of data and a 
range of procedures for responding to that data. Those research 
processes took place in a context of investigation which acknowledged a 
number of perspectives among which was my own educational 
orientation towards children and language development.
This chapter comments on the research journey. In it I clarify the 
forces and dynamics which allowed me to interpret the phenomenon of 
the child victim witness under cross examination as being controlled by 
'the discourse of denial'.
I point to the need for an informed and critical language study that 
crosses discipline borders (7.1). Language as an issue in cross 
examination is considered (7.2), along with children's rights. Because 
of its multidisciplinary flavour, the study has implications for areas of 
professional practice and research which were used to inform and are 
now informed by it (7.3). An appropriate research process was chosen 
(7.4) within which method, tools and results were developed (7.5). 
Having retraced the journey thus far I make suggestions for further 
study and action (7.6) and draw the chapter and this thesis to a close 
with a short concluding statement (7.7).
7.1 CROSSING DISCIPLINE BORDERS
7.1.1 Studying language in context
The study of language in its social context, a phrase used by many 
students of language from the time of Saussure, is not a uniformly 
accepted concept. Schools of description and analysis have tackled 
appraisal based on variations of speech characteristics and distribution 
according to class, time and place, but have generally managed to steer 
clear of problematic social questions. If one adheres to the principle 
that, ’... the social context is ... not so much an external condition on the 
learning of meanings as a generator of the meanings that are learnt
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(Halliday, 1974:140) then it is almost impossible to study language 
without a major reference to its context and problematic social 
questions.
In this thesis the context included the baggage of anxieties and 
associations which reside in a person’s experience. Just as one seeks to 
understand the behaviour of others by considering their cultural back­
ground so the focus here was on the phenomenon of the child victim 
witness under cross examination. Such a socio semiotic perspective 
allows us to see how social reality is shaped, constrained and modified.
A variety of forces need to be accounted for in such shaping, and so the 
research process had to admit information from many sources. The 
boundaries between levels and bodies of understanding needed to be 
challenged as a phenomenon within a cultural setting
In the close and culturally constraining environment of adversarial 
court proceeding language becomes in the full Hallidayan sense a 
metaphor of reality. Talking becomes a critical issue and applying 
labels becomes the assertion of power.
Earlier in the study, what appeared as ’strange' language to some 
listening in court was compared to other excluding languages - codes 
which seek to include one set of people while excluding others by 
assuming the right to label and control 'reality'.
7.1.2 Adversarial law: creating competing narratives
In taking a stance critical of the treatment of child victim witnesses as 
evidenced through language use, this study was by implication also 
critical of the inadequacy and reluctance of disciplines (as traditionally 
defined) to tackle significant issues. This thesis drew on new sources of 
data and created a new narrative which has become a fresh and credible 
version accessible to competing stakeholders, providing them with a 
new and productive way of interpreting the phenomenon of the child 
victim witness under cross examination. The challenge remains 
however for child victim witnesses and their carers to find ways within 
the legal system to 'have their say’ when it comes to the point of battle 
in court. Indeed the whole court situation can be conceptualised as a 
battle over competing narratives.
The aim of the prosecutor can be seen as the creation (through the 
witness) of a particular narrative, and the task of cross examination is to 
break down that narrative not only in terms of 'the story' but also in 
terms of 'the telling'.
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Winning is of the essence, and to advocate listening to the witness 
hinders that process. But if  display of truth is of the essence then 
nothing is compromised by the array of data from a variety of sources. 
The burden of truth in court is grounded in the same philosophical 
precepts as atavistic discourse and Arisotelian logic. Listening to 
witnesses would not be a softening of the rules of evidence but rather an 
expansion of the evidence that can be admitted, and thus a strengthening 
of the precepts of truth.
The assumptions and values which I attach to language in use are 
different from the assumptions and values of those who work within the 
court structures or whose role it is to win.
Adversarial proceedings determine that a duel 'to the death' is enacted 
between barristers through witnesses.
The terms 'plaintiff and 'defendant' are examples of dialectical terms 
employed in the law. These terms separate actions into opposing camps 
and identify the partisan forces which divide the parties in dispute. 
These position forces are not characterised physically, but rather in the 
way we position the opposing forces. This positioning assigns a value 
orientation by which actors develop and employ strategies for 
prevailing in the given case. (Danet and Bogoch, 1980)
7.1.3 Social science research and the law
This thesis draws on insights and concepts from a variety of disciplines, 
the link always being the experiences of the child victim witness. The 
relationship between the disciplines of law and social science is 
considered by Charles Robert Trempert (1987) in a paper entitled 
'Sanguinicity and disillusionment: where law meets social science’. He 
begins with the challenging words:
The current state o f legally orientated social science research is a 
mixture o f success and unfulfilled promise ... inhibiting factors 
include uncertainty about whether any particular study will influence 
policy making, and a profession reward structure that discourages 
interdisciplinary empirical research.
(Trempert, 1987:267)
The adoption by courts of social science findings faces two main 
hurdles. Firstly the judiciary has not embraced social science, and 
secondly it is in the nature of the social sciences to disagree amongst 
themselves as to the significance of outcomes and their interpretation. 
Trempert quotes from Richard Abel (1980: 803)
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Social studies o f law have reached a critical point in their 
developm ent The original paradigm is exhausted. Until new 
ones are constructed, scholarship will be condemned to spin its 
wheels, adding minor refinements to accepted truths, repeating 
conventional arguments in unresolvable debates.
(Trempert, 1987:271)
Trempert claims that many other commentators echo Abel’s concern 
and contends th a t '... researchers do not deal adequately with the moral 
underpinnings of the legal system they study ' The identification of 'the 
discourse of denial' represents a challenge to the morality of court 
proceedings.
The other challenge of this thesis has been to engage in a research 
process which would inform and find credibility amongst a variety of 
professional peers whilst establishing as common ground the centrality 
of language as a useful medium for clarifying the phenomenon of the 
child victim witness under cross examination.
... An interdisciplinary researcher faces the dual hurdles o f peer 
review and judicial scrutiny. Daunting as these hurdles may be for 
the researcher content to work in established areas, they are even 
more dispiriting for anyone inclined to follow  the law and social 
science soothsayers' exhortations to explore new terrain where the 
prospects of either peer or judicial acceptance are less certain.
(Trempert, 1987: 274)
7.2 LANGUAGE AS AN ISSUE IN CROSS EXAMINATION
Within Australian and international literature on 'the child as witness', 
the only place to find specific critique of language as a central issue is in 
papers and presentations arising from the development of this thesis. 
That language is of central importance is not doubted, yet at one of 
society's most significant sites of struggle and inequity, where powerful 
are sent into combat against the poorly equipped and the weak, where 
words and the way they are put together are everything, language rates 
not a mention.
At the time of writing there is much interest in the concept of allowing 
children in sexual abuse cases to be examined and cross examined by 
videotape. There is also much discussion about the credibility of 
children as a 'class' of people. Neither of these responses negates the 
concern of this thesis because the language issue, which determines all 
the rest, remains largely unrecognised.
Recognising and making obvious the problem of what now appears as 
punitive, unfair and inappropriate treatment of sexually abused children 
in criminal court proceedings was grounded in linguistic activity and
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was discernible through linguistic analysis. The discourse rights 
(Walker, 1981) were seen to be a legitimate area for study and 
advocacy, given the focus on the phenomenon of the child victim 
witness.
I was also mindful that children have rights. I was aware that children 
cannot protect those rights themselves, but need a person, agency or 
process that is prepared to pursue their 'rights'. The legal nature of 
these rights is specified in the preamble to the United Nations 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child in which the duty of the law and 
its administration is made totally clear:
The child shall enjoy special attention, and shall be given  
opportunities and facilities by law and by other means, to enable him 
to develop physically, mentally, morally, spiritually and socially in a 
healthy and normal manner and in conditions o f freedom and 
dignity. In the enactment o f laws for this purpose, the best interests 
o f the child shall be the paramount consideration.
(Proclaimed by the General Assembly of the UN 20/11/59).
This statement was especially significant in a context of legal 
administration. Rather than recognising that child victim witnesses may 
have 'special' rights, there is no recognition that they even have the 
same rights as others. Adult rights are articulated in the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights where it is stated that:
... everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression (and) this 
right shall include the freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas of all kind.
(Australian Law Reform Commission, 1984)
But witnesses in courts are not free to impart information and ideas of 
all kinds (Penman, 1990). Indeed they are actively restricted from 
uttering the 'whole truth'. Because of an assumed inadequacy, children 
are even more likely to be restricted in expressing themselves clearly. 
On review of the available transcripts, this is borne out in the frequent 
'child breaks down' statement. This represents not only patterned but 
predictable behaviour and the situation generally works to ensure this 
outcome. The concept of 'rights' expressed above is apparently not 
being upheld by the very processes that have been established to pursue 
and uphold such rights.
This thesis is a direct response to an imperative which acknowledges the 
real and extensive experiences of sexually abused children. For those 
children the courtroom experience of cross examination is not only 
about the settling of a disagreement. It is a part of and a continuation of 
their own real experiences. Identifying the linguistic descriptors of the
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child victim witness under cross examination has varied, and in some 
cases radical, implications for other areas of practice and study.
7.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER AREAS
For the applied sociolinguist there was the challenge of defining and 
responding to the widest possible definition of context, the personal 
psychological and historical inner context of the child victim witness. It 
was an opportunity to investigate in an applied and socially critical way 
the connections and consequences of the relationship between language 
and thought. Those connections have been expressed in the descriptive 
taxonomy of the discourse of denial which was constructed as a result of 
studying particular constructions of speech used in cross examination.
The study offered the possibility of understanding the dynamics of 
language which is constructed to obfuscate. My professional orientation 
as a language educator has developed the belief ¿hat language should be 
used to support and clarify. However the language of cross examination 
contradicted the precepts of education wherein language is used as an 
'ally' for growth and learning rather than as a 'weapon' of destruction. 
The implication for effective teaching (teaching which seeks to engender 
the ability in others to create narratives and texts of many different 
kinds), is that the language characteristics identified in 'the discourse of 
denial’ should be avoided at all costs. Educators need to constantly 
search for linguistic strategies which counter the effects of denial.
The possibility of being able to identify and describe language features 
and their effects in a specific situation suggested a heightening of 
awareness for practitioners in all fields of human interaction. 
Specifically, counsellors of children and others preparing children for 
court stood to benefit from any clarification of the experience of the 
child victim witness under cross examination. Within the court, police 
prosecutors and judges might also be helped to identify more clearly the 
plight of the child victim witness through developing an appreciation of 
the details of force embedded within the language of cross examination.
The range of areas of practice that might inform and be informed by 
the thesis suggested the use of a research paradigm that could recognise 
and respond not only to the focus question but also to the range of 
potential stakeholders. The diversity of data required to create a 
credible, dependable, confirmable and transferable result could only be 
tackled within a naturalistic paradigm.
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7.4 CHOOSING A RESEARCH PROCESS
In a naturalistic inquiry, it is the movement through the layers of 
inquiry activities and the interaction between them that constitute the 
dynamics of the (emergent) design. The human as instrument, using his 
or her tacit knowledge is the mechanism by which the process occurs. 
(Camboume and Curtis, 1988)
This suggests that any consideration of the language and its effect in 
court should take into account the possible reasons for the existence of 
these effects. It is an implied assertion of this thesis that many language 
characteristics are not so much grounded in legal requirement but 
rather in the necessity to do combat with words. The combat is fought 
both with propositions embodied in words, as in argumentation, and 
with configurations and forms of strings of words. The quality of 
wordness itself in the combat may be paralleled to the person with 
withered arms who has to prove him or herself in a sword fight.
As I became informed by the research process I realised the need to test 
traditional assumptions about subjectivity and objectivity. The study 
had to be credible to non-sympathetic observers and stakeholders. The 
need to present a mixture of objective and subjective descriptions and 
results influenced the choice of research paradigm and method.
Although causal connections are often looked for in research, it is 
questionable whether they are the strongest form of connection. For the 
purposes of this study die strongest degree of connectedness is that 
which shows the existence of certain human responses and activities as 
part of a pattern of responses, the sense of which can be made by 
reference to an overarching theoretical proposition:
Causation should perhaps be viewed as a semantic or attributional 
phenomenon ... because the concept of causality does not fit human 
research, the designs of research based on that concept, however 
implicitly, are misleading and may, ultimately, be the cause of the 
demise of our profession.
(Guba and Lincoln 1982:9)
In discussing the process of naturalistic research in the social sciences 
Guba and Lincoln suggest five axioms. These are ' multiple realities, 
investigator-respondent interaction, generalisations, causality, and 
values' (1982: 10). They assert that these criteria of the investigative 
process are more useful than the plethora of approaches and procedures 
arising from a rationalist philosophy.
The data collection techniques of interview, review of documentary 
evidence, and general survey create an appreciation of 'the state of 
play'. Descriptive statistics are a significant and important aspect of the
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report as they provide another means of embellishment, support, and 
refutation of the case being made, as do personal comments and 
observations. Opening up a case to a variety of tests and sources of data 
can strengthen that case by providing a variety of means by which to 
gauge i t  In this study such variety enriched the whole experience and 
helped to clarify points of concurrence and tension as concepts arose 
and were adopted or discarded.
Although my research journey was not carried out in accordance with 
an initial briefing chart, the thesis displays the power of generalisation 
or transferability. There are several kinds of generalisation which are 
applicable:
• there is a perceived relationship between the dynamics of private 
abuse and the public abuse observed in court proceedings bound 
together by the denial of valid experience. This is supported by 
social theories which suggest that micro behaviour can be viewed and 
analysed as a cellular embodiment of macro behaviour.
• the activity of language denial can be seen to operate in a number of 
other sites and situations to a greater or lesser degree.
• the existence of a discourse of denial is consistent with a number of 
other theories which speculate about the relationship between 
language and society, human experience and mental states.
Although it is a mistake to equate correlation of any phenomenon with 
any other phenomenon as creating a causal relationship, it is equally 
remiss of any researcher to knowingly ignore relationships in the data 
which present themselves as connections.
The standards for the conduct and veracity of this research must be 
created and reviewed in terms of my aspirations as a researcher, and the 
claims that I made about the subject which were that:
• a particular phenomenon, children under cross examination, 
warranted investigation beyond the rules and requirements of court 
procedures, from the child’s point of view.
• what happens in court is a function of, and is viewable through the 
lens of language interaction.
• the language used embodies a particular set of pressures and 
dynamics.
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• the pressures and dynamics of court appearance reflect the pressures 
and dynamics which exist both in the society at large and in sites 
other than the court setting.
Because of the desire to go beyond correlational sociolinguistics to 
establish connections and patterns of connections, the results reflect the 
premise about the linguistic base of ideology. The results also describe 
connections and dynamics in such a way that change can be effected. 
The research process (which created and allowed for all the above 
constraints, aspirations, contexts, and levels inherent in the research 
question) had to be responsive in the fullest possible sense.
7.5 USING A METHOD AND DEVELOPING TOOLS
In response to Danet's observation (1980: 211) that 'a trial is a very 
complicated communicative process with many variables simultaneously 
at work', I decided upon three ways of creating, accessing and 
combining data. Both qualitative and quantitative results were produced 
which provided:
• empirical evidence of the lack of match between what is said and 
what is heard
• detailed descriptors of the aspects of language which characterise 
cross examination
• an appreciation of aspects of propositional force which are contained 
within the cross examination interchanges.
These results were produced respectively by:
• the testing program which showed that around half of what was said to
children was not heard as language
• an analysis of transcripts which produced a list of possible descriptors 
of the hard to hear language
• a collection of propositions from transcripts which created 
discernible and constant themes about the reliability and veracity of 
children’s testimony
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7.5.1 The testing program
This empirical study showed the validity of the claims that the children 
did not understand about half of what was said to them in court. The 
statistical calculation of 43% confirmed a general appreciation of the 
discourse as a whole. The general collection of 'lawyer questions' was 
chosen at random from all the available transcripts and provided the 
clearest links with the central concern of this thesis - that is, how is 
language used to deny the experience of child victim witnesses in cross 
examination. The categories of 'counsellor', 'teacher', and 'selective 
lawyer' serve as points of comparison with the central finding.
7.5.1.1 The search for meaning In questions
The results indicated that although the language of the questions offered 
for repetition was outside the respondents' normal repertoire, (indicated 
by an inaccurate repetition), they still searched for, and imposed 
meaning on, what they heard. They used a variety of techniques to 
change the original text into a piece of language which was 
comprehensible for them.
This tactic indicates that children actively search for meaning in what 
they hear. Their preference is for 'A Sense' rather than 'No Sense'. 
The existence of this category highlights the distance which must exist 
between the language of the child and the language of the questioner 
before 'No Sense' is produced. Even if there is a mismatch between the 
child and the questioner's language capacities, as indicated by an 
inaccurate repetition, the child will attempt to compensate for this 
distance and try to actively search for an independent and sensible piece 
of text. To fail in this task, as indicated by the 'No Sense' category 
represents the child's total failure to hear the language of the question 
being asked. In everyday conversation most of us search for sense in 
the language of other people. Frequently messages are wrong, 
sometimes they are right. But when we find 'No Sense' in the language 
of the other person, frustration and confusion are the likely results. If 
we multiply these feelings by an anxiety quotient to adequately reflect 
the stress of the child witness under cross examination we have a 
disturbing picture of what is happening to children in the courtroom 
context.
7.5.1.2 The Implications of mismatch
In the courtroom transcripts examined there was a mismatch between 
the language of the lawyers and the language capacities of the children.
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This mismatch varied according to the particular type of question asked. 
As the questions became more courtroom specific and more combative 
under cross examination, the less likely it was that children would be 
able to hear the language and respond in a meaningful and truthful way.
Strong as this result was however, it was still unfinished. The picture 
was incomplete. There was a need to add depth and colour to the 
canvas.
7.5.2 Analysis of transcripts
By comparing characteristics of the language samples which the 
children failed to hear with the features of the selective lawyer sample, 
it was possible to generate a list of features of the language of cross 
examination. When perceived functionally they became known as 
tactics and strategies because of their debilitating effects upon 
comprehension. The list of features included:
• the context of the situation (lawyers examine children on police 
statements)
• the context of the text (lawyers change topics)
• the context of words, phrases and expressions (semantic and syntactic 
features of language which generate meanings).
Other contexts which create and project meanings include architectural 
features of a particular site, physical stance of the interlocutor, male 
domination, and intonation.
7.5.3 Establishing themes
One of the outstanding features of language and its analysis is that 
within discourses one is able to produce, project and identify themes or 
story lines which arise from one or other of the interlocutors, or which 
result from their interaction. In criminal court, sides are taken and 
story lines presented and defended. The themes thus created are a 
function both of supposed 'facts' and also 'stances' which one or the 
other parties can be shown to have - lazy, drunken, unreliable, 
provocative, aggressive. The 'kind' of person you can be shown to be 
becomes central to the judge and jury's assessment of individual 
credibility. The establishment of 'themes' becomes an essential part of 
the fight for credibility. In the transcripts under consideration themes 
were created from side comments, statements and in some cases
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statement by omission. 1 put it to you that everything you have said is a 
total pack o f ... sorry, Til ask that question again'. Such expressions are 
only possible because they capitalise upon ideas that exist in the general 
fabric of social relationships.
In the proceedings reviewed, the themes which were voiced cast 
children as manipulative, unreliable and fantasy prone beings. Such 
generalisations are unwarranted and only serve the dynamics of 
prejudice and punitive discrimination. The assertion that children, as a 
class, are reliable truth tellers, is similarly untenable. It is my 
experience as an educator that such claims are not true. The example of 
Matthew as a child 'striving for meaning' rather than as one who is 
incapable or inactive illustrates this point.
Matthews change for example of "Let me see if I've got it right? You've 
told stories which are untrue?" to "Let me see if you've got it right? 
You've told stories that are untrue?" illustrate this point well.
See Appendix 9: Test question responses for Matthew
To appreciate the nature and effect of language in the situations under 
scrutiny the examination of these themes adds another dimension to the 
analysis.
An analysis of discourse can be carried out at a number of levels 
drawing on units of varying features and size. The problem with 
analysing only the meanings of words spoken is that unless an appeal is 
made to meanings other than those contained in the words spoken, no 
sense can ever be made of the discourse. Insanity itself is often the 
result of such tension and lack of resolution between 'statement' and 
'meaning'.
When talking about units of analysis it is tempting to appeal to the 
notion of micro or macro features. Choosing the size of units for 
analysis however misses a crucial feature of discourse itself, that is, that 
it can be appreciated in a number of different ways. Drawing upon the 
concept of 'levels’ suggests an hierarchical arrangement of factors and 
indicators whereas the concept of 'difference' allows for the presence of 
alternative perspectives.
From the combination of results from different analyses of a variety of 
data pools the descriptive taxonomy of 'the discourse of denial' was 
created.
7.6 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER ACTION
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This thesis distances itself from other linguistic studies in three 
significant respects:
• the province of language studies and sociolinguists, with correlated 
links between the social and the linguistic, is not connected enough 
for the precepts of this study. It is inconceivable to study language 
in use without also studying the social. The term 'sociolinguists' 
becomes redundant and we are left with language which is social.
• the end point for many studies of language in use is the display of 
correlational behaviour itself. In this thesis I am looking for the 
explication of power, role and status as expressed and embodied in 
particular linguistic expression
• the motive behind studying a particular site is to understand more 
about that site and to use that understanding to complement more 
global analyses.
To address all of the above the speaker/ hearer needs to be admitted into 
the speech act and its subsequent analysis and presentation. For a full 
appreciation, their role and function needs to be noted as well as the 
baggage of experiences, assumptions and needs they embody. By 
including in data gathering and analysis the relationship between 
context, experience and consequences for the child, the discourse of 
denial has been identified .
I am not suggesting that the effects of cross examination in court can be 
viewed only in terms of a single discourse. There are other discourses 
operating independently which support the central one of denial. It may 
have been possible to reflect some of those possibilities - 'the enactment 
of the legal process', 'the perpetuation of myths about children', or 'the 
assertion of power in the courtroom'. However because of my concern 
with the possible effects of language upon the victim I pursued the 
research problem and created conclusions in those terms.
I have not claimed any supra legal status for children. Rather I would 
claim that because of their less powerful position and the forceful effect 
of words on them, child victim witnesses are being treated as sub legal 
entities. Being powerless and the subject of verbal batterings are by no 
means the sole province of children, abused or otherwise, but the issue 
is most discernible with this particular group of society’s victims. What 
is done to these children in court is done in the name of the defendant's 
welfare. The adversarial nature of criminal proceedings is responsible 
for the child's powerlessness.
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This study creates some critical space for the further consideration of 
the welfare of the child in the context of court, and a reappraisal of that 
context. The children who find themselves in court are neither accusers 
in the traditional adult sense, nor bystanders to the activities of others. 
They are young people who have asked for help and protection and in 
so doing have brought down upon themselves all the force and scrutiny 
of combat.
To accommodate a concern for the welfare of children in court whilst 
preserving the rights of the defendants, there have recently been a 
number of measures discussed and tried. They include the use of 
screens in court, replaying in court interviews held elsewhere and using 
closed circuit video devices. Whatever the efficacy or advisability of 
these measures there remains the issue of language which confuses and 
denies.
Because the language of court is so strange to children, the use of a 
translator could be justified. However no single response will 
accommodate the concerns of this study. The meanings and effects of 
language come from a number of sources and any response to the 
problem should recognise this. A total change to the court environment 
could be advocated as well as a total reform of language in court 
proceedings. The basic recommendation is not conceptually complex - 
children and alleged victims should be allowed to tell their own stories 
in their own language, supported by other methods of communicating 
sense and meaning. If the court cannot accept this adjustment then the 
child is entitled to a translator. If neither of these adjustments can be 
made then the evidence of this study suggests that the child will remain 
unheard. There is no doubt that children's knowledge remains virtually 
untapped and unexploited even by the prosecution. Strange and 
obfuscating language is not a feature only of cross examination. 
Sympathetic prosecutors fail to make the adjustments required to enable 
children to respond sensibly to questions asked.
Inappropriate language is a barrier which stands in the way of child 
victim witnesses saying what they might. An appreciation of the 
strangeness and its effects should equip prosecutors to help their 
witnesses present themselves more fully, and magistrates and judges to 
hold in check the linguistic excesses of cross examiners. Police are 
reluctant to prosecute on behalf of young children because of the 
treatment they get in court, and magistrates refuse to set cases for trial 
because they believe the primary witness would not stand the rigours of 
the trial. Yet other ways of collecting evidence, asking questions, cross 
referencing stories and ascertaining truth remain unexploited by the 
courts.
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The young and the slow are increasingly vulnerable:
There are four main reasons why prosecution in these cases is 
difficult. First, adults are often sceptical when children report 
having been molested. Second, many lay and professional people 
believe that sexual abuse is caused by a mental disorder, and 
therefore that the mental health system, not the criminal justice 
system, is the proper forum for dealing with the matter. Third, 
many fear that children will be traumatised by taking part in such 
legal proceedings and hence be further victimised. Fourth, many 
prosecutors do not want to undertake cases that rest heavily on the 
testimony of child victims because they fear that the child will not be 
able to perform adequately as a witness.
(Berliner & Barbieri, 1984: 126)
The more strange or denying the examining environment, the more 
likely it is that these fears will be realised.
When there is no evidence of physical injury and there is no other 
corroborating evidence, the case comes down to an issue of child versus 
adult in a legal context which is more appropriate for the adult than the 
child. Currently available statistics indicate '... there is no indication of 
physical injury to 171 (76.7%) of the 223 complainants' (Cashmore and 
Horsky, 1987:26).
Given these figures it is necessary for the judicial system to create a new 
category of evidence which is admissible in court and which safeguards 
the interests of this large population of children who sustain no obvious 
physical signs of assault. There is a need for the admission of expert 
advice on the identification of indicators of sexual assault other than the 
purely observable ones. The verbal assaults evident in many of the 
proceedings reviewed, and their continued endorsement, stand in the 
way of any progress in this direction.
The claim by a community health counsellor th a t'... there is more in 
the system to stop kids talking than to keep them going' is sustainable. 
The situation is even more critical for young and less verbal children 
who need, and can ably take advantage of, the opportunity to display 
what they know in a variety of ways. The use of anatomical dolls, 
drawings, interviews and assessments are all forms of creating messages 
to either supplement, support or refute verbal testimony. The 
courtroom does not generally allow for these non-verbal representations 
by the child.
Children are persistent and tenacious language users and pursue sense 
and meaning with vigour, they are not frail in this respect. However 
when their efforts to create and respond to meaning are discriminated 
against, their youth and social inexperience become critical factors. 
There is little evidence to suggest that their vulnerability is regarded by
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the court as requiring any adjustments through language. Victimisation, 
immaturity and vulnerability are met with time lapses, disbelief, and 
intimidation. The denying language of cross examination fits well in the 
stable of social and circumstantial punishments.
7.7 CONCLUSION
Given the power and significance of language in determining the 
position, definition and fate of the individual in relation to others, it is 
interesting to note that the issue is often missing from documents and 
investigations which have reform and critique as their focus. 
Architecture, setting, and physical confrontation of the accused are 
considered more significant than language.
The observed maltreatment of child victim witnesses has drawn a 
variety of responses from workers in the field of law and law reform. 
These responses have ranged from protection of the defence counsels' 
right to do whatever is necessary to further their own client's cause, to 
calls for the introduction of video technology to insulate children from 
the exposure of the open courtroom. None of these recognise the 
centrality of language activity and its manipulation to further the needs 
of adversarial combat.
Amongst these responses lies my own decision to settle on aspects of 
language as a measure of the perceived inequity. That decision was 
based on the moral premises that firstly, the child has the right to be 
protected from abusive adult behaviour in both private and public 
contexts; and secondly that language behaviour itself, where it is seen to 
contribute to such abuse, should be exposed and held in check.
Specifically because the processes of criminal law are established to hold 
in check the excesses and infringements of others, to critique those 
processes is problematic to say the least.
The deconstruction of the myth that the process of law is grounded in 
the pursuit of truth begins when the processes which law purports to 
uphold are shown not to operate. What can be observed in the language 
of cross examination of victim witnesses is a discourse which underpins 
the raw expression of power; where the central pursuit is the 
establishment of control over meaning; where language is used as an 
instrument of domination created by the elimination of the expression of 
experience of the child victim witness. It is both problematic and 
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Understanding children's lies
Lying by children is rated by parents, teachers and clinicians as one of the 
most serious of child behaviour problems. Behaviour that may sometimes be 
only 'child's-play' can have serious consequences in the court-room battles 
of the adult world.
Not just child's-play. These cards of court room scenes help prepare children for court
In criminal court cases, particularly those dealing with child sexual as­sault, concern runs high about the reliability of child witness testimony.
Dr Kav Bussey, senior lecturer in psy­
chology at Macquarie, began research 
on children's lying and truth-telling 
three years ago as part of a study aimed 
at preparing children for court.
The major question arising out of Dr 
Bussey’s observations of court proceed­
ings during the study concerned the 
reasons whv children, as witnesses, 
often fail to perform successfully in 
court.
Children's evidence, she points out, 
js  often refuted as invalid by judges or 
defence counsels holding the belief that 
children cannot distinguish fabrication 
from the truth. Such cases are then dis­
missed from the court.
Child witnesses in court also deny 
testimony presented by them prior to 
the court hearing says Dr Bussey. Thus 
a child who has been abused may say 
months later, when the case finally 
reaches the courts, that 'it didnt 
happen'.
In cases involving sexual abuse, kid­
napping or domestic violence, the child 
is often the sole victim and witness of 
an event. It is in these hearings that the 
debate concerning lying or truth-telling 
in children becomes a crucial element 
in the outcome of a case.
Increasing numbers of children are 
required to provide testimony as wit­
nesses in court. Until recently, however, 
most of the major research examining 
children's capacity for truth-telling had 
been conducted more than 50 years ago. 
Research conducted by Jean Piaget in­
dicates that children lie more or less as
. . .  (they) play'. This evidence underlies 
the arguments of many of those who 
question the veracity of children's tes­
timony.
Dr Bussey's findings throw a shadow 
of doubt on Piaget's conclusion that chil­
dren cannot distinguish the truth from 
a lie. She maintains that Piaget's 
research 'seriously underestimates 
younger children's competence' in this 
area.
Current research at Macquarie indi­
cates that children can provide 'accurate 
and useful' evidence to a court hearing
by at least seven years of age. Pre­
schoolers' accuracy rate in identifying 
lies from truth is still good — 'about 85 
per cent', Dr Bussey says.
Children from a young age, it is ar­
gued, can tell the truth. Dr Bussey's po­
sition on whether or not children will 
tell the truth is equally clear. 'No age 
group has a monopoly on honesty' — 
even adults may lie in court. However, 
as the study reveals, the motivation be­
hind children's lies differs from that of
(continued on page 2)
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Sexually-abused children 'lie* to courts out of fear
The court system should be changed to encourage children to give truthful evidence in 
sexual assault and other cases, according to a leading Sydney Psychologist.
Senior lecturer in psychology at Macquarie University, Dr Kay Bussey, believes evidence 
given by children in sexual assault an similar cases is too often dism issed as invalid 
because the court questions the veractity o f their testimony.
Dr Bussey, whose three-year, Australian Research Council funded study on children's 
lying habits was prompted by these concerns, said children as young as seven can provide 
"accurate and useful" court evidence.
"Children can tell the truth but we need to have a court structure that would allow them to 
tell the truth," she said.
"One day in court I saw a case where the father was charged with abusing the child, but by 
the time that case got to court the child had recanted the evidence."
"She was saying it didn't happen because she realised the repercussions were enormous."
One problem was that children often retracted initial evidence becasue they were afraid of 
the repercussions.
As the child was often the sole victim  and witness of sexual abuse, kidnapping and 
eomestic violence, their honesty in such cases was crucial.
Dr Bussey Advocates a system in which children would give evidence on vidio in a relaxed 
and friendly atmosphere, and most importantly, away from any eye-contact with the 
defendant.
by Bronwyn McNulty (The Australian 3/10/89)
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Children learn to lie 
-and well-
at an early age: Study
Sydney - Children learn to lie at a much earlier age than most people realise, according to 
a new United States study.
The researchers also found that young children were "highly persuasive" liars, and that 
girls were more likely than boys to deceive.
Reported in the latest Australian Dr W eekly magazine, they said this could reflect that girls 
were more likely to feel shame after doing something naughty and thus more likely to deny 
the act
"Evidence that females are more interested in social approval suggests they deceive so as 
not to displease an experimenter and, possibly, to avoid punishment," the researchers said.
"These results indicate that very young children have begun to learn how to mask their 
emotional expressions and support the role o f socialisation in this process."
The study, conducted jointly at the Institute for the Study o f Child Development and the 
University o f  M edicine and Dentistry in N ew  Jersey, involved 15 boys and 18 girls, all 
aged about three.
They were individually videotaped while sitting alone in a room, after having being told not 
to peek at a toy on a table behind them.
(The Daily Advertiser)
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Researchers lift lid on the ancient art of lying
When the truth hurts, we bend it
The world is full of liars, and that's no lie. Children are told that it's wrong to lie, but are 
taught how as part of their survival package for life. So, what is wrong becomes right.
Despite its paradoxical and bedevilling character, lying is one o f the most under-researched 
areas o f the human condition. But that is about to change.
Professor John Barnes, a sociologist with the Australian National University in Canberra, 
is considering writing a book on lying; Dr Candida Peterson, a senior lecturer in 
psychology at Murdoch University in Perth, is now looking at lying trends in China; and 
Dr Kay Bussey, a psychologist at Macquarie University in Sydney, has just made lying 
topical again with her findings from a three-year study.
Dr Bussey started her research because she was curious about the perception of children as 
liars. "That reputation has ben one of the factors that has been impeding children acting as 
witnesses in court cases," she explained. "The judiciary is concerned that they will 
undermine the integrity o f the court because they lie so much . . .  children in the age group 
three to five rarely get into the witness stand because of judges' perceptions that they are 
lying."
Dr Bussey has concluded from her work that adults are more adept liars than children. 
However, by learning to mask their true emotions through card and board games like 
Monopoly, youngsters can learn to become more successful in the art.
Dr Bussey said the testimony of young children in sexual assault cases was often not taken 
seriously as the defence counsel and judge could call into question the child's capacity to 
tell the truth.
"What I have concluded is that rather than children not being credible witnesses, they are 
not credible liars," she said. "Adults are much better liars. The fact that children are much 
more likely to be found out means they are more easily labelled as liars."
Sociology Professor John Barnes argued that lying was often essential to save us from 
potentially embarrassing or damaging situations. To teach children to bend the truth is an 
integral part o f their socialisation. "It can be very embarrassing when children say 
something which is true but which is offensive," he explained.
Professor Barnes has been titillated by the subject since he attended a conference on lying 
in Sydney six years ago. His research has focused on differences between one culture and 
another in their attitudes to lying.
"Some cultures like Ireland and Greece have much more productive liars than others," he 
observed. And Australia? "(It’s) not doing too badly. They are good liars. My argument 
would be that you cannot run society without a certain amount of lying going on. Nothing 
but the truth would be horrendous."
A white lie has always been regarded as the harmless variety of the species. But it has 
never really been defined. "A lie is treated as white if it is regarded in the culture as
acceptable," said Professor Barnes. "But a lie which may appear white to one person may 
be black to another."
In her book, ’Lying: Moral Choices in Public and Private Life', author F Bok defined 
lying as "an intentionally deceptive message in the form o f a statement". In her years o f 
research into the subject, Dr Candida Peterson has found that the interpretation of what 
constitutes a lie differs widely.
In one Australian study, she found that 38 per cent of five-year olds considered swearing 
as a lie. This finding was consistent with the conclusions o f Jean Piaget, a French 
psychologist who did extensive research into lying in the 1930s. Even then children 
reported that to tell a lie was to say something naughty.
One of the more interesting aspects of Dr Peterson’s work was the number who considered 
exaggeration to be a lie. In one example, a child who over-estimated the size of a chicken 
chasing her - she compared it to an elephant - was believed by most of the children 
questioned to be telling a lie. More surprising, however, was that half o f the adults 
questioned also believed her to be lying.
It is generally accepted that most children lie to avoid punishment. Dr Bussey, in her 
research, pointed out that in sexual abuse cases children often knew that they would be 
punished by the accused if they told the truth, so they lied to avoid severe punishment
"In this case, children don't have the option of telling the truth. This is true for many 
everyday examples of lying. To tell the truth is worse than to lie," she said.
Dr Bussey argued that just knowing that lying was wrong was not enough to encourage 
truth-telling. Children needed to be made to feel good when they told the truth and 
censured when they didn't. " . . .  it is our own reactions of self-censure for lying and 
feelings of pride for truth-telling that will lead us to be truth-tellers rather than liars," she 
observed.
by Muriel Reddy (The Sunday Age) 22 October 1989
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more Hhoty to bo found out means They are good Uars. My argument 
they m s  e i »  eaMly lgbelled a s |ia (|.w| f ’would be that you cannot run society
she sai
without a certain amount of iy3ng i 
lng on. Nothing but the truth would 
horrendous."
A white lie has always been rega 
ed as the harmless variety of the si 
cies. But it has never really be 
defined. “A lie is treated as white i 
is regarded in the culture as acce 
able,” said Professor Barnes. "Bu 
lie which may appear white to t 
person may be black to another."
In her book, ‘Lying: Moral Chci< 
In Public and Private Life’, author 
Bok defined lying as "an Imtcnticr. a 
deceptive message in the form o: 
statement”. In her years of resea i 
into the subject. Dr Candida Peters 
has found that the interpretation 
what constitutes a lie differs wide!
In one Australian study, she feu 
that 38 per cent of five-year-olds c<
Behavior
Why Children Lie in Court____
New research shows how the power o f suggestion can lead U.S. 
youngsters to say things that send innocent adults to jail
By JEROME CRAMER WASHINGTON
T he poignant scene is played out time and again in America’s courtrooms. A  
small, bewildered child sits in a witness 
chair, being led by an attorney through 
shocking testimony. The youngster speaks 
haltingly o f unspeakable things done to 
him or her by a stranger, a baby-sit­
ter or even a parent. Could such an 
innocent soul possibly be telling any­
thing but the truth?
Most legal experts, child psychi­
atrists—and ju ries —have long  
thought that children rarely lie 
about sex-abuse crimes on the wit­
ness stand. On the strength of that 
assumption, many adults in the U.S. 
have been sent to jail for sexual abuse or 
other charges, professing all the way that 
they are not guilty. But evidence is mount­
ing that children, particularly those who 
have been extensively coached, give inac­
curate testimony far more often than pre­
viously imagined. Both research studies 
and courtroom experience are causing 
many U.S. psychiatrists to question their 
views of the reliability of what comes from 
the mouths of babes.
A stunning piece of evidence came 
late last year when a California ap­
peals court overturned the convic­
tions of three men and four women 
for m olestin g  10 ch ildren . The 
adults had maintained their inno­
cence but were sentenced to a com­
bined total o f  2,619 j^ars in prison 
The case fell apart, and the adults 
were freed when three of the chil­
dren later recanted their testimony 
and the state attorney genera’s of­
fice criticized the way prosecutors 
had allegedly manipulated the chil­
dren’s testimony.
Recent research has shown how 
easy it is for youngsters to stray un­
wittingly from the truth. Psycholo­
gists Karen Saywitz o f Harbor-UCLA 
Medical Center and Gail Goodman 
of the State University of New York 
at Buffalo interviewed 72 girls, ages 
5 and 7, about routine medical pro­
cedures they had received. Half 
were given full examinations, in­
cluding anal and vaginal checks, and 
the rest were given just general phy­
sicals. When the first group was 
asked a broad question about what 
had happened, only eight men­
tioned the vaginal examinations,
and when the children were shown ana­
tomically correct dolls, six pointed to the 
vaginal area. But o f the girls who received 
only a general checkup, three claimed they 
had also had vaginal or anal exams. One 
child even reported that “the doctor did it 
with a stick.”
Child-custody disputes are often the
Prodded by prosecutors, kids 
often make unfounded sex- 
abuse charges. This is 
“the atomic bomb of 
child-custody fights."
trigger for youngsters’ unwitting lies. Suspi­
cions can cause parents to launch what legal 
scholar Douglas Besharov of Washington’s 
American Enterprise Institute calls “the 
atomic bomb of child-custody fights, the 
charge of sex abuse.” In these stressful situ­
ations, children quickly discover what 
adults want to hear and can offer lies or dis­
tortions in order to please an anxious parent 
or social worker. A  study conducted by the 
American Academy of Child Psychiatry 
found that in custody disputes involving
charges of sex abuse, as many as 36% of the 
allegations were later proved to be untrue.
R esearch by p sych olog ist A lison  
Garke-Stewart of the University o f Cali­
fornia at Irvine illustrates how easily adults 
can sway children’s perceptions. In that 
study 75 five- and six-year-old children 
were asked to watch a man clean up a 
room. During that time, he picked up and 
cleaned a doll. Later an interviewer told 
the children she thought the man had been 
playing with the doll. When first ques­
tioned, 25% of the kids said the man had 
played with the doll, and the rest said he 
had cleaned it  The interviewer then told 
the children she was certain that the man 
had been playing with, not cleaning, 
the doll. In the end, all but two chil­
dren accepted the interviewer’s story 
as the truth.
Misleading questions by adults 
can cause children not just to lie but 
also to believe their falsehoods. 
Besharov rites the case of a three- 
year-old who told a social worker a 
story about a piece o f candy being 
dropped into her underpants. After inter­
views by various child-protection workers, 
the story evolved into a tale that a candle 
had been inserted into the child’s vagina. It 
took months of further interviews to discov­
er that the original story had been correct 
The current methods for obtaining evi­
dence in sex-abuse cases—direct question­
ing and the use of dolls with sex organs— 
are under fire. “Kids can be fed ideas they 
quickly come to believe are true, and these 
dolls are highly suggestive,” says Lenore 
Terr, a professor of psychology at the 
§ University of California at San Fran­
I cisco. For example, some of the dolls 
I lack hands and have only painted 
3 eyes, yet they have highly explicit 
I genital areas. Terr stresses that nor­
* mally inquisitive children who play 
with these dolls can mistakenly be 
suspected of having been abused  
The controversy is sure to escalate 
soon, when the American Psychologi­
cal Association publishes a book 
called The Suggestibility o f  Children's 
Recollections, in which several experts 
question the truthfulness of kids’ testi­
mony. The ARA- will not allow out­
siders an advance look, but a psychol­
ogist involved in the project says the 
book shows that “there are definite 
limits to our knowledge about wheth­
er children are telling the truth.”
What these researchers and oth­
ers are finding is that truth for a child 
can be blurred, especially in periods 
o f stress, such as during a trial. To 
protect children from sex crimes— 
and adults from unfounded accusa­
tio n s—child-welfare workers and 
prosecutors will have to take special 
care when searching for the truth. ■
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A CASE STUDY
SUBJECT : Jason 
D.O.B. : 3.9.81
CARE & PROTECTION ORDER : 21.3.84
Placed with foster parents, H and S of Town X
Jason was the victim of a number of sodomy offences by 
his mother's defacto C, while he was in his mother's care 
in Town Z from late 1986 to early 1987. He was 
subsequently placed with his father, R of Town X. This 
placement broke down because of physical abuse by his father.
Jason was then placed with his two younger sisters in 
foster care on 3 August 1987. It is envisaged that this 
will be a permanent placement. Jason has had multiple 
placement changes but has settled in very well with the family.
In October 1987, this office was contacted by the Crown 
Prosecutors office, requesting that Jason be a witness in 
the crown case against C. To prepare Jason for this 
rather traumatic episode his foster mother and I spoke to 
him on a number of occasions to reassure him that C would 
never hurt him again and that the incidents were not his 
fault. During this period Jason frequently soiled his 
pants and seemed generally anxious.
I accompanied Jason and his foster mother to the Crown 
Law Office to see Q on 20 November 1987. Q prepared 
Jason as best as possible and talked to him about how he 
would be like a 'star on a stage' in court. Jason 
responded well to this. Q was also made aware of Jason's 
anxieties about the court procedure.
We were requested to have Jason at Town Z Court House on 
3 December 1987 at approximately 9 a.m. To avoid having 
Jason accidently meet the offender or his mother before 
court, the staff placed S, Jason and I in a small court 
room. We waited in this room until approximately 12 p.m.
- Jason becoming increasingly agitated with the passing 
hours.
We were allowed to take Jason for a drive until 1.45 p.m. 
When we returned we were placed in another small room. 
Jason, being very tired and frustrated, fell asleep on 
the floor.
Jason was finally called into the court room at 3.30 p.m. 
His foster mother was allowed to sit about ten feet from
him. There were approximately thirty strangers in the 
court room (including 12 jurors).
Considering that Jason is only six years old, he did 
quite well in the witness box. Q demonstrated very early 
in the process that Jason had not mastered the concept of 
time - hours, days, weeks, months or years.
Unfortunately the defence lawyer tried unnecessarily to 
further confuse Jason regarding time.
Jason had been "practising" his story before court but 
occasionally needed prompting to say the words 'penis' 
and 'bottom'. He was too embarassed to say these words 
in front of a room full of strangers. Although Jason 
could not be asked leading questions, it was a shame that 
the questioning did not proceed at a more child oriented 
pace.
After Jason had been on the stand for about twenty 
minutes his voice started to fade, and he got restless. 
There was no microphone for him to use, so he was 
continually being prompted to repeat himself. This upset 
the flow of events for Jason.
During the cross-examination Jason was questioned about 
his family circumstances. It was a shame that the court 
had not been made aware that Jason has three families 
(i.e. his foster family, his father's family and mother's 
family) because it seemed to the court that Jason was 
very confused. Jason actually made a lot of sense 
considering his many placement changes - but it did not 
seem so to the court.
Towards the end of the 1.5 hour long court appearance, 
the defence lawyer accused Jason of being a liar. This 
could have been done without distressing Jason - for 
instance, by asking if he knew what happens when people 
don't tell the truth, etc.
In summary, the judicial process very much worked against 
the child - victim in this circumstance. The end result 
was that the offender was acquitted and Jason was 
traumatised. Some of the process could not be avoided 
given the present legal arrangements for child witnesses.
I was mostly concerned about the huge time delay and the 
manner with which the defence lawyer was 'allowed' to 
address Jason.
<< This case study was provided by a 
country-based care worker who is 
unable to attend the seminar, but 
wished to have this made available 
for participants' consideration >>
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CHILD AT RISK SUB COMMITTEE MEETING - HELD 8TH FEBRUARY
AT VAGGA DISTRICT CENTRE AT 11.30 A.M.
P R E S E N T : Mark Brennan, Robert Stone, Kathy Sharpe, Barb Howard.
A P O L O G I E S : Kathryn Peters.
It was decided to:-
1) Examine cases of intellectually handicapped children that had not 
. proceeded to/or succeeded at court because of the children.
2) Make recommendations that would assist these cases to proceed. 
This would include such things as
a) Children's oath age.
b) Means of communication - possibly an interpreter.
c) Tools that could be used, include dolls, screens, pictures.
B. Howard 
MINUTE TAKER.
CHILD AT RISK COMMITTEE MEETING
15.2.89 - 11.30 A.M.
AGENDA :
1 . Apologies.
2. Report on sub-committee meeting re submission on legal represnetation 
for children with intellectual disabilities.
3. Request from Malcolm Beveridge - Magistrate Dubbo - Mark to reports 
A. Educational segment - John Hall.
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CHILD AT RISK COMMITTEE MEETING - HELD AT '
’ ON 15.2.33 AT 11.3C VAGGA DISTRICT CENTRE
PRESEN' Eileen Knox, Anne Cooney, Mark Brennan, Jim Humphries, 
Fran Beechan, Bernice Reid.
APOLOGIES : Community Health - Kathy Sharpe.
MATTERS ARISING:
-• Discussion was r.e_d re the submission to the Child Protection Council 
on physical abuse and neglect of children. Kathy Sharpe has arranged 
a series of meetings with professionals in Vagga and Jillian Calbert 
from Child Protection Council.
-. Report given by Mark and Barb re the sub committee meeting on legal 
representation for children with intellectual disabilities. It was 
agreed that a 3 month time frame should be sent and a letter sent that 
we are preparing a submission. Three cases have been identified and 
court transcripts are being obtained and will be examined closely.
3. Mark reported Malcolm Beveridge, Magistrate at Dubbo requested details 
of special requirements for children k m  courts. He was interested in 
screens, or anything else that the committee could suggest. Anne and 
Mark to draft a letter in reply.
4. Mark reported that an International Conference was to be held at 
Selwyn College Cambridge. June 26-28 1989 on Children's Evidence in 
Legal Proceedings. (Please see enclosed details).
5. Guest speaker John Hall from public prosecutions presented a very 
informative talk cn what the prosecutions has to consider before a 
court hearing. John kindly gave us his notes to circulate to other 
members who we:- unable to attend - please see enclosed notes.
6. Next meeting 29*b Marcn, 11.30 at Vagga District Centre.
Future meeting date:, for the year are:-













QUESTIONS FOR ELEVEN YEAR OLDS. 
SELECTIVE LAWYER QUESTIONS
1. That's not quite correct is it, you had been out with him before let 
me assist you, you have been to the Sturt Mall with Peter and your 
brother Ted on a number of occasions before going to school in the 
morning hadn't you?
2. Remember that you told us before lunch break that you had never 
been out with Fred before this particular day, 8th of August do you 
remember saying that before lunch, do you remember or do you 
not?
3. Now there was another time when you went out with Fred and 
your brother apart from the Sturt Mall and that was to Cronulla 
Beach do you recall that, can't give you a date but in July about a 
month or so before the 8th of August, Fred took you and your 
brother to Cronulla Beach do you remember that?
4. I put it to you that those conversations on the Monday and Tuesday 
that I have spoken to you about, he said to you "I am working”. 
What do you say to that?
5. Now he is suggesting some other things to you that might I suppose 
remind you that might have happened now I suppose it is hard to 
understand why he says these things to you when you say it didn't 
happen, that's hard to understand isn’t it, but he is allowed to do 
these things and if you say it didn’t happen, all you have to do is 
say no, okay or if it did say yes, now do you follow that?
5. How far away from your front door were you or from the front 
gate of your house when you got into the car? Two or three houses 
away or six houses or whereabouts was it?
7. Now when you reached the start of the rocks just when Fred held 
your hand and started to help you over there, do you recall how 
long it was before you got to the little cave area?
8. Now do you say that whatever it was that happened, or whatever it 
was that happened to you and Sue, you were in the kitchen at the 
time and you obviously heard something did you?
9. Yes if you would have a look at this document, is that the statement 
that you made to the Principal and that you referred to before 
giving your evidence today and that you signed?
10. Well I know, I understand what you have been talking about to her 
today but you see what I am asking you is this, that statement 
suggests that you said those things that you are now say are wrong 
to the Principal. Now did you say it to the Principal or did you 
not?
11. Well you are not sure whether you said those things to the 
Principal which are wrong?
12. Well on the week before you made this statement to the Principal 
you said that one night you were in the kitchen?
13. All right so between his patting you and his attempt or his trying to 
put his squash racquet in your bag there was nothing else is that 
right?
14. Yes so he sat down beside you and started talking about football 
and then he started tickling you and then what happened next in the 
sequence, do you understand?
15> You have got a distinct recollection of seeing Judy coming into the 
room have you?
15. This terrible thing happening to you, if there was someone else 
there you’d remember it wouldn't you?
17. Well what do you mean you can't remember, this is something 
you'd remember, you’ve just told the teacher, that's the instructor, 
that if Judy had been present that’d be something you'd remember, 
do you remember saying that earlier?
18. Well that would be something you'd remember wouldn't it, you see 
the position is I suggest to you you're not telling the truth?
19. You read through this statement a day or so after you made it and 
there was nothing wrong with it, is that right?
20. See we went through the sequence of what happened and how you 
stayed in bed and your father went out, he went downstairs, do you 
remember all those questions?
COUNSELLOR QUESTIONS
1. Do you know why you are here?
2. Where was your Mum when it happened?
3. How many times did it happen?
4. When did it happen?
5. How did you feel?
RANDOM LAWYER QUESTIONS
1. You went for a swim there I am putting to you at Cronulla Beach?
2. Well I am not concerned with what your Father does or dosen't 
allow you to do I am concerned with what you actually did?
3. I will put this to you that on Wednesday afternoon that's the 7th of 
August, that's the day before the Thursday at about half past three 
in the afternoon you telephoned the place where Frank was living, 
what do you say to that?
4. You do realise or do you realise the important position Fred is in at 
the moment?
5. You do understand the importance of telling the truth don't you?
5. Are you denying that it happened?
7. Was it a long time or a short time?
8. All right. Well what is the next thing you recall happening as 
regards Sue?
9. And you indicate as you walk on your right hand side is the 
doorway that lead into the bathroom?
10. So where is the doorway of the bathroom?
11. Just so, you have drawn two drawings, on the left hand side is a 
larger version, on the right hand side is a smaller version, is that
right?
12. Whose address is it in Garland Street?
13. And what did she say to you?
14. Did Sue tell you what she told her Mother?
15. Well, were you saying anything?
15. And you say you got in?
17. And between the first time and this time had you slept in your 
Mother's bed on a number of occasions in the meantime?
18. After these things happened did you go in September of this year, 
did you go to see a doctor, were you examined by a doctor?
19. It went in a little way is that right?
20. The first time this terrible thing happened to you, do you 
remember that?
TEACHER QUESTIONS
1. Can you explain to me the way you think the eyes work?
2. Could you tell me about what happens at school on Fridays?
3. What happens when Daddy comes home from work?
4. What sort of things do you usually do on weekends?
5. What do you remember about the last school holidays?
Appendix 4
Transcript of Beverley's committal hearing
BENCH
1. Q Beverley how old are you? A. Thirieen.
2. Q D o you go to school? A. Yes.
3. Q. What school do you go to? A. Eastridge High.
4. Q And what class are you in? A. Year 7.
5. 0 And who is your Teacher? A. Miss Harste, Miss Halliday, Mr. 
Eco and Miss Spencer.
6. Q That is for all the different subjects you have is it? A. Yes.
7. Q And do you know what a Bible is? A. Yes.
8. Q What is a Bible? A. It tells you all about God, Jesus an d .....
9. Q And do you know what an oath is to tell the truth on the Bible?
A. Yes.
10. Q What do you understand that to mean? A. Not lie
11. Q. And what happens if  you do tell a lie? A. You get punished for it.
12. Q. Yes, thank you. I am satisfied the person is competent.
9
PROSECUTOR
14. Q Beverley will you tell the Court your full name, what is your full 
name? A. Beverley May Courtney.
15. Q And at the moment are you residing at the Children's Centre? A.
Yes.
16. Q. You are a School girl? A. Yes.
17. Q D o you still go to Pankhurst High School? A. No.
18. Q What School do you go to now? A. Eastridge High.
19. Q Beverley, is the person before the Court, David Courtney, known 
to you? A. Pardon.
20. Q D o you know David Courtney? A. Yes.
21. Q And to your knowledge was he married to your mother? A. Yes.
22. Q Were you present when that marriage ceremony took place? A. I
don’t get what you mean.
23. Q Were you there when they were married? A. I think so.
MR. MANNERS: Sorry, did not hear what Beverley said. A. 1 said 1 think so.
PROSECUTOR. 
24 Q. Did you used to live in Horsley with your mother and David? A.
25. Q
Yes.
Did you also live with your brothers and sisters? A. Yes.
26. Q Were they John who is fifteen years o f  age, fifteen years o f  age,
27. Q.
Greta, Ray and your twin sister Sonia? A. And Mary.
How old do you believe you are at the moment? A. Thirteen.
28. Q D o you recall before living at Horsley you lived at Crowley and
29. Q.
about that time you were in Sixth Grade at School? A. Yes.
D o you remember an occasion when you were in Sixth Grade,
30. Q
around your birthday? A. Yes.
At that time were you living at 19 Morrow Street Crowley? A. (No
31. Q.
verbal answer).
Can you remember an evening during - withdraw that. Can you
32. Q
remember an evening when you were in your bedroom asleep?
A. Yes.
Did something happen between you and your stepfather? A. Yes.
33. Q Did he enter your bedroom? A. Yes.
34. Q What happened then? A. Then he walked into my room and......
35. Q Walked into your room and what happened? A. Took my
36. Q
knickers down.
How were you dressed at that stage? A. I was in my nightie and I
37. Q
had my nickers....
You say he took your nickers down, what room were you in at that
38. 0-
stage? A. I was in with Sonia.
Sorry? A. 1 was in the room up the end.
39. Q Did you share that room with anyone else? A. Yes, Sonia.
40. Q. D o you know where your mother was at that stage? A. 1 think she
41. Q
was at Aunty Margaret’s I think.
When he took your knickers down did he say anything? A. Yes.
42. Q What did he say? A. He said “This won't hurt’’..
43. Q Did you feel anything? Were you frightened? A. Yes.
44. Q What happened then? A. When he fingered me.
45. Q When you say he fingered you Beverley can you tell the Court
46. Q
exactly what he did? A. He put his finger into my vagina. 
Did you say anything to him? A. No, I just screamed.
MR. MANNERS: Sorry, 1 did not hear that.
PROSECUTOR: ... just screamed.
47. Q. Did you scream out? A. Not very loud. 
M R. MANNERS: Sorry, I cannot hear her.
W h y  d o e s n Y h e  a s k  “ D o  y o u  knou 
D a v i d  C o u r t n e y ?  A n d  is h e  in  c o u r t ’' "
" i f  th is  q u e s t io n  is  n e c e s s a ry .  * h \
d o e s n  Y h e  s a y  " .....as  f a r  as  y o u
k n o w . . .  ".
B o t h  t h e  “ P a r d o n  "  a n d  th e  " I  d o n  Y g e t  
w h a t  y o u  m e a n ” a r e  a  c o n s e q u e n c e  o f  
t h e  w a y  s h e  is  a s k e d  t h e  q u e s t io n s .
H e  d o e s n  Y a c k n o w le d g e  h e r  
c o n t r i b u t io n .
T h e r e  a r e  t h r e e  q u a l i f i e r s  in s id e  th e  
q u e s t i o n .?
W h o ?  W h a t ?
( D o  y o u  k n o w  w h a t  I  k n o w  y o u  t h in k  
I ' m  t a lk in g  a b o u t? )
T h e  q u e s t io n  s e e m s  t o  “ s p e c ify  " ... b u t  
b y  im p l i c a t io n .
W h o ?
T h is  c o n s t r u c t io n  e l im in a t e s  a g e n c y .  
N o - o n e  d i d  a n y t h in g .  I t  h a p p e n e d .
I n t e r r u p e d .  B e v e r ly  is n o t  a l lo w e d  t o  
f in is h
W h a t  d o e s  th is  m e a n ?  W h a t  is  th e  t im e  
f r a m e  b e in g  i m p l ie d ?
W h a t  is  th e  " s t a g e " r e f e r r i n g  t o n T h e  
t im e  o f  n ig h t ?  L i v in g  in  C r o » J e y 't  
W h e n  a b u s e  s t a r te d ?
A  m ic r o p h o n e  w o u ld  b e  h a n d y .
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BENCH: Not very loud. A. Not very loud.
PROSECUTOR
48. Q Yes, then what happened? A. Then he went out o f the room.
49. Q How was he dressed on that occasion? A. He had his, he had 
jeans, shoes and a shirt on.
50. Q Beverley do you know what the term penis is, what is a penis? A.
It’sa d o o v er .
Is  t h e  q u e s t io n  a b o u t  t h e  t e r m  o r  th e  
t h i n g ?
51. Q. Right, it is part o f  a male or a female body? A. A male. S h e  m o v e s  f r o m  s i n g u l a r  to  c o l le c t  n e
52. Q- And whereabouts is it? A. Between their legs.
53. Q When you were living at Crowley did something happen with 
David's penis? A. Oh....
T h is  is a  d i s t a n t  w a y  o f  t a l k i n g  a b o u t  
a n  i n t i m a t e  h a p p e n in g .
54. Q Did he visit your bedroom on any other occasion? A. No.
55. Q What did you feel when he fingered you on the occasion you told 
the Court about? A. Scared.
Q u ic k  c h a n g e  in  t h e  ty p e s  o f  
i n f o r m a t i o n  b e in g  s o u g h t
56. Q Did you feel any pain? A. Yes.
57. Q When you screamed did he say anything to you? A. No.
58. Q Did you do anything when he left the room? A ...... (inaudible)
toilet.
59. Q D o you know where Sonia was at that stage? A. No. ...... o f  t h e  n ig h t? . . .  "
60. Q Was she in the room? A. No.
61. Q Did anything else happen when you were living at Crowley? A.
Yes.
62. Q When was that? A. I think two nights, two nights away from the 
first time.
63. Q. Before or after? A. After. “.4 way f r o m  th e  H r s t  t im e . . . .  " m u s t
64. Q What happened on that occasion? A. He rooted me. e q u a l  “ a f t e r " .
BENCH: I’m sorry, 1 know it is terribly hard, but you’ve got a soft voice, 
could you just raise it a little bit, just take your time. A. Yes.
PROSECUTOR:
The answer was “he rooted me”. Your Worship.
/ w o n d e r  w h a t  B e v e r lv  t h in k s  o f  th is
BENCH: c o n v e r s a t io n .
Thank you.













Where were you when he rooted you? A. In his bedroom. T h e r e  is a n  a c c e p ta n c e  h e r e  o f
How did you get into his bedroom? A. He came and got me.
Where from? A. My bedroom and he put me on his bed and 1 
woke up.
Did you walk to the bedroom? A. No.
How did you get there? A. He carried me.
Did he say anything to you as he was carrying you? A. No.
Did he say anything lo  you when he entered your room? A. No A„ „„„„„„ COInf l(|f
Cause 1 was asleep.. b e g in n in g  o f  th e  q u e s t io n s .
Well, when did you wake up? A. When he put me on his bed.
D o you know where your mother was then? A. No.
Was she home? A. No.
MR. MANNERS: What did she say? I cannot hear her.
BENCH: The answer ‘N o’.
PROSECUTOR:
So on that occasion he put you on his bed. What happened next? A. Then he took o ff my nightie and my knickers.
T h e  p r o s e c u t o r  a l lo w s  B e v e r lv  to




























Yes? A. Then he hopped on me and was mov ing up and down then 
while he was moving up and down he was breathing hard..
D o you know where his penis was when he was on top o f  you? A.
Yes.
Where? A. Inside my vagina.
Did you feel anything at that stage? A. Yes.
What did you feel? A. Sore.
Did he say anything to you? A. No.
Did you say anything to him? A. (No verbal answer.). Docs thls nfer to -the m adenror
How long did that take place? A. Two nights after. "th e  o c c u r a n c e s "?
You say two nights, was there another incident? A. That was the
I  f in d  th is  c o n fu s in g .
same incident.
Well what did you mean when you said “two nights'? A. Two
nights after the first.
Yes, and after he moved up and down what happened next? A. He
was breathing hard and then he hopped o ff  and then....
Did he say anything when he hopped off? A. No, I hit him and 
then I went to my room.
Could you see his penis on that occasion? A. No. Docs th ts  m e a n  a n y t i m e  d u r i n g  th e
What position were you in on the bed? A. On my back. I l i c id e n t  o r  as  h e  d i d  s o m e t h in g  m
Where were your legs? A. Together.
How were your legs when his penis entered your vagina? A. Were 
open.
p a r t ic u la r  o r  w h e n  h e 'd  " h o p p e d  o f f V
Sorry? A. They were open.
And how were your legs opened Beverley. Who opened your legs?
A. Uncle David.
Did you do anything at that stage? A. No.
Did anything else happen to you at Crowley? A. No. We moved to 
Horsley.
Do you recall when it was you moved to Horsley? A. In the middle 
of Sixth Grade I think.
Do you know the address at Horsley? A. Yes.
What was the address? A. ...(inaudible) Street I think it was where 
we lived, the number of the house was 19..
....Your Worship.
H e  p r e s u m a b ly  m e a n s  ‘o f  t h a t  k in d '.  I f  
h e  s p e c if ie d  th is  in  s o m e  w a y  i t  m o u ld  
r e d u c e  a  lo t  o f  u n n e c e s s a ry  s e a rc h in g  
o n  h e r  p a r t .
MR. MANNERS: Sorry, 1 cannot still....
PROSECUTOR: Can you speak up a little bit please Beverley.
T h e  use o f  " a t  t h a t  s t a g e ”, " o n  t h a t  
o c c a s io n ” a n d  “ t a k e  p l a c e ” d o  le a d  th e  
h e a r e r  t o  a  Jess p e r s o n a l  im p r e s s io n  o f  
th e  a c t io n .
BENCH: Number 19.
MR. MANNERS: 1 am having great difficulty hearing anything that the young person is saying.
BENCH: Beverley, look 1 know it is terribly hard for you, but this is a rather big room and we have got to hear, 
do you understand? A. Yes.
99. Q. Now you have got a soft voice, you might have to just raise it a W h o ’s r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  is  t h is 9 
little bit, can you do that for us. Thanks.
T h e  w itn e s s  h a s  to  b e a r  th e
MR. MANNERS: Thank you. Sir. r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  f o r  th is  fa c t .
PROSECUTOR:
100. Q. D o you recall where you lived when you moved to Horsley? A.
Morrow Street and the number of the house was 19.
W h y  c a n  > h e  s a y  " r e m e m b e r  ”  o r  " C a n  
y o u  t e l l  us th e  a d d r e s s ? ”
101. Q How many houses did you live in that street? A. One
102. Q. Was there a Cafe near the house? A. Yes
103. Q. Where was the Cafe? A. Across the road
104. Q. How long did you live in that house? A. 1 can't remember H o w  lo n g  a g o ?







































moved to a Commission house
Did anything happen to you when you were living in the house 
near the Cafe? A. No
You told the Court you moved to a Commission house, how far 
was that from the other house? A. A few blocks away 
Was that still in Horsley? A. Yes
Did something happen between you and David in the house we 
have referred to as the Commission house? A. Yes 
What happened there? A. Well Mum went out and Uncle David 
came home from darts and he asked me to make him a cup o f tea 
and 1 made him a cup of tea and I took it into his room and when 1 
was coming out, going out o f the room he grabbed me.
Yes? A. Then he pushed me onto the bed.
Now Beverley do you recall when that was? A. A third time.
How long ago did that happen? A. I can't remember.
D o you know whether it was this year, last year or the previous 
year? A. No, no.
What happened after he pulled you down onto the bed? A. 1 had
my uniform on.
What uniform was that? A. My school uniform.
Yes? A. And he took it o ff and my knickers.
Yes, what was he wearing? A. I couldn't see.
Well what happened next? A. Then he hopped on top of me.
Yes? A. Then he rooted me and he was breathing hard and then I
said to him 1 was going to tell Mum and......
Just pause there for a moment. You say he rooted you Beverley, 
what did he do? A. He put his penis in my vagina and when he 
stopped I said 1 was going to tell Mum and he said if 1 tell Mum 
he’ll make sure 1 would go into a home.
D o you know where your mother was at that stage? A. No, not
really.
Did you tell your mother at that stage? A. ‘Cause he said if 1 did 111 
go into a home.
Did you believe that? A. Yes
D o you remember last August School holidays? Where were you 
living then? A. In Horsley 1 think.
Where were you living then? A.In Horsely 1 think 
Was it the house near the Cafe or the Commission house? A.
Commission.
Did something happen to you on that occasion? A. Yes.
What happened then? A. Well he rooted me.
Well where were you when that took place? A. In his room.
Can you tell the Court how you got into his room on that 
occasion? A. No.
Did you walk in? A. No.
How did you get there? A. Can't remember.
When you say he rooted you in his room on that occasion can you 
tell the Court what happened then? A. Well he took my clothes off  
and he was on me and he was moving up and down and he 
stopped and then I decided that 1 wasn't going to go home the next 
day when 1 was at School.
Did he place his penis in your vagina on that occasion? A. Yes 
Did you have any conversation on that occasion? A. No.
On each o f  these occasions - withdraw that. Did you ever tell T a l k i n g  to  th e  w itn e s s  is p u n c tu a te d  h \  
anyone about these occasions? A. Yes. a d d re s s in g  th e  c o u r t .
Who did you tell? A. Greta.
Greta is your sister? A. Yes, and down at Crowley 1 told Chloe and 
Rachel.
Are they relatives o f  yours? A. Yes, cousins.
Did you run away from home? A. Yes.
Why did you do that? A. ‘Cause 1 didn’t want to get hurt anymore,
‘cause I didn't want to get hurt anymore.
T h e r e  a r e  d i f f e r e n t  re g is te rs  u s e d  h e re  
T h is  le a d s  a ls o  to  th e  u s e  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
n o t io n s  o f  a g e n c y
------►.?------►.T — S o m e b o d y  d id
s o m e t h i n g -► 
S o m e th in g  
h a p p e n d e d -► 
S o m e b o d y  s a \s  
s o m e th in g  
h a p p e n e d
S o t e  A m b ig u o u s  e x p re s s io n s  m a k e  























And were you apprehended by the Police? A. Pardon 
Were you caught by the Police? A. No.
Did you later speak to an Officer o f  the Youth and Community 
Services? A. Yes.
And in turn did you then speak to Police Officers? A. Yes.
Did you later go to The Prince o f  Wales Hospital in Sydney? A.
Yes.
And there were you examined by a Doctor Hay? A. Yes.
Did you ever see David with anyone else apart from yourself? A.
No.
Did you ever see him with your sisters? A. Yes.
When was that? A. I can’t remember.
C a u g h t ’’
B e v e r ly  h a s  b e e n  m a d e  i n t o  th e  
p r im a r y  a g e n t.  T h is  is n o t  a n  
im p r e s s io n  c o n s is te n t  w i t h  b e in g  a  
v ic t im .
T h is  p r e s u m a b ly  m e a n s  s e x u a lly  
i n t e r f e r r in g  w ith  a n y o n e  e ls e . T h e  
q u e s t io n s  a s k e d  d e p e n d  o n  a  t o ta l ly  
s h a r e d  c o n te x t  b e tw e e n  th e  q u e s t io n e r  
a n d  th e  r e s p o n d e r
Do you recall whether it was this year or last year? A. No.
Do you recall where you were? A. At Horsley.
At the Cafe house or the Commission house? A. Commission.
What did you see on that occasion? A. Uncle David, 1 walked into 
the bedroom to tell him that Sonia was sick and he was on Greta.
Did you notice anything about Greta? A. Yes, she was crying.
Did she have any clothing? A. I don't think so.
Did David have any clothing on? A. Don't think so.
Did anyone say anything? A. Yes.
What was said? A. Uncle David said, told me to get out. A n  a l t e r n a t i v e  m ig h t  b e :
Did you leave the room? A. Yes.
Did you later talk to Greta? A. Yes. Q m °'’A D‘ ' ,d °  Wha' dld hc
" W a s  s h e  d re s s e d ? "
" W a s  s h e  u n d re s s e d ? "
" W h a t  c lo th e s  d i d  s h e  h a v e  o n  o í r "  
W h ic h  o f  th e  a b o v e  d o e s  t h e  b e s t j o b  


























Beverley you have been staying at Meleymead have you not? A.
Yes.
And you ran away from Meleymead did you not? A. Yes.
Why did you run away from Meleymead? A. Because I didn't like 
the place.
You liked living at Crowley did you not? A. Yes.
You love your mother? A. Yes. T hcse  arc f
J is n o  r o o m  h e r e  f o r  e x p la n a t io n  o r
You do not like your Uncle David? A. No. r e s o lu t io n .
And do you know why you left Crowley? A. Uncle David got a 
promotion to go to Horsley on the silos.
And you wanted to stay at Crowley, did you not? A. Yes.
Now during the School holidays in August this year where were 
you living? A. Horsley.
At the Commission house? A. Yes.
And who lived there? A. My two brothers, step-brothers, Greta,
Sonia, Mary and I, Mum and Uncle David.
And that was a three bedroom house? A. Yes I think so.
And the boys slept out the back did they not? A. Yes.
And you shared a room with Sonia is that not right? A. Yes.
Sonia is your twin sister? A. Yes.
She is very close to you is she not? A. Yes.
You are very good friends as well as being twin sisters? Is that not 
right? A. Yes.
And quite often you and Sonia share the same bed do you not, 
sleep together do you not? A. Yes.
Now, where was your room, you and Sonia's room from your 
mother's room? A. Um it was next door.
It was next door? And you mother and Uncle David's bedroom 
door was always open was it not? A. Yes.
And their room, their bedroom was right next to the kitchen? A.
Yes.
The kitchen is a large open area is it not? A. Yes.
It has a table in the middle? When you got up first thing in the 
morning, when you were living at Horsley, you all, all the children 
had chores did they not? Things to do? A. Yes.
T h is  q u e s t io n  is in  s t a t e m e n t  f o r m  a n d  
th e  q u e s t io n  m a r k e r  d o e s  n o t  a p p e a r  
u n t i l  th e  e n d
H e  uses n e g a t iv e  a f f i r m a t i o n .  T h is  
m a k e s  d e n ia l  d i f f i c u l t .
T h e  cro ss  e x a m in e r 's  u se  o f  s ta te m e n ts  
e s ta b lis h  h im  as k n o w lc d g a h le  a n d  in  
c o n t r o l  o f  b o th  th e  i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  











































You had set things to do did you not? And the house worked on a A r e  th e s e  j u s t  d e t a i ls
routine? A. Yes.
And what chores did you have to do first thing in the morning,
after you got up? A. Wiping up, and do. clean my room.
And Greta had chores too did she not? A. Yes.
H e  e s ta b lis h e s  th e  a c t i v e  a g e n c y  o f  
“ s h e ' 'b y  u s in g  “ d i d "  th e n  m o v e s  to  th e  
less a c t iv e  “ w a s " .
B y  u s in g  “ a n d " h e  c o n t in u e s  h is  o»n 
c o n t r o l  o f  th e  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h e n  a d d s  
th e  “ b u t "  w h ic h  i m p l ie s  s o m e t h in g  
a b o u t  w h a t  th e  w itn e s s  is  s a y in g .  Is  she  
‘s a y in g  a n y t h i n g ? "
And Sonia? A. Yes.
One o f Greta's chores was to take some tea in to her? A. Uncle 
David, make breakfast for Mum and Uncle David.
Right. And she did that every morning did she not? A. Yes.
Did she ever, was she ever away from Horsley this year, up until 
you left home? A. Yes she used to babysit.
And where did she babysit? A. With, for a friend, that used to 
come around.
And that was in Horsley was it? A. Yes.
And, but she had never stayed overnight would she? A. Oh yes. a 
few nights she did.
And when were those nights? A. She stayed overnight when she 
was babysitting, I can’t remember the night.
That was at the beginning o f  the year was it not? A. Yes.
So around about August she was living all the time, she did not go 
away from Horsley? A. No.
From the Commission house. So she would take tea into, or 
breakfast into your Uncle David and your mother every morning?
A. Yes.
What was the weather like at Horsley in August this year, do you 
remember whether it was hot or cold? A. No.
It was winter time was it not? A. I think so.
It was very cold was it not? A. Yes.
And you and Beverley, sorry you and Sonia and Greta usually 
wore jeans to school did you not? A. Yes.
When it was cold? In fact you did not like your school uniform did 
you? A. No.
Now can you remember the first incident that something, that you 
say Uncle David interfered with you at Horsley? A. It was at the 
Commission house.
Yes, and it was in the morning was it not? A. No.
It was not in the morning? A. No. T h e r e  is  a  s u d d e n  s h i f t  h e r e  f r o m  la r g e
When was it? A. In the night. t im e  ( * h ' n w c a t  H o r s e fy )  to
And what lime o f nijht? A. I don't know. sma" ,,me l,lx mornmi’
You do not know? A. No.
Sorry, could you tell me again what happened? A. Well he came H is  r e p e t i t io n  c o n f i r m s  h e r  “ n o t  
into my room. k n o w i n g
Yes. A. And he took down my blankets, and took down mv 
knickers, and um he said this wouldn’t hurt.
I see, and that was at Horsley? A. Yes.
In the Commission house? A. Yes.
And you were awake? A. Yes.
And where was Sonia? A. 1 don't know.
You do not know? A. No.
And was that in August this year? A. Yes.
Was it dark outside? A. 1 don't know, I didn't look outside.
“ In  f a c t .....” s u g g e s ts  B e v e r ly  h a d  s a id
o t h e r w is e
T h is  is a n  u n c le a r  c o n s t r u c t io n  b u :  
e s ta b lis h e s  “y o u  s a y "  as  a n  e m b e d d e d  
p r o p o s i t i o n .
I see. Was it night? A. Yes.
You sure it was at night? A. Yes it was.
And how long had you been in bed for before this happened? A.
We were going to bed at 7.30.
I see, and how do you know it is 7.30? A. Because we always go, we 
always go to bed after Sale o f the Century.
I see, and you were watching television on this night, were you? A
Yes.
And after Sale o f the Century, you and your sisters went to bed is , .
. T o t a l  a b s e n c e  o f  q u e s t io n
that right. A. Yes. m a r k e r s . . . .e x c e p t  f o r  p o s s ib le









































She shares a room with Mary does she not? A. Yes
So do all four o f  you go to bed straight after Sale o f  the C entury?
A. Yes all of us do.
And that is what happened on this night, this first incident? A.
Yes.
At Horsley is that not right? A. (No verbal answer).
Sorry? A. Yes.
And where was your mother? A. I don’t know.
You do not know, but she was in the house when you went to bed 
was she not? A. 1 think so.
Yes. Sorry, you think so? A. Yes.
Can you not remember? A. No.
Where would she have been if  she was not in the house? A. 1 don't 
know.
She did not go away anywhere in August holidays did she? A. Yes, 
she went away for a week to Aunty Thelma's.
That was not in the school holidays was it?A. I can’t remember. 
No it was not in the holidays at all? It was before the holidays? A.
(No verbal answer).
Or was it after the holidays? A. 1 can't remember.
But apart from that week that your mother went to your Aunt 
Thelma's she was at the house, the Commission house at Horsley 
all the time, was she not? A. I don't know.
As far as you know, she was, is that not right? A. Some, some 
nights she was ‘cause she went over to Kathy’s because she lived 
next door to us.
I see. But she would be always there to put you to bed would she 
not? A. No, no-one put us to bed, we had to go ourselves.
I see, but she would be in the house when you went to bed? A. Yes. 
I think so.
And when your Uncle David came in to your room, did he turn the 
light on? A. No.
You do not know? A. No. Echo
Did he close the door after him? A. I think so.
And that is when he came in? A. Yes.
And he closed the door? A. Yes I think so.
And you say you think so? A. Yes.
Are you not sure? A. Yes, I’m not sure.
You are not sure. You usually sleep with your bedroom door 
closed or open? A. Closed.
Did you hear him come into your room? A. No. because 1 was 
asleep.
You were asleep? And did you hear Sonia leave the room? A. 1
don’t really know.
You do not really know? A. Yes.
So you do not remember if you heard Sonia leave the room do 
you? A. Yes.
When your Uncle David came into the room, did you look to see 
where Sonia was? A. No.
She was not sleeping in your bed that night, or was she? A. She 
wasn't.
Was there any reason for that? A. She doesn’t sleep in my bed 
every night.
1 see. Just when you want to talk or not? A. Yes.
What did, what did he do, sorry, did you wake up as soon as 
Uncle, your Uncle David came into the room? A. Yes.
And did he say anything to you? A. No.
And you saw him close the door behind him did you? A. No, 
because it was dark.
I see, so you did not know whether it was Uncle David did you at 
that stage? A. No.
So somebody came into your room? A. Yes.
E c h o in g  th e  w itn e s s 's  “ l  d o n ' t  k n o u " 
a.v “ You d o n 't  k n o u " c a n  le a d  th e  
m e a n in g  f r o m  'h a p p e n  n o t  to  h a v e  th e  
in  f o r m a t i o n '  to  ‘th e  p e r s o n  t a l k i n g  is 
u n k n o w le d g a b le ' .
C o n t r i b u t io n  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  b y  th e  
w itn e s s  is n e g a te d
T h is  c re a te s  a n  im p r e s s io n  o f  in s ig h t  
w h e n  th e  interchange s u g g e s ts  
o th e r w  ise.
“ I  th in k  s o " h a s  b e e n  c o n s e r te d  to  
“ ¡ 'm  n o t  s u r e " a n d  c o n f i r m e d  as a  
s ta te m e n t  o f  fa c t .
W h a t  is th e  q u e s t io n .1’ I f  s h e  d i d  n o t  
r e m e m b e r  th e n  “ Y e s "  is g r a m m a t ic a l l y  
r ig h t .  B u t  i f  s h e  h a d  a n s w e r e d  “ S o "  I  
w o n d e r  i f  i t  w o u ld  h a v e  b e e n  r e g a r d e d  
a n d  d i f f e r e n t ly  R e f  Q . 6 o f  cross  
e x a m in a t io n .
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104 Q And som ebody, that person, then pulled the blankets down from 
your bed is that right? A. Yes.
105 Q And that person who you do not know, who you did not know at 
that stage? A. Mmm. W h a t  t im e  f r a m e 9
106. Q Took your nightie off? A. He didn’t take my nightie off, he took 
my knickers off.
107 Q Took your knickers off? And you did not say a thing? A. No. B y u s in g  “a t h i n g " i n s t e a d  o f
108. Q You were frightened? A. Yes. " a n y t h i n g "  h e  e c h o e s  t h e  e x p r e s s io n
109. Q Did you scream? A. No. “ . a n d  s h e  d i d n ' t  d o  a  t h in g  to  s to p. t  t '*
n o Q Why did you not scream? A. Because I was frightened. It'
III. Q Did you try and get away? A. No. 1 tried to get my blankets.
112. Q You tried to get your blankets to cover up? A. Yes.
113. Q And, but you did not know who this person was? A. It must have 
been Uncle David because there’s no-one else would come into my 
room and do that.
T h e s e  d o  n o t  m e a n  t h e  s a m e
114. Q I see. But you had no idea who it was but you thought it was your 
Uncle David? A. Yes.
T h is  s e n te n c e  is i n t e r n a l l y  
c o n t r a d i c t o r y
115. Q. Is that right? A. Yes.
W h a t  h a s  s h e  a d m i t t e d  as  b e in g  n g h t  ’ 
Is  i t  t h a t  s h e  “h a d  n o  i d e a " o r  t h a t  s h e  
" t h o u g h t  i t  w a s  y o u r  U n c le  D a w d "
116. Q. And after this person took your knickers o ff, what happened 
then? A. He fingered me.
117. Q. He fingered you. And how long did that last? A. For a while. T h is  d e p e r s o n a l is e s  t h e  a c t io n .  D o e s
118. Q Did you scream out? A. Yes. th is  s u g g e s t  ' f o r  h e l p '  W h a t 's  th e
119. Q And why did you scream out? A. Because it hurt. i m p l i e d  d i f f e r e n c e  b e t w e e n  ‘s c r e a m  as
120. Q You were not frightened? A. Yes. o p p o s e d  t o  's c r e a m  o u t 9
121. Q. You were frightened ? Why did you not scream out when you were 
frightened? A. Because 1 was too frightened to.
122. Q And there was no conversation? A. No.
123. Q So this could have been some stranger? A. And when he was 
doing, he said this won't hurt.
'B o t h  a  y e s  a n d  a  n o  a n s w e r  w o u ld  
a d m i t  th e  u n s t a t e d  p r o p o s i t i o n  th a t
124. Q And did you recognize the voice did you? A. Yes. anything said, i f  said, w o u l d  b e  c o n v e r s a t i o n ’. T h is  is  a n  e x a m p l e  o t  a
125. Q And it sounded like Uncle David? A. Yes n o n p r o p o s i l i o n a l  m e s s a g e , t h a t  i s .
126. Q So those words were the only identification you had o f  him? A.
Yes.
s o m e t h in g  t h a t  is n o t  s t a t e d  b u t  
n e \e r t h e le s s  c le a r ly  t h e r e
127. Q Now how loud did you, did you scream? A. Not long.
128. Q How loud? A. Not loud.
129. Q Not loud. Why did you not scream loud? A. Because 1 didn’t want 
to get in trouble.
130. Q You did not want to get into trouble? A. Yes
131. Q You were able to scream when he hurt you? A. Yes.
132 Q But you were not able to scream when he frightened you? A. No.
133. Q Sonia could have heard you if you had screamed could she not? A.
Yes I think so.
T h is  e c h o e s  t h e  u s e  o f 'o u t  ’ in  Q 's  
1 1 9  12 1
134. Q. Sonia has not said, sorry, have you said anything to Sonia about 
this incident? A. No.
135. 0 You have not told Sonia at all? A. Um 1 told her. just before 1. 
when 1 ran away.
136. Q So you told Sonia about this night? A. Yes.
137. Q Did you not ask Sonia if  she heard Uncle David or this person on 
that night? A. Yes.
138. Q Did you not ask Sonia if  she heard Uncle David or this person on 
that night? A. Yes.
139. 0 - And what did she say? A. She said she did, and Uncle David told 
me to tell her that a dog bit me.
BENCH Sorry? A . Uncle David told me to tell Sonia that a dog bit me.
MR MANNERS:
1 see. When did Uncle David tell you to tell Sonia that a dog bit 
you? A. When he was in my room.
N o t e :  W h a t  th e  w itn e s s  a n s w e r s  to
139. Q- in c lu d e s  b o t h  p r o p o s i t i o n a l  a n d  n o n ­
p r o p o s i t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n
140. Q On this night? A. Yes.
141. Q Was there any other conversation? A. No.
142. Q So there were two bits o f  conversation, there was him saying “this 












































By answering at all, Beverly admits the 
cross examiner's definition. (When did 
you stop beating your wife?)
He questions her credibility by 
presuming how she should act in the 
circumstances.
In this exchange there is a change o f 
register, change o f agency and a denial 
o f Beverly’s message.
What is she saying “no" to? And what 
does she mean? What do others in the 
court hear in her answer? What has 
she heard o f the question?
And then he said “Tell Sonia the dog bit you ^ A. U s ._ . v  1 his is tied in with the nopropositional
Now is that all the conversation there was. A. Yes message about conxersation stated at
The dogs do not sleep in your room do they? A. No. q  122
And after he had finished, or this person had finished interferring 
with you, what happened? A. He went out.
He went out, and did he close the door after him? A. Yes 
And did you say anything to Sonia then? A. No.
Did you see, try and see if she was awake? A. No.
Or indeed if she was in her room? A. No.
You did not even think to speak to your sister? A. No.
You went back to sleep did you? A. Yes.
And when was the next incident at the Commission house? A. (No 
verbal answer).
When was the next? A. Two days after.
Two days after, so that would, was this in August this year? A. Yes 
I think so.
And school holidays? A. Just before school holidays.
Just before the school holidays? And what happened on this 
occasion? A. He rooted me.
Well can you tell me how that came to pass? A. No.
Sorry? A. No.
You cannot tell me what led up to? A. No.
You cannot remember? A. (No verbal answer).
You cannot remember anything about it at all? A. No.
You have forgotten everything about it? A. Yes.
You have forgotten where it took place? A. No.
Where did it take place? A. Horsley.
Horsley. Apart from the fact that it took place in Horsley, there is 
nothing else you can remember about it? A. Yes.
Is that, is what I have said correct? A. Yes there's nothing else.
There is nothing else you can remember? A. No.
Sorry, keep your voice up? A. No.
Do you remember the day o f the week? A. No.
Do you remember whether it was night or day? A. It was night.
It was night. Do you remember if it was early at night? Or late at 
night? A. No.
You do not? Do you remember if you were in bed, or you were up?
A. 1 can't remember.
You cannot remember. Do you remember who was home? A. My
sisters and brothers.
Your sisters and your brothers? And do you remember where you 
say Unde David rooted you? A. No.
When you come home from school, if you had been wearing 
school uniform you always change do you not, get out of your 
school uniform as quickly as you can? A. Sometimes.
You do not like wearing it do you? A. No.
It is not very attractive is it? A. No.
So really you try and get out o f your school uniform as quickly as 
possible? A. Yes.
And you put on some jeans or something like that if you are just 
going to do your homework or do chores around the house do you 
not? A. Yes.
Because you do not want to get your school uniform dirty, so you 
have to wash and iron it again, is that right? A. Yes.
So every day really you get out o f your school uniform, every 
school day that you wear your school uniform you take it off as 
soon as you get home do you not? A. Yes, nearly every day.
Sorry? A. Nearly every day.
Nearly every day, well can you remember any day where you did
not take if off? A. When 1 went down the shop with Greta.
He is establishing ownership of 
information and theme....and 
propositions contained within.
There is a change o f pace here as a 
string o f ‘S o ’ answers is elicited. 
When information is forthcoming the 
examiner moves down a level o f detail 
to elicit more ‘S o ’ answers.
She responds with information then he 
changes the topic from a neutral issue 
(who was home) to an emotive issue 
(saving, rooting)
185. Q I see, so that was one day when you went down to the shop with •
186. Q
Greta, can you remember any other days? A. Yes I was, I just went 
to my friend’s place and 1 was just playing with, playing in my 
school uniform.
I see, that was before you went home? A. No. After.
\
187. Q. So you can remember two days can you? A. Yes.
188. Q And that would be about all would it not? A. Yes.
189. Q. Did anything happen to you during the August school holidays?
190. Q
A. I think so.
You think so? A. Yes.
191. Q What do you think happened to you? A. Uncle David rooted me.
192. Q A third time? A. Yes.
193. Q Where was this at? A. He never, he tried to and 1 was sitting on the
194. Q
lounge, and he tried to, he undone my zipper and I ran outside. 
I see, so he did not root you? A. No.
195. Q You say he tried to undo your zipper? A. Yes.
196. Q Who did you tell about this? A. No-one.
197. Q You have ■, this is the first time you have told anybody about it, is
198. Q
it not? A. No. At school I told Wendy Mills.
Right you told Wendy Mills. Did not tell anybody from the Youth
199. Q.
and Community Services did you? A. No. 
You did not tell the Police? A. No. By using the negative here he suggests
200. Q And today, the second time you say, that you have spoken about
an ommission on her part.
201. Q.
this incident is that right? A. Yes.
Yes. So he did not root you then did he? A. No.
202. Q Right. So did anything else happen during the August school
203. Q
holidays? A. Not that I can remember.
And what about after you went back to school again? A. When I
204. Q.
went to school I decided that I wasn't going to go back home. 
Right.
BENCH:.




206. Q. Was that the first day of school? A. 1 don't think so.
207. Q You do not think so. So other than the incident that you have told There is no suggestion elsewhere in this
208. Q.
His Worship today about Uncle David taking down your zip? A.
It’s in the um, thing there.
In what thing where? A. it’s on the papers down there.
transcript that she is addressing “His 
Worship".
209. Q Well I do not get to see those papers Beverley, so will you, do you She has told 'herstory’ many times before.
210. Q
mind telling me? A. No.
You do not mind, so is it what you are saying that during the
211. Q.
school holidays, your Uncle David tried to take, or took you zip 
down, you say that is all that happened? A. Yes.
And as soon as you went back to school, you ran away? A. Yes.
212. Q So nothing else happened? A. No.
213. Q. Now, could we go back to, has your Uncle David put his penis into
214. Q
your vagina whilst you were living at the Commission house at 
Horsley? A. Yes.
And when was that? A. In the middle of sixth grade.
215. Q In the middle of sixth grade? And when were you in sixth grade?
216. Q
A. At Crowley.
Right. So the only time he put his penis into your vagina was at
217. Q.
Crowley? Is that right? A. Yes.
And so he did not put his penis into your vagina at Horsley? A.
1 'm con fused
218. Q
Yes.
I am sorry, Beverley, I thought you said the only time he did it was
at Crowley.
BENCH: No, this has been a problem, 1 think you will find that the emphasis 
on the Commission house. This happened before when you were 
talking about at the Commission house and then on the second 
occasion, and two days later. Now you said Horsley.
MR. M A N N E R S : Well I just...
BENCH: I think to be fair to clean it up...
MR. M A N N E R S: Certainly I will...
BENCH: Just indicate that to you.
MR. M A N N E R S: I do not mean to be...
BENCH: No, no, I am just saying to be fair to clean it up, both to the Witness
and to the Defendant.

























Where did Uncle David put his penis into your vagina? A. At
Horsley.
At Horsley. Now whereabouts at Horsley? A. At the Commission 
house.
At the Commission house, and where did he do this? A. In the
August holidays.
In the August holidays? A. Yes, just before.
Just before the August holidays. Did you not say to me a few .... at the time when it was confusing
minutes ago that he did not put his penis in your vagina at and t t̂e Bench intervened 1
Horsley. A. He did. What she said was "Yes" to his
He did. You are saying he did? A. Yes. negative statement.
Can you tell me where he did? A. In his room.
In his room. And what time of day was that? A. Night-time.
Night-time. And this was just before the August school holidays 
this year? A. Yes.
You are certain of it? A. Yes 1 think so.
You think so? A. Yes.
How certain are you? A. A little bit.
A little bit. And what did you remember about it? A. When he 
rooted me.
Well can you tell me anything more about it? A. No.
There is nothing more that you can remember? A. No.
Tell me about any other incidents? A. No.
There were no other incidents at Horsley? A. Yes there was but I 
can't tell you.
I am sorry, you cannot tell me? A. Yes.
Why can you not tell me? A. I don't know.
You cannot tell me. Have you told anybody else? A. Yes. Follow up the issue o f the willingness
Who have you told Beverley? A. Some kids at school. of sexually abused children to disclose
Perhaps Beverley could... lo d,fferent people.
Would you like a glass o f  water or would you like a little rest?
A. Yes. 1 think I will give the Witness a break.
MR. M A N N E R S : Yes, certainly Your Worship 1 do not want...
BENCH: I will take a short adjournment so the Witness can have a break.
MR. MANNERS:
241. Q. Beverley before lunch you mentioned that at Horsley various 
things happened, now this was the Commission house at Horsley,
is that not right? A. The Commission house, yes.
J8eg your pardon? A. Yes.242. Q
243. Q. Yes, and in Horsley nothing else happened other than at the
Commission house? A. No nothing else happened other than at 
the Commission house.
%
244. Q. Thank you, and do you say there were two incidents, or more than 
two incidents at the Commission house? A. Two incidents.
245. Q. Two incidents. Now you are certain about that? A. Yes.
246. Q. And when did those incidents take place, at the Commission 
house at Horsley? A. I don’t remember.
247. Q. You do not remember. Do you remember if they took place this 
year? A. No they didn’t take place this year.
248. Q. Sorry? A. They didn’t take place this year.
249. Q. They did not take place this year? A. No.
250. Q. Are you certain about that? A. Yes.
251. Q Where do you say, when do you say these incidents took place? Do 
you say last year or the year before that? A. I don’t remember.
The forced choice construction o f the 
questions suggests that one or the
252. Q. You do not remember? A. No. other has to be true.
253. Q. And do you think it might be 1984? A. I think.
254. Q. You think it was 1984? A. Yes.
255. Q. And do you remember whether it was in the summer-time or the 
winter-time? A. I think it was summer.
256. Q You think it was in the summer, and can you remember if these 
incidents took place during the school holidays or during school 
times? A. No.
257. Q. You do not remember? A. No.
258. Q. Now who did you tell about these incidents? A. Down at Crowley 
I told.
259. Q Well leave Crowley aside and just looking at what happened at the
Commission house at Horsley last year? A. I told Greta and at 
School and I told Wendy Mills.
This in part accepts Beverly's 
assertions.
260. Q. Right, and you did not tell anybody else? A. Yes, I told Felicity 
Mills when I ran away from home.
261. Q. Right, but you ran away from home over a year later, do you 
understand my question? A. No.
What question?
262. Q. You said the incidents at Horsley at the Commission house took 
place last year, do you remember saying that? A. Yes.
263. Q. And you agree with me that you ran away from home? A. Yes.
264. Q. ...in August or September this year, do you say that you did not 
tell anybody for all that time from? A. I told some friends at 
school.
265. Q. And you did not tell your school teacher? A. No.
266. Q. Did not tell your mother? A. No.
267. Q. Did not tell the Youth and Community Service people? A. No,
only when I ran away.
Topic change.268. Q. Only when you ran away? A. Yes.
269. Q. Now you said before you did not like your Uncle David, is that not 
right? A. Yes.
270. Q Do you remember he saved your life? Remember that? A. Yes. This expression nominalises her
271. Q. You are an epileptic are you not Beverley? A. Yes. condition. She is ‘an epileptic’ rather
272. Q. And sometimes you stop breathing and you have a fit, is that not 
right, and your father saved your life on one occasion that you 
know about, or your step-father I mean, I'm sorry. A. Yes.
than a person who has or suffers from 
epilepsy.
“Yes"to what?
273. Q. And do you support a Rugby League team? A. Yes.
274. Q. And is that the same team that your Uncle David supports? A.
Yes.
275. Q. And he has bought you T-shirts and jumpers in Manly colours has 
he not? A. Yes.
276. Q. And you got on very well with your Uncle David, did you not? A.
Yes.
277. Q You are very close to him, were you not? A. Yes.
278. Q True to say that you loved him at one stage? A. Yes.
279. Q And he is hard on the girls is he not, when you were all living 
together, strict, he is hard on you, is he not? A. Yes.
There is a chant like quality to this 




































He is very strict? Sorry, do not shake your head or nod because...
A. Yes he is.
He is. And if you do something wrong he punishes you does he 
not? A. Yes.
And you admit that you have done things wrong in the past, have 
you not? A. Yes.
And he has punished you, is that not right? A. Yes.
Now did he not punish you for smoking? A. Yes.
And do you remember when that was? A. Oh a while ago.
Do you not think it could have been the August holidays this year?
A. ...(inaudible).
You do not think it was the August holidays? A. No.
Just before you ran away? A. No.
Do you remember him saying to you “W ell give you the 
cigarettes, w ell buy your cigarettes for you if  you give up all your 
school outings and your sport", do you remember him saying
that? A. Yes.
And you told him that you did not want to do that you would stop 
smoking, do you remember that? A. Yes.
Did that happen in August this year? A. I don't know.
You do not know. Do you remember how you came to be 
punished for smoking, do you remember that? A. Yes, we were 
made to smoke a cigar.
And do you remember another occasion your father, or your 
step-father asked you if you were smoking, did you not say no? A.
Yes.
So you told him a lie, did you not? A. Yes.
And he found you smoking on another occasion, did he not? A.
Yes.
And this was about August this year, or September this year, just 
before you ran away? A. I don't know.
Did he not yell at you? A. Yes.
He was very angry, was he not? A. Yes.
Did he tell you he was very angry with you because you told him a 
lie? A. Yes.
And he shouted at you and told you to go to your room? A. Yes. 
Do you remember that he kicked you in the bottom as you went 
into your room? A. Yes.
Now in September o f this year just before you ran away do you 
remember that Unde David and your mother went to Crowley for 
the day, do you remember that, and the girls stayed at home? A.
No.
You usually vacuum your room do you not? A. Yes.
And that is the room you share with Sonia. Do you remember that 
you hit Sonia on the arm with the steel part of the vacuum cleaner?
A. Yes.
And that hurt Sonia, did it not? A. Yes.
Were you and Sonia having a fight? A. Not a real fight we were 
just, you see Sonia was calling me names and I just hit her with the 
vacuum cleaner.
What names was she calling you? A. She was stirring me.
What names was she calling you Beverley? A. 1 can't remember
The use o f the passive suggests 
something did happen and she was the 
agent. She came to be punished 
(necessarily) is quite different from 
someone else punishing her. This is 
consistent with being a victim.
Note: The following pages are 
relatively free o f comments thus 
leaving you to make your own.
the names.
Remember if  she was calling you “Iceberg’?  A. What, yes, they 
used to call me that at Pankhurst High.
See you did not like that, did you? A. No.
Did Sonia call you that? A. Yes, and they used to call me another 
name.
And what was the other name? A. A two C tunnel cunt.
Two C tunnel cunt.
Did your Uncle David see Sonia after you had hit her with the 










































Sonia was in great pain, was she not? A. Yes.
She was crying, was she not? A. Yes.
And your Unde David told you that he thought you had broken 
Sonia ’s arm? A. Yes.
He was very angry with you, was he not? A. Yes.
Sent you to your room did he not, again, he yelled at you? A. Yes. 
Shouted at you? A. Yes.
Do you remember what he said to you? A. No.
Do you remember him saying to you uYour mother ought to put 
you in a home where you belong*? A. Yes.
You remember him saying that to you? A. Yes.
And that was after the incident with the vacuum cleaner, was it 
not? A. Yes.
And you did not want to go to a home, did you? A. No.
No. You wanted to go back to Crowley? A. Yes.
And do you know a man called Mr. Kay, Mr. Mark Kay? A. Yes. 
He is the Welfare Supervisor, is he not? A. Yes.
He had told you that you would be sent to a home, did he not? A. 
Oh I can’t remember.
And that was about August or September this year. He had 
spoken to you about stealing, had he not? A. Oh yes.
Breaking into a lady’s house? A. Yes.
And he told you that you would be sent to a home if  you did not 
behave, did he not? A. Yes.
Now you were very worried about what your father had said to 
you, shouted at you, had he not? A. Yes.
And you were worried that he was going to put you in a home, 
were you not? A. Yes.
Now your mother gave you a be!t*ng after Uncle David told her 
about this incident with S o n r , uiu she not give you a hiding? A.
Yes.
And this was just before yju ran away, was it not? A. I don’t 
know.
A few weeks before you ran away or a few days? A. I don't really 
know when I ran away
You do not remember when you ran away? A. Yes.
You ran away in September this year, did you not? A. I think so. 
You think so. Do you remember going to see your mother in 
hospital? A. Yes.
Do you remember going with Greta and Sonia? A. Yes.
With the Welfare Officer, the lady Welfare Officer? A. Yes.
And that was after your mother had been sick, was it not? A. Yes, 
after Mum had the baby.
Yes, so it has been in the last two months, has it not? A. Yes.
Yes. Do you remember Sonia saying to your mother about Uncle 
David, do you remember Sonia saying something about Uncle 
David? A. No.
No? A. No.
You do not recall Sonia saying “I don’t know why I have to he’s 
never done anything to me”, did not Sonia say that? A. No, I
didn’t go with them to pick up.
Sorry? A. I didn’t go with them to pick up Sonia and them.
I am talking about at the hospital when you went to see your 
mother? A. No. She never said nothing like that.
Sonia did not say that? A. No, I never heard her.
In front, sorry? A. 1 never heard her.
You did not hear her. Now after you left home where did you 
stay? A. At Felicity Mill’s.
I see, and how many days did you spend there? A. I think a week.
A week? A. Or so.
And after that where did you go to? A. I went to the Refuge at 
Pankhurst.
%
Sole: "Hitting"and "Stealing"are 
assumed to be actions typifying 
undesirable behaviour. They are not 
regarded as symptoms o f a condition 
or as clues to a problem.
356. Q Now what happened to Greta and Sonia and Mary, where were 
they when you were at the Refuge? A. They were at the Refuge 
too.
357. Q. I see, and did Greta and Sonia and Mary share a room with you at 
the Refuge? A. Yes.
358. Q Did you say, sorry. At the Refuge you and your three sisters used 
to talk at night, did you not? A. Yes.
359. Q And sometimes you would wait on till you thought Mary had 
gone to sleep before you would talk, did you not? A. Yes.
360. Q. Do you remember saying one night after Mary had gone to sleep, 
to your two sisters, “if you follow what 1 'm doing then well get rid 
o f him". Do you remember saying that? A. No.
361. Q. Did you say that - sorry. 1 suggest to you that Mary - 1 withdraw 
that. I f I said to you Beverley that Mary had said that you said “1 f 
you follow what I'm doing then well get rid of him" what would 
you say? A. I never said it.
362. Q. You say Mary is telling a lie? A. 1 didn't say anything like that.
363. Q. Do you say Mary is telling a lie? A. No, I don't know what she's 
saying because I never said.
364. Q. You do not know whether Mary is telling the truth or telling a lie, 
do you? A. No.
365. Q. So what she could have said could have been the truth, could it 
not? A. No.
366. Q. So it is a lie is it? A. Yes, ‘cause I never said anything like that.
367. Q. You say Mary is telling a lie do you?
OBJECTION:
PROSECUTOR:
Well I object Your worship. My friend has put a hypothetical 
question to the Witness initially, if Mary said certain things.
MR. MANNERS: I do not press the question Your Worship.
368. Q. Did you go to school at Pankhurst? A. Yes.
369. Q What school did you go to there? A. Pankhurst High.
370. Q. I see, and who was your Form Master? Who was your Form 
Master this year? A. Mr......
371. Q. Mr. Carlton was it not? A. Yes.
372. Q. And he was away for a time this year, was he not? A. Yes.
373. Q Before August of this year, was he not, and you had a Relief 
Teacher, is that not right? A. 1 don't know.
374. Q You do not know. You do not remember do you? A. No.
375. Q. No. Did you have friends at this school? A. Yes.
376. Q Boyfriends and girlfriends? A. Yes.
377. Q. Did you know a boy called Steve Donne? A. Yes.
378. Q And that was this year, you knew Steve Donne this year, he was in 
your class was he not? A. Yes.
379. Q. Do you know what it means to have sex, do you know what that 
means? A. No, don’t know what it means.
380. Q. Do you know what it means to have sexual intercourse? A. 1....
381. Q Do you know what that means? A. 1 think so.




And did you have sexual intercourse with Steve Donne?
PROSECUTOR: I object Your Worship.
MR. MANNERS: I am going to press the question Your Worship.
PROSECUTOR: Your Worship evidence of prior sexual conduct as regards this 
Complainant is not admissible in proceedings of this type.
Beverly’s direct involvement ends here.
The following dialogue takes place 
with her present and she is stood down 
as the legal argument continues. She 
is brought back two months later.



















It would have to come within the...
Well with, with respect it does because the question is leading up 
to this in as much as the time framing. It does come within the 
period.
But that has not been, that has not...
Oh well perhaps...
Not in the form it is in at the moment.
I thought it was implicit.
No, it is just do you know Steve Donne, have you had sexual... 
...with Steve Donne.
Now this year at Pankhurst High School did you have sexual 
intercourse with Steve Donne? A......
I object Your Worship.
Well Your Worship I press the question.
Yes.
Once again. Sir, ...Section 409. Evidence of prior, or evidence 
which tends to ... indicate or suggest prior sexual behaviour. Sir, is 
not admissible, the only exemption to that rule, Sir, are basically - 
of consent. It may be considered by the Court in determining these 
matters. In respect of the matters now before the Court, Sir 
consent is not a defence. I suggest that there is a total prohibition 
in relation to evidence of this nature.
Well if 1 could take Your Worship to Section 409B. There are 
many, many exceptions to the admissibility rule. If I can take 
Your Worship first, to Section 409B sub-section (3) sub-section 
(0  where it is evidence given by the complainant in cross 
examination by or on behalf of the Accused person, being 
evidence given in answer to a question which may refer to sub­
section (5) be asked, and its probative value — any distress, 
humiliation or embarrassment which the Complainant might 
suffer as a result of the — we could then go to sub-section (5) 
where it says in prescibed sexual offence proceedings and that in 
my submission is such proceedings that we are presently dealing 
with, where the Court or Justice is satisifed that it has been 
disclosed or applied in the case for the Prosecution against the 
Accused person that the complainant has or may have during 
specified period or without reference to any period had sexual 
experience or lack of sexual experience of a general or specified 
nature or to have taken part or not taken part in sexual activity of 
a general or specified nature, and the Accused person might by 
unfairly prejudiced it the Complainant could not be cross 
examined by or on behalf of the Accused person in relation to the 
disclosure of implication. The Complainant may be so cross 
examined but only in relation to the experience or activity of the 
nature - so specified during the period, if any, so specified. Now 
the Prosecution in this case are relating a time frame that goes 
from sometime in January 1981 - sorry - 1983 up until August 
1985. The evidence of Beverley is not conclusive, it is very vague 
about incidents within that time frame.
The evidence of the doctor must be borne in mind too, in relation 
to what he said he discovered upon his examination. I am asking 
my questions in a particular way, where it is, or in such a fashion 
to minimise any distress, humiliation or otherwise. Which might
be occasioned to Beverley. But it would be my submission that 
Mr. Brent would be unfairly prejudiced if 1 could not put 
questions in relation to any sexual experience Beverley might 
have had prior to her examination of the doctor, which would fall 
into the category of those experiences which would result in the 
findings that the doctor gave before the Court last week. That 
would be quite, that will tie in with the Doctor’s evidence if the 
answers came out as I expect they will.
BENCH: How would he be unfair.
MR. MANNERS: Pardon?
BENCH: How would he be unfairly prejudiced?
MR. M ANN ERS: Well, Your Worship is hearing this, these proceedings by way of a 
committal. In doing that under, pursuant to Section 41 of the 
Justices Act, it is forcing you to hear the matters and then making, 
make a decision as Judge and Jury, the inferences being left 
following the Doctor’s examination that the results or his 
findings, could only have come in the absence of any other 
evidence from the allegations that have been made against my 
clients. 1 f I can show to Your Worship, that there are many other 
instances involving Beverley and Greta, that the Doctor’s findings 
could have come from, then that is a proper matter that Your 
Worship ought to take into consideration, when considering the 
matter as Judge and Jury, as Section 41 requires you to.
BENCH: Now, I put it to you this way that not in this particular case. This
is, is it not what the heart of the legislation goes to that if a female 
person complains that some person had sex with anybody on any 
number of occasions, is not relevant to.
MR. MANNERS: It is not relevant in that particular case, but it is relevant in this 
particular case.
BENCH: Why?
MR. MANNERS: In as much as the findings ofthe doctor implicate Mr. Brent at the 
present, if there are alternatives which would tend to not 
implicate those Doctors findings with Mr. Brent, then for that 
evidence not to come out, he would be severely prejudiced.
BENCH: How in this case does, other than the...
MR. MANNERS: Well perhaps...
BENCH: ...the medical findings disregarding what he was told by the
Complainants, how apart from his medical findings, is that 
different in this situation?
MR. MARSHALLWell perhaps I could continue with what I wish to say to Your 
Worship in the absence of the witness.
BENCH: Yes.
MR. MANNERS: Because then I can make it...
BENCH: Beverley, do you mind waiting outside for a moment while we 
have...A. Yes.
385. Q. Beverley when was the first time that you told anybody that your 
step-father had been interfering with you? A. That was down at 
Crowley.
386. Q. And who did you tell at Crowley? A. Rachel and Chloe.
387. Q. And they are your cousins? A. Yes.
388. Q. And did you tell your sisters? A. Yes.
389. Q. When did you tell your sisters? A. They already knew.
390. Q. When did they know? A. I don’t know.
391. Q. Was it at Crowley that they knew? A. I don’t know.
(Witness stood down) 13 12/85














































Or was it at Horsley? A. I think at Horsley.
So they did not know in Crowley, they knew in Horsley? A. Yes. 
And did you speak to, this is Sonia and Greta, is this right? A. Yes. 
And did you speak to either Sonia or Greta about what your 
step-father had been doing to you? A. Yes.
And where did you speak, was that at Horsley? A. Yes.
And what did you say to Greta? A. Well I just told her what was 
going on.
And what was going on? A. About what Uncle David was doing. 
And did you speak to Sonia? A. No she was speaking to me. 
And what about, you say you told Greta, now did you tell Sonia?
A. Yes.
And what did you tell Sonia? A. Just what happened.
And that was at Horsley? A. Yes.
And that was the first time you had spoken to Greta and Sonia 
about what was happening between you and Uncle David? A. Yes. 
In Crowley you shared a room, did you not? A. Yes.
Who did you share a room with? A. Sonia I think.
And do you remember Uncle David had two jobs at that time? A. 
Yes, he was on the, driving taxis and he was on the silos.
He worked at the silos during the day and drove the taxis at night, 
is that not right? A. Yes.
And when do you say he interfered with you at Crowley? A. At
night ‘cause he didn’t work every night.
And where was Sonia on this particular evening? A. I don't know. 
You were the only person at home, were you? A. No.
Who else was at home? A. Greta, Mary and Sonia.
And they were at home when your father first interfered with you?
A. Yes.
Your step-father that is? A. Yes.
Did you not scream out? A. Yes.
And the first time that you spoke to Sonia or Greta about this was 
two years later at Horsley? A. Yes.
Did you tell your mother? A. No.
Did you ever tell your mother? A. Yes 1 told Mum.
When did you tell your mother? A. 1 can’t remember when 1 told 
her, but we told Mum.
Did you say “we told mum”, who is “we”? A. Yes, Me. Sonia and 
Greta.
All three o f you at the same time? A. Yes.
And when was that? Was that at Horsley? A. Yes.
Was that in August this year, or last year, sorry. Just before you 
left? A. I think so.
You think so. Are you not sure? A. No.
What did you tell your mother? A. We just told Mum that Uncle 
David was being rude to us.
Being rude to you, is that all you said? A. Yes, that's what I said. 
And what did Sonia say? A. She told Mum that he w as being, that 
he was being rude to her.
What did Greta say? A. I don’t know.
You do not know? A. No.
And what did your mother say? A. Mum said no.
She said no? A. Yes.
Is that all she said? A. She said no it didn't happen.
Now you recall the day that you left Horsley, left home as it were, 
do you remember that? A. Yes.
When you packed some things to take to School? A. Yes.
Do you remember saying to your brother on that day, do you 
remember speaking to Stewart on that day? A. Yes.
Do you remember saying about your Uncle David “I ’m going to 
get rid o f him and 1 know just how to do it”, remember saying 
that? A. No, no.
Question markers plus “and "s create 
tone o f affirmation and dialogue.
Is this strange in patterns of 
disclosure?
This starts a new pattern o f  
questioning
l. The examiner repeats her uncertainty 
and elicits an “/ don't know"response
2. He asks her questions in terms o f 
remembering.
436. Q Do you say you did not say it? A. Yes.
437. Q When you were at Crowley your mother usually put you to bed 
did she not? A. Yes.
438. Q And as she put you to bed she usually stayed in the house, did she 
not? A. Sometimes she used to, she would go down and see Aunty 
Margaret for a while.
3 He uses the negative statement as a 
question.
439. Q But that was only two houses away, was it not? A. No.
440. Q And she would not go down and see your Aunty Margaret very 
often at night, would she, after you had gone to bed? A. Not very 
often.
4. He does not acknowledge her 
modification
441. Q Not very often. Your Uncle David did he say anything to you on 
any o f the occasions that he interfered with you, do you recall that 
he said anything to you? A. Yes he said something but I don't 
remember.
442. Q Do you recall him saying "I'm  teaching you to do, what to do to 
please men when you grow up?" A. Yes.
443. Q Do you remember when he said that? A. Yes.
444. Q When? A. We were sitting on the lounge.
445. Q Was that at Crowley or Horsley? A. Horsley.
446. Q That was at Horsley. That was the only thing he said to you? A.
Yes.
5. The time frame is not dear.
447. Q Either at Crowley or at Horsley? A. No he said something else too.
448. Q. What else did he say? A. He said something about if I tell anyone 
I'll get into trouble.
449. Q Was that at Crowley or at Horsley? A. Horsley.
450. Q So he did not say anything to you at Crowley? A. No.
451. Q Did you see your Uncle David interfering with Greta? A. Yes.
452. Q What did you see? A. 1 saw Uncle David on Greta.
453. Q Sorry? A. I saw Uncle David on Greta.
454. Q On top of Greta? A. Yes.
455. Q And when was this? A. It was in Horsley when I went to tell him 
that Sonia was sick.
456. Q. And it was in his bedroom was it? A. Yes.
457. Q Do you remember what time of the year this was at? A. No.
458. Q Do you remember whether it was winter or summer? A. No.
459. Q Do you remember whether it was 1985? A. Yes.
460. Q It was in 1985. Do you remember if it was shortly before you left 
Horsley or was it a long time before you left Horsley? A. I can’t 
remember.
461. Q. Did you speak to Greta after this incident? A. No. 6 He uses formal phrasing and
462. Q Greta did not say anything to your mother in your presence about 
this particular incident, did she? A. No.
expression.
463. Q And you did not tell your mother, you did not tell your mother 
specifically or in detail what you say Uncle David had been doing 
to you, did you? A. No, not specific. 7. Propositions are embedded in the
464. Q Do you remember being at the Pankhurst Youth Refuge? A. Yes. question.
465. Q With your Aunt Margaret? A. Yes.
466. Q. And do you remember Greta saying “We’re not allowed to talk 
about i t”, referring to your Uncle David? A. Yes.
467. Q Do you remember Sonia saying that he has done nothing to me?
A. Yes.
468. Q Do you remember then saying to Sonia “Shut up"? A. No.
469. Q. Do you remember telling Sonia and Greta “Just follow me and 111 
get you out of this mess"? A. No.
470. Q. You visited your mother in hospital with your Aunty Grace, did 
you not? A. Yes.
471. Q. Do you remember Sonia saying to your mother “I don’t know 
what I ’m doing mixed up in this", or words to that effect? A. Yes.
472. Q. It is correct to say that Sonia looks up to you, follows your 
example, does she not? A. Yes.
8. He characterises her behaviour as 
manipulative.
473. Q. And you are a stronger girl than Sonia? A. Yes.
474. Q. You are cleverer, more clever than Sonia? A. Yes.
475 Q. 
476. Q.
And she accepts what you say, is that not right? A. Yes. ,
Did you go swimming with Sonia one day at the river near 
Horsley? Last year? A. No I don’t remember. '
477. Q. With Nick Curtis? A. No we never went swimming.
478. Q. You do not remember Sonia taking her clothes off? A. No.
(Witness retired and excused)
Appendix 5
Testing profile for James









Q No* A -  H  J - L
/ 5 \  A i  J *  o £
ö x  j t  j ä  ____
Total Sense 
6 A
2. SINGLE ELEMENT CHANGE
O No* ____ Omission









3. MULTIPLE ELEMENT CHANGE
O Nos - L  k
A . ___________
©





Addition A Sense 
\ s iSubstitution \ SemanticDislocation
m I
Transposition \ No Sense 
\ \ \
v s / .Reconstruction
4. NIL REPRODUCTION
O NOS 2  _ 5 _  f L  ) 
/ ^ N  A *  J i  J O -  f







O Nos _A—  J L  .3.
( ^ )  -**• —






3. MULTIPLE ELEMENT CHANGE
O Nos
4. NIL REPRODUCTION
O m iss ion
A d d it io n
Substitution






































------  ------  -------
2. SINGLE ELEMENT CHANGE
O Nos ^  H »  _____ Omission \
Yes No The Sense
l ASyntacticOisloction
w A Sense
l «ZC P ------- Addition
Substitution V SemanticDislocation w No Sense
T rsnsposition
3. MULTIPLE ELEMENT CHANGE 
O Nos ^  ^
< S > ------------






Addition VV A Sense
VV voZSubstitution -UVf \ W SemanticDislocation \ \ vv
Transposition l No Sense
W KOlReconstruction
4. NIL REPRODUCTION
0  Nos J __  I
( 1 * \  ± -  * -  J k - \
No Sense
o v \  tsr »«K i ©
NOTES:












2. SINGLE ELEMENT CHANGE
O Nos _____ _____  ____
3. MULTIPLE ELEMENT CHANGE














































O Nos _____ _____ _
Total Sense
2. SINGLE ELEMENT CHANGE








Ves No The Sense
A Sense
No Sense
3. MULTIPLE ELEMENT CHANGE



























u u e s i i o n  t y p e  -  c o u n s e l l o r
KEY






"T T T ] Multiple element k  ir ir ir


















I I The sense '
I I A sense
I ■ ' ■■ 1 No sense










Q u e s t io n  ty p e  — Teacher
KEY










i n r w i r
# # # #
# # # #e
CD(O
• • • • «






















Q u e s tio n  ty p e  — Random Lawyer
KEY




' : .V' ■ . ;•
«#«#«## ######• «##»#»# li JJ tu,f ' .











W W  W W  



























Question type — Selective Lawyer
► amt
jon tw w w w i
t f f t t i i
*##*##
»«####
m w ;• • • • • • •
15y 14y 13y 12y 11y 10y 9y 8y 7y 6y
KEY






0)</> c<t> w0)-c K
m n r  
k ir i r i r  


















T h e  sense  
A sense  
N o  sen se
A r i e  o»er 0 1 - 1 1 1  n o c M
Appendix 8
Tables of testing programme responses
SELECTIVE LAWYER
AGE 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6
/ TOTAL REPRO D UCTIO N 10 2 10 0 0 17 12 15 8 50
T H E  SEN SE < SINGLE ELEM ENT 0 3 10 2 0 3 2 2 3 0
* M ULTIPLE ELEM ENT 2 2 13 2 0 0 2 3 3 0
A SEN SE
i SINGLE ELEM ENT 5 5 0 5 3 5 0 0 5 7
< M ULTIPLE ELEM ENT 27 27 40 52 15 27 37 27 20 23
( SINGLE ELEM ENT 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 3
NO SEN SE J M ULTIPLE ELEM ENT 22 12 10 12 7 13 30 5 17 10
" NIL REPRODUCTION 34 61 17 25 75 35 17 46 44 7
COUNSELLOR
AGE 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6
/ TOTAL REPRODUCTION 100 100 93 100 93 100 100 100 87 100
T H E  SEN SE |  SINGLE ELEM ENT 0 0 7 0 7 0 0 0 7 0
* M ULTIPLE ELEMENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
A SEN SE
< SINGLE ELEMENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
\ M ULTIPLE ELEMENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
/ SINGLE ELEMENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
NO SEN SE < M ULTIPLE ELEMENT 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
* NIL REPRODUCTION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0
TEACHER
AGE 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6
,  TOTAL REPRODUCTION 60 66 66 87 59 79 73 100 73 73
T H E  SEN SE |  SINGLE ELEMENT 13 13 13 7 7 7 7 0 0 20
1 M ULTIPLE ELEMENT 0 7 7 6 7 0 0 0 7 0
A SEN SE
( SINGLE ELEMENT 13 7 0 0 0 7 7 0 13 7
1 M ULTIPLE ELEMENT 7 0 0 0 27 0 6 0 7 0
i  SINGLE ELEMENT 0 7 7 0 0 7 7 0 0 0
NO SEN SE j M ULTIPLE ELEMENT 7 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 NIL REPRODUCTION 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
RANDOM LAWYER
AGE 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6
/ TOTAL REPRODUCTION 65 50 70 72 48 37 44 42 43 80
T H E  SEN SE J SINGLE ELEMENT 3 5 12 8 2 10 7 10 8 10
* M ULTIPLE ELEMENT 3 0 3 0 2 3 0 3 0 0
A SEN SE
j  SINGLE ELEMENT 0 12 0 2 0 3 7 1 0 10
l M ULTIPLE ELEMENT 10 15 8 10 12 17 20 17 2 0
/  SINGLE ELEMENT 0 2 0 2 2 5 2 0 0 0
N O  SEN SE ] M ULTIPLE ELEMENT 7 8 2 3 8 13 10 7 4 0
* NIL REPRODUCTION 12 8 5 3 26 12 10 20 43 0
PERCENTAGE WHICH PRESERVED THE SENSE 
OF THE ORIGINAL QUESTIONS
AGE C O U N SE L L O R T E A C H E R R A N D O M SELECTIVE
L A W Y E R LAWYER
15 100 73 71 12
14 100 86 55 7
13 100 86 85 33
12 100 100 80 4
11 100 73 52 0
10 100 86 50 20
9 100 80 51 16
8 100 100 55 20
7 94 80 51 14
6 100 93 90 50
PERCENTAGE WHICH PRESERVED NO SENSE
OF THE ORIGINAL QUESTION
AGE C O U N SE L L O R TE A C H E R R A N D O M SELECTIVE
LA W YER LAWYER
15 0 7 19 56
14 0 7 18 73
13 0 14 7 27
12 0 0 8 39
11 0 0 36 82
10 0 7 30 48
9 0 7 22 47
8 0 0 27 53
7 6 0 47 61
6 0 0 0 20
Appendix 9
Test question responses for Matthew
I- At the time-fhot this occurred you^roro seven 
years old, is that right?
SELECTIVE LAWYER QUESTIONS
AVt *Hs€-
And the park that you were-playing in, is tbat-next
door to the pre-school that you went to1
3. And where is the trampoline in respect to where 
you first met Mrs Brown here, do you onderctand 
w h at I am saying?
VWk-
4. H ad you been going to the pre-school for some 
years before?
5. Right and-when Mrs Brown approached you ,4«Vevv » j
you re member what was said between herself and
vou.
6. And how long did you stay on the bike -far whttet- 
he was helping you ride it?
uewr
7. Alright, wall when you stopped ridingShe bike, 
w hat did y o u do than, whew you stopped riding, 
what was the next thing m at happened? *
8. H ow do you remembe r g iving w m  evidence 
■aWm  after you had go ne and seen Jenny, 1 think it 
w a s . a nd to ld her you the n went back to the park 
and you  -saw Mrs Brown near a tree?
U»V|A
9. Right *ow* after you had first - gene to the
« .. à\é «\ew .
Principal s office you rem ember whether it was-on»
the day that you made the statement, or the next 
daŷ
10. Well, d o  you know that you ’re going to tell me 
s o me thing that’s happened , that’s why youVe been 
o cked to oome here, do you know the*?
11. Those stories are what you think about in your 
head?
12. And you make up stories about what other 
people have done with you, is that right?
13. When you eoy you got into trouble lor telling 
stories what sort o f trouble did you get?
14. A nd then o not her time later after youVe hod the 
s m acks, maybe weeks, maybe months, maybe years 
•fitter, you Ve toid other stories-that are untrue and  
•yo u've got more smacks from Mammy and P addy?
15.4 understand that but the second timeyougot the 
sm acks for telling lies the second-time , i t didn't step 
you telling lies did-it? 
utat*.
16. But you told the Principal e arlier before lunch 
that your cat was pulled b^ok off the lounge do you 
remember, pulled back from the lounge?
(C«M<
17. Weil the first-time that your sister pulled your
dv i iu «A (k
hair is the same time that ye ur sister punched
against you. agaiaa you is that right?
'HsA.'V
18. Did you have a look to see whether there was any 
problem or damage or injury^to it?*
19. Did you see her do anything else, did she do 
anything else?
“1  -VoVA
20.1 m sorry, you mrght not understand me, the first 
time and then it's finished, how long until-the oent 
time that your siste r pulled your hafr?
RANDOM LAWYER QUESTIONS
1. That is stories that are untrue?
2. So the first time yoo- got s m acked for -telling 
sto ries you still told stories and got smacked agairii 
Is that right? So -it- didn't make any difference to  
whether or not you to ld any stories did it?
82
3. The third time it was dark, was it?
4. And you ’ve been for telling lies in Loughnan 
Street?
5. Again”* •
6. Let me see if+Ve got it right? You've told stories 
HnfiA
which are untrue?
7. He has got into trouble for telling lies at 
Loughnan Street?
8. -Mas the re batn sometimes whe n Mummy and 
Paddy have got the three of you togethe r and told 
■yau tha t you arc not allowed to tt ll lias? Hat, that 
♦vtr happened?
9. -Not only hove you been told that it is bad but 
whe n you have told lies you’ve been stnookcd?
10. When was that?
11. And w hilst she was pushing you around what 
was your friend doing?
12. Now the »nvclopc .- l 'M withd raw that« th< park 
■that'-you wore In. has It-got a fence around it?
13. Any climbing equipment?
14. Right now you say that you had your costume 
that day, is that right?
15. And what sort of costume was it?
16. When did you first see the envelope?
17. Right and you spoke to Mrs Brown there, is that 
right?
18. Yes'*
19. And has the park got a path through it?
20. Mow how far was the trampoline from you when 
you wars first helped on the  bike by Mrs Brown?
COUNSELLOR QUESTIONS
1. Did it only happen once (one time).*
2. Who did it?
3. Was anyone else there?
4. Were you scared?
5. Did you tell your Mum?
TEACHER QUESTIONS
1. What did you do over the weekend. Jodie0 (S  B 
insert name)
2. Which subject do you like best at school?
3. Who is your favourite teacher?
4. When did you start feeling ill, before break fast or 
afterwards?
5. How do you make the dog sit up and beg?
83
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